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Abstract 
 
This thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we 
ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to 
know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In 
chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the 
Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 
2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ involve a free relative 
complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that 
knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism 
about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of 
propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality 
problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended 
inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers 
why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) 
that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking 
and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-
operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion 
that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for 
the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which 
consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account 
both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the 
Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of 
ability to answer the question of how to do it.
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 When we consider questions in philosophy we often find ourselves answering two 
questions at the same time: a first-order question about some philosophical issue and a 
second-order methodological question about how to resolve this issue. To answer a 
question like what are numbers?1 we would need to first ask a series of metaphilosophical 
questions. For starters: what does it mean to ask ‘what are numbers?’?. The recent debate about 
the nature of knowledge-how provides a good example of how first-order philosophical 
questions interact with methodological issues. This debate encompasses first-order, and 
methodological disputes. On the one hand, we have Intellectualist views of knowledge-how, 
which argue that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge on the basis of 
primarily linguistic evidence. And on the other hand, we have Anti-Intellectualist views of 
knowledge-how, which argue that knowledge-how is not a species of propositional 
knowledge on the basis of primarily non-linguistic evidence. 
 
 This thesis investigates two questions: the first-order question what is the correct 
account of knowledge-how? and the methodological question how ought we to balance linguistic and 
philosophical considerations in understanding the nature of knowledge-how?. On both questions, my 
approach is conciliatory. At the metaphilosophical level, I will be arguing for a framework 
that allows us to bring philosophical and linguistic considerations together in our 
understanding of knowledge-how. I advocate for a picture on which the relationship 
between linguistics and philosophy is a two way street: philosophical considerations can 
feed into our account of the best semantics for natural language sentences, and linguistic 
considerations constrain the accounts of phenomena which are picked out by sentences of 
natural language. And at the first-order, I will be arguing for a compromise position 
between the standard versions of Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism, according to 
which knowledge-how is both a kind of ability, and a relation to a question. According to 
                                                            
1 I will use ‘question’ to pick out a metaphysical category – questions – and ‘interrogative’ to pick 
out a linguistic category – sentences and phrases in the interrogative mood. These should not be 
confused with the speech act of asking a question. I will use wh-phrases with single quotes to refer 
to interrogative phrases, and italics with question marks to refer to the questions that are expressed 
by interrogative phrases. On this convention the interrogative phrase ‘what’s for dinner?’ 
expresses the question what’s for dinner?. I will occasionally use ‘Wh-F?’ and ‘ ‘Wh-F?’ ’ as variables 
for questions and interrogative phrases. 
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what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in 
a certain kind of ability to activate knowledge of the answers to a question. 
 
 I will address these questions from a number of different directions, but there are 
three central themes to this thesis. 
 
 The first theme is that the best — perhaps the only — way to engage with 
metaphilosophical questions is by doing a lot of first-order philosophy. When I started to 
think about the connection between knowledge-how and metaphilosophical issues, I 
thought that it would be possible to first resolve the metaphilosophical issues about the 
nature of philosophical inquiry, and with those issues safely resolved take on the first-
order questions about the nature of knowledge-how equipped with the right philosophical 
tools.2 Over time, I came to realise that it is rather difficult to get traction on the 
metaphilosophical questions without thinking through particular philosophical issues in 
considerable detail, meaning that making claims about philosophical methodology requires 
a correspondingly broad overview of first-order philosophy. My approach in this thesis 
will be to start with first-order philosophical questions that have metaphilosophical 
significance. Once I’ve made some progress on these first-order issues, I will try to draw 
out some of the metaphilosophical implications. 
 
 The second theme is that the knowledge-how debate has neglected epistemic 
questions about the nature of knowledge-how. Putting to one side the question of whether 
knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge I take it that knowledge-how is 
interesting qua species of knowledge (Hawley 2003: 19). One might have thought that we 
can only get straight on the epistemic properties of knowledge-how once we’ve settled the 
question of whether knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. I think that 
this attitude is mistaken: there are a great many questions about the properties of 
knowledge-how that are orthogonal to the issue of whether it has a propositional or non-
propositional object. For example, we can consider the question of why knowledge-how is 
a species of knowledge (Setiya, 2008, p. 407, 2012, pp. 304–5) independently of the 
question of what kind of knowledge it is. Part 2 of this thesis is an extended enquiry into 
the epistemological properties of knowledge-how, which — following (Craig 1990) — 
                                                            
2 (Habgood-Coote, 2013). 
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considers what the point of having a concept of knowledge-how is and what different 
pictures of its point can tell us about the role of knowledge-how in the mental economy.  
 
 The third thought is that to the extent that we have an ordinary concept of 
knowledge-how, it is messy, contradictory, and context-sensitive in a way that makes it 
unsuitable for serious philosophical theorising. Consider the attitudes of ordinary speakers 
toward the relation between knowledge-how and ability. Almost without exception, when 
I describe my academic work to non-philosophers, they will make the suggestion that 
knowing how to do something is just being able to do that thing — or some related 
suggestion involving muscle memory, skill, or some kind of bodily knowledge. However, 
when we consider the relation between knowledge-how and ability more carefully, it 
becomes clear that there are many cases in which we pre-theoretically judge that it is 
possible to have knowledge-how without ability, or ability without knowledge-how. Our 
intuitions about the intension and extension of knowledge-how appear to be in conflict. 
 
 Another indication of the messiness of the concept of knowledge-how comes from 
cross-linguistic evidence concerning the grammatical constructions used to pick out this 
kind of knowledge. A brief survey shows that the translations for the English phrase ’S 
knows how to V’3 involve importantly different constructions. Here is a representative 
(but certainly not exhaustive) survey: 
 
(1) Ruth knows how to swim (English) 
(2) Ruth sait nager (French) 
(3) Ruth sabe nadar (Portuguese) 
(4) Рут умеет плавать (Rut umeyet plavat’) (Russian) 
(5)  (lau6 si1 wui5 jau4 wing6) (Cantonese) 
(6) Ruth tietää miten uida/Ruth osaa uida (Finnish) 
(7) Ruth yüzmeyi biliyor (Turkish) 
(8) Ruth kann schwimmen (German)4 
(9) Ruth kan svømme (Danish) 
                                                            
3 Throughout ’S’ will denote an agent, and ‘V’ an activity. 
4 Stanley claims that German has no translation for ’S knows how to V’, because it doesn’t allow 
infinitives in embedded questions (Stanley, 2011b, p. 132). Ditter points out that having the same 
syntactic properties is an implausible test for adequate translation (Ditter, 2016, pp. 8–9). 
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(10) I Ruth kseri kolimbi (Modern Greek) 
 
 To ascribe knowledge-how English (1) employs the embedded question 
construction with the same verb used to ascribe propositional knowledge. Romance 
languages like French (2) and Portuguese (3) employ an infinitival construction with no 
question-word, but the same verb (Rumfitt, 2003, pp. 161–3). By contrast, Russian (4) 
employs different verbs to pick out knowledge-how and knowledge-that and the verb for 
practical knowledge (umeyet/умеет) can only take an infinitival complement with no 
question-word (Rumfitt, 2003, pp. 164–5; Ditter, 2016, pp. 5–6). We find the same pattern 
in Cantonese (5), which employs no question word in the knowledge-how construction, 
and uses different verbs —  (wui5) and  ( jing6 sik1) for know-how and know-that, 
which correspond to connaître and savoir in French (Stanley, 2011c, p. 233). Interestingly 
Finnish (6) allows both the embedded question construction and the infinitival 
construction, but uses different verbs for each construction (tietää/osaa) (Stanley, 2011b, p. 
137). Turkish (7) uses the propositional knowledge verb (bilmek), but combines this with a 
finite verb with no question-word (Ditter, 2016, pp. 6–7). German (8) (Ditter, 2016, p. 7) 
and Danish (9) uses a construction for ascribing knowledge-how which involves a verb 
which can also mean ‘can’ (können and kan respectively). Modern Greek employs various 
constructions for ascribing knowledge-how, including a construction involving a noun 
phrase with no question word which literally means ‘Ruth knows swimming’ (10) 
(Douskos, 2013, p. 2329) (for examples of this construction in English, see (Glick, 2012, 
pp. 125–6)).  I don’t want to draw any very grand conclusions out of this lightning survey, 
except to point out that from a linguistic point of view, things are just really messy.  
 
 Rather than assuming that we have a clear concept of knowledge-how already in 
our language, I will make the case that our ordinary concept of knowledge-how, and our 
ordinary language constructions for picking out knowledge-how are in important ways 
flawed and unsuitable for systematic philosophical theorising. The account of knowledge 
how which I develop in chapters 6 and 7 can be understood as an ameliorative proposal 
giving us a way to change our concept of knowledge-how in order to facilitate clearer 
thinking and talking about practical knowledge.5 
 
                                                            
5 On the ameliorative project, see (Haslanger, 1999, 2000, 2006) and on conceptual engineering, 
see (Cappelen, forthcoming; Burgess & Plunkett, 2013a, 2013b). 
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 Looking forward, here’s a plan of the structure of this thesis.  
 
 Part 1 considers a range of linguistic arguments for various views about the nature 
of knowledge-how. The methodological line will be conciliatory: I will argue that linguistic 
evidence concerning the semantics of ‘knows how’ ascriptions is relevant for philosophical 
debates about the nature of knowledge-how, but that we cannot read a complete account 
of knowledge-how off of the semantics offered by contemporary linguistics, and that 
linguistic considerations do not necessarily overrule philosophical considerations. Chapter 
1 sets out the context of this debate, focusing on the linguistic case for Intellectualism. I 
distinguish a number of versions of the linguistic argument for Intellectualism, and argue 
that the interesting role of the linguistic evidence in this debate is in telling us which 
accounts of the nature of knowledge-how can be semantically implemented. Chapter 2 
applies the idea of semantic implementability to Objectualist accounts of knowledge-how 
(Bengson & Moffett, 2011a) showing that these accounts are not semantically 
implementable because a free relative semantics for ‘S knows how to V’ is not linguistically 
plausible. Chapter 3 argues that there is an in-principle challenge to reading an 
Intellectualist account of the nature of knowledge-how off of the semantics for ‘knows 
how’ constructions in English, since the standard semantics does not offer an account of 
the generality of the propositions involved in knowledge-how. I argue that this leads to a 
kind of generality problem for Intellectualism, consider a number of ways to resolve this 
problem, and argue that they are unsatisfactory.  
 
 Part 2 asks what the point of having a concept of knowledge-how is and what the 
function of the concept can tell us about the normative properties of knowledge-how. 
Chapter 4 lays out Craig’s (1990) genealogical framework for thinking about the function 
of the concept of knowledge. I isolate two proposals about the function of our concept of 
knowledge-how, with two corresponding norms. The first proposal is that the function of 
the concept of knowledge-how is to allow us to pool practical skills (Craig, 1990, Chapter 
17), by picking out a state is the norm on teaching (Buckwalter & Turri, 2014). The 
second is that the function of the concept of knowledge-how is to allow us to engage in 
responsible practices of co-operation, by picking out a state that is the norm on intending. 
Chapter 5 criticises the first proposal, arguing that a know-how norm on teaching is 
implausible. Chapter 6 makes the case for the second proposal, arguing that knowledge-
how is the norm on intending. 
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 Part 3 brings linguistic and philosophical considerations together. Chapter 7 argues 
that the conflict between linguistic and philosophical evidence concerning knowledge-how 
has been overstated and that there is a way to account for both kinds of evidence by 
claiming that knowledge-how is a certain kind of capacity to answer a question, which I 
call the Interrogative Capacity view. 
 
 I cannot hope to address all of the topics in the knowledge-how debate, so some 
questions will inevitably be put to one side: 
 
• Whether there is a legitimate notion of a practical mode of presentation (Stanley, 
2011b, Chapter 4; Zardini, 2013; Glick, 2015; Pavese, 2015b); 
• Whether there is a species of ability which co-ordinates with knowledge-how 
(Rosefeldt, 2004; Noë, 2005; Fantl, 2008; Lihoreau, 2008; Glick, 2012; Carter & 
Czarnecki, 2016); 
• How knowledge-how connects to skill (Stanley & Krakauer, 2013; Dreyfus, 2014; 
Pavese, 2016a, 2016b; Stanley & Williamson, 2016); 
• What the epistemic properties of knowledge-how are (Poston 2009; 2016; Cath 
2015; Carter and Pritchard 2015a; 2015b; Brownstein and Michaelson 2016); 
• What the relationship between knowledge-how and agents’ knowledge is (Setiya, 
2008, 2009, 2012; Small, 2012; Hornsby, 2013); 
• What empirical evidence from psychology and cognitive science can tell us about 
the nature of knowledge-how (Wallis 2008; Toribio 2008; Adams 2009; Stanley 
2011a; Glick 2011; Stanley and Krakauer 2013; Gregory et al. 2016). 
 7 
Part 1: Linguistic Evidence 
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Chapter 1: Linguistic Arguments about Knowledge-How 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, I untangle various linguistic arguments that have been used in the 
knowledge-how debate, and argue for a conciliatory attitude about the significance of 
linguistic evidence. I argue that linguistic arguments are a legitimate source of evidence 
about the nature of knowledge-how, but maintain that there might be non-linguistic 
reasons to prefer an account of knowledge-how that is not consistent with the best theories 
of contemporary linguistics. In §1, I set out the main contours of the debate about the 
nature of knowledge-how. In §2 I discuss Ryle’s contribution to this debate, before in §3 
considering some linguistic problems for the Ryle-inspired ‘Standard View’ of knowledge-
how. In §4, I dive into Stanley and Williamson’s linguistic case for Intellectualism, using 
their discussion as a jumping off point for a wider discussion of the significance of 
linguistic evidence in this debate. 
 
1. Set-up of the Rylean Debate 
 
 The distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how seems like an 
important feature of our folk epistemological framework. It is natural to trace back certain 
kinds of failing to the lack of one or other kind of knowledge. When someone has read all 
of the books she can get about running, but still struggles to pace herself or come up with a 
sensible training plan, she lacks a kind of practical grasp of running. When an experienced 
runner produces excellent results, but can’t say anything about how they train, or what 
rules they are following while they are running, she lacks a certain kind of theoretical 
grasp of running. We might say that the former runner has a great deal of factual 
knowledge, but doesn’t know how to run; whereas the latter runner knows how to run, but 
cannot convert this knowledge into informative factual knowledge. 
 
 That our ordinary use of ‘knows how’ and ‘knows that’ seem to mark a distinction 
between a practical and a theoretical grasp on some subject matter suggests that there is a 
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theoretically important distinction between knowing that something is the case, and 
knowing how to do something. Let’s call this claim Anti-Intellectualism:6 
 
     Anti-Intellectualism: knowledge-how is distinct from knowledge-that.  
 
 Anti-Intellectualism is true if there are some states of knowledge-how that are not 
states of knowledge-that, and there are some states of knowledge-that which are not states 
of knowledge-how. Anti-Intellectualism would be true if all states of knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that were disjoint — so that no state of knowledge-how was a state of 
knowledge-that and vice versa — but it does not rule out the possibility of there being 
states which are both knowledge-how and knowledge-that,7 nor does it rule out the 
possibility that knowledge-how relies on various pieces of knowledge-that (Hornsby, 2005, 
2011; Wiggins, 2012, pp. 115–6). Even if the two kinds of knowledge are disjoint, any 
reasonable Anti-intellectualist will admit that both are species of knowledge, meaning that 
both share whatever properties are essential to knowledge. 
 
 Anti-Intellectualism is a thesis about the relation between knowledge-that and 
knowledge-how, and not a theory of knowledge-how. In itself it does not tell us what the 
extension of these two species of knowledge are, or what their properties are. Anti-
Intellectualism can be combined with a number of different accounts of the nature of 
knowledge-how: 
 
 Abilityism: S knows how to V iff S is able to V.8 
 Actism: S knows how to V iff S knows V-ing.9 
 Objectualism: S knows how to V iff S knows O, and O is F.10 
 Predicativism: S knows how to V iff S knows x is P, and P is F.11  
 
                                                            
6 On the history of the distinction between Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism, see (Kremer, 
forthcoming). 
7 An analogy: courage and kindness are distinct, but certain character traits — such as a 
disposition to care for someone with severe mental illness — can make a person both courageous 
and kind. 
8 (Rosefeldt, 2004; Glick, 2012). 
9 (Carr, 1979, 1981; Hornsby, 2011; Wiggins, 2012). 
10 (Michaelson, MS; Bengson & Moffett, 2011a). Bengson and Moffett call their view Non-
propositional Intellectualism, but their terminology is rather different from mine (see footnote 26). 
11 (Brogaard, 2011). 
 10 
 (Here and below, I’ll use F as a placeholder for property standing for an account of 
the distinctive kind of activity, proposition, object and so on which is employed in the 
analysis of knowledge-how or knowledge-that.) 
 
 Anti-Intellectualism is falsified if all cases of knowledge-how are cases of knowledge-
that, or if all cases of knowledge-that are cases of knowledge-how. Lets call the first view 
Intellectualism, and the second view Practicalism12: 
 
  Intellectualism: Knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that 
  Practicalism: Knowledge-that is a species of knowledge-how 
 
 Like Anti-Intellectualism, both Intellectualism and Practicalism are claims about the 
relation between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, and not accounts of the nature of 
knowledge-how. However, in both cases commitment to the thesis about the relation 
between the two kinds of knowledge will likely be driven by theories of knowledge-that 
and knowledge-how respectively. Practicalism is likely to be motivated by an analysis of 
knowledge-that as a kind of ability (Hartland-Swann 1956; Roland 1958; Hetherington 
2011). Let’s call this kind of account of knowledge-that Praxism: 
 
 Praxism: S knows that p iff S knows how to V and V is F. 
 
 Similarly, the Intellectualist’s claim that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-
that is likely to be motivated by a specific propositional account of knowledge-how 
(Stanley & Williamson, 2001; Stanley, 2011b). Let’s call this claim Propositionalism: 
 
 Propositionalism: S knows how to V iff S knows that p, and Fp. 
 
 One central concern of this chapter will be whether one can establish Intellectualism 
via linguistic support for Propositionalism.13 
                                                            
12 I take the term ‘Practicalism’ from (Hetherington, 2011). 
13 In the X-first terminology, Intellectualism is a knowledge-that-first theory, and Practicalism is a 
knowledge-how-first theory. It is possible to endorse these claims of explanatory priority without 
endorsing the species-genera claims. Ryle claims that “knowledge-how is a concept logically prior 
to the concept of knowledge-that,” (1945, pp. 4–5), but does not endorse Practicalism. Insofar as 
virtue epistemologists appeal to the notion of competence analysing the notion of propositional 
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2 Ryle’s Discussion of Knowledge-How 
 
 Contemporary discussions of knowledge-how have their source in Ryle’s mid-
century discussions (Ryle 1945; 1949/2009).14 Ryle employs the distinction between 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that as a tool in his wider polemic against dualism. Ryle’s 
Dualist splits the life of an agent into two: her outer physical life, and her inner mental life, 
and claims that behaviours inherit mental predicates from internal mental acts.15 In these 
two essays Ryle’s target is the application of dualism to intelligence, which he calls 
Intellectualism. The Intellectualist claims that intelligent action can be divided into inner 
acts of thought, and physical behaviours, and claims that the intelligence of both our 
mental and practical activities is due to the consideration of appropriate propositions 
(Ryle, 1945, p. 1, 2009b, pp. 15–16). On this view, if we apply an adverb of (positive) 
intelligence to someone’s action — for example saying that an agent acted cleverly, 
sensibly, or wittily — this adverb picks out some private, silent, and internal act of 
considering an appropriate proposition.16 Ryle’s use of ‘Intellectualist’ differs from the use 
set out in the previous section, so I will call this view Rylean Intellectualism. Ryle’s aim in 
these papers is to upset the Rylean Intellectualist’s paradigm for understanding intelligence 
and to put forward an alternative picture of intelligence adverbs, according to which they 
pick out a procedure or manner of those acts (1945, p. 3, 2009b, p. 20) stemming from a 
dispositional state (1945, p. 3, 2009b, pp. 33–9).17 
 
 The point of appealing to the knowledge-how in this dialectic is to use our everyday 
inclination toward Anti-Intellectualism (in the sense of §1) as a tool against the Rylean 
Intellectualist: 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
knowledge, we might think they also endorse a knowledge-how-first epistemology. This worry is 
distinct from the concern that virtue epistemologists need to construe the relevant kind of 
competence as a competence to know that p (Kelp, forthcoming; Millar, 2009; Miracchi, 2015; 
Pavese, 2016a, pp. 642–3), which concerns whether virtue epistemology can avoid being a 
knowledge-that-first theory. 
14 Page references to The Concept of Mind are to the 2009 edition. 
15 (Small, forthcoming; Hornsby, 2011). 
16 It’s not obvious what the Rylean Intellectualist thinks about negative intelligence adverbs, such 
as ‘stupidly’, ‘recklessly’, or ‘dully’. Do these acts involve considering the wrong proposition or 
failing to consider any proposition? 
17 There is some controversy about whether this view is behaviourist, see (Stanley, 2011b, Chapter 
1). It is true that Ryle understands various mental states in terms of dispositions. However, these 
dispositions are to actions, not to behaviours described in non-mental terms, meaning that this view 
is not the Skinner-Watson style of behaviourism, but is rather closer to the kind of Aristotelian 
behaviourism proposed by (Stout, 2006). 
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Philosophers have not done justice to the distinction which is quite familiar to us all 
between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do things. In their 
theories of knowledge they concentrate on the discovery of truths or facts, and they 
either ignore the discovery of ways and methods of doing things or else they try to 
reduce it to the discovery of facts. They assume that intelligence equates with the 
contemplation of propositions and is exhausted in this contemplation (Ryle, 1945, 
p. 4) 
 
  Ryle’s thought seems to be that philosophers have gone along with Rylean 
Intellectualism by focusing on the role of knowledge-that in producing intelligent acts, 
thereby neglecting the role of knowledge-how in producing intelligent acts. Knowledge-
how is not a natural fit for the Rylean Intellectualist’s picture of intelligence, in part 
because the exercise of knowledge-how does not seem to involve the contemplation of 
propositions, and in part because the possession of knowledge-how does not seem to 
consist in a relation to a proposition. In order to account for the role of knowledge-how in 
producing intelligent action, the Rylean Intellectualist needs to identify knowledge-how 
with knowledge-that, endorsing Intellectualism, applying their model of intelligence to the 
various practical activities which we know how to do, such as reasoning, fishing, and 
playing chess.18 
 
 Ryle gives a number of arguments against Intellectualism about knowledge-how. 
First, he points out that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have different epistemic 
properties. Knowledge-that entails belief and justification, and knowledge-how does not 
(Ryle, 2009b, p. 17; see also: Glick, 2011; Brownstein & Michaelson, 2016). Knowledge-
how ascriptions are gradable — we can say that Raj knows in part how to swim, or that 
Tahlia knows how to swim better than Raj — whilst knowledge-that ascriptions are not 
(Ryle, 2009b, p. 46; see also: Pavese, 2017). Secondly, Ryle observes that knowledge-how 
and knowledge-that seem to be associated with different kinds of learning. Whereas 
knowledge-that can be imparted at once, for example by an act of testimony, knowledge-
how can only be inculcated via a gradual process of practice meaning that when we learn a 
practical skill we learn to, rather than learning that (Ryle 1945, 15; Ryle 2009b, 30–31, 46; 
                                                            
18 This interpretation owes a great deal to (Hornsby, 2011). 
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Ryle 1971; Ryle 2009a; see also: Hawley 2010; Dickie 2012; Glick 2012). Thirdly, Ryle 
raises the challenge to the Intellectualist to say which body of propositions a given piece of 
knowledge-how is identical to; asking which propositions one would need to know in 
order to know how to play chess (Ryle, 1945, p. 5).  
 
 Ryle’s central argument against the Rylean Intellectualist is a series of regress 
arguments. The regress arguments are tricky: they are not easy to understand, and it is 
controversial whether these argument is successful against Intellectualism.19 I will present 
a version of what I take to be the central regress which I take to be pretty faithful to Ryle’s 
text, and at least somewhat plausible, following (Bengson & Moffett, 2011b, p. 10). 
 
 I take the regress argument to have three premises: 
 
1. An act is intelligent in virtue of the manifestation of propositional states (definition 
of Rylean Intellectualism);20 
2. The manifestation of a propositional state is an act which is assessable for 
intelligence;21 
3. An act inherits its intelligence from the intelligence of the manifestation of the 
propositional states that underlie that act.22 
 
 Some clarifications: In this argument, ‘intelligent’ picks out positive intelligence 
adverbs, putting negative intelligence adverbs to one side. Although Ryle frequently talks 
about the manifestation of propositional states as involving the contemplation or consideration 
of propositions, talking about contemplation can make it sound like Ryle’s Intellectualist 
thinks that every intelligent act requires a conscious mental act of thinking about a 
                                                            
19 (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, pp. 214–6; Hornsby, 2005, 2011; Fantl, 2011; Stanley, 2011b; 
Cath, 2013; Weatherson, 2016). 
20 “The prevailing doctrine […] holds: […] that practical activities merit their titles "intelligent," 
"clever," and the rest only because they are accompanied by some such internal acts of considering 
propositions.”  (1945, p. 1). 
21 “The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or 
less intelligent, less or more stupid” (2009b, p. 19). 
22 “The absurd assumption made by the intellectualist legend is this, that a performance of any sort 
inherits all its title to intelligence from some anterior internal operation of planning what to do.” 
(2009b, p. 20). 
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relevant proposition. Although it might be true that Ryle’s targets did endorse that claim,23 
endorsing this claim might make one think that one can avoid the regress argument by 
giving a different account of how propositional knowledge manifests in action (Stanley, 
2011b, pp. 14–6). Moving to a premise concerning manifestation in general blocks off this 
move.24 Some versions of the regress omit premise 3 (Weatherson, 2016) but I think it is 
crucial. Premises 1 and 2 are compatible with an act being intelligent whilst the thought 
underlying the act is stupid. If (some) stupid acts are unintelligent because they are not the 
manifestation of propositional states at all (see footnote 16) then an intelligent act that is 
grounded in a stupid thought can block the regress, since that stupid thought need not be 
accompanied by the activation of a distinct propositional state. Including premise 3 blocks 
off this move. 
 
 The regress argument goes like this. Take some intelligent act: such a clever foot-
swap made whilst climbing. According to the Rylean Intellectualist, this act is intelligent in 
virtue of being the manifestation of some propositional state or states: say, the agent’s 
knowledge that she needs to adjust her balance. But her manifestation of that propositional 
state is also assessable for intelligence: we can ask whether she ought to have been 
thinking about balance, or focusing on other features of her situation. And the intelligence 
of the action depends on the intelligence of the thought. The act of performing the foot-
swap can only be clever if it was also intelligent to consider the issue of balance at that 
time. If balance isn’t a big deal in the current situation, then thinking about balance is 
stupid, and the foot-swap was not a clever move to make. But if the manifestation of 
propositional knowledge is itself an intelligent act, then by the Rylean Intellectualist’s 
lights we need to explain the intelligence of this manifestation in terms of the manifestation 
of some other propositional state. This explanatory demand goes on indefinitely, meaning 
that the Rylean Intellectualist ends up positing an infinite series of propositional states in 
order to explain the intelligence of any action. This regress suggests that something is 
seriously amiss with the Rylean Intellectualist’s explanation of intelligence.  
 
                                                            
23 Bengson and Moffett find this kind of view in Husserl, Cook Wilson, and Frege (Bengson & 
Moffett, 2011b, n. 13), and Kremer finds it in G.F. Stout and Stebbing (Kremer, forthcoming). 
24 One might think that premise 2 is only plausible when a propositional state manifests via a 
mental act. (Weatherson, 2016) gives some nice examples of the manifestations of propositional 
states being assessable for intelligence without being accompanied by an act of contemplation. 
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 Unlike most formulations of the regress argument (and closely following Ryle), this 
argument makes no mention of knowledge-how. There are two ways in which Ryle might 
connect this regress to Intellectualism about knowledge-how. One might see the regress as 
a reductio of Rylean Intellectualism, and think that Ryle proposes an alternative picture of 
intelligence, in which knowledge-that plays no role (Bengson & Moffett, 2011b, pp. 14–
16). Alternatively one might think that knowledge-how is introduced to play the role of 
regress-stopper (Hornsby, 2011, p. 83)25.  
 
 The first interpretation seems problematic. It is just obvious that we sometimes 
activate propositional states before acting (Bengson & Moffett, 2011b, pp. 15–6), a fact 
which Ryle was well aware of: 
 
Now very often we do go through such a process of planning what to do, and, if we 
are silly, our planning is silly, if shrewd, our planning is shrewd. (Ryle, 2009b, p. 
20) 
 
 As we shall see below, Ryle also has an important role for propositional thought in 
his account of intelligent action. 
 
 On the second interpretation, knowledge-how plays the regress-stopper role, 
providing a fundamental explanation of what makes acts intelligent. This interpretation 
leaves some space for propositional knowledge in the explanation of the intelligence of 
action. When Ryle says that intelligence adverbs pick out manners of performance which 
are grounded in the dispositions which are manifested in those acts, it would be a mistake 
to interpret him as saying that the states which are involved in the production of 
intelligence are exclusively non-propositional.26 His point is that when propositional states 
                                                            
25 (Hornsby, 2005) sees knowledge-how playing a similar regress-stopping role for a regress 
relating to intentional action, (see also (Fantl, 2011)). 
26 This means that when Bengson and Moffett are mistaken to ascribe to Ryle the view that 
intelligent action is due to some kind of ability or disposition, rather than a propositional attitude 
(Bengson & Moffett, 2011b, p. 15). In their set-up of the logical space the Intellectualist can appeal 
to both propositional states, and to other kinds of states in explaining intelligence and giving an 
account of the conditions which ground knowledge-how (Bengson & Moffett, 2011b, pp. 7–8) but 
the Anti-Intellectualist theory of intelligence can only appeal to dispositional states. One might 
think that the default Anti-Intellectualist theory of intelligence is that states of intelligence involve 
both dispositional states, and propositional states, a position which Bengson and Moffett call 
Conjunctivist (Bengson & Moffett, 2011a, n. 5). 
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play a role in explaining the intelligence of action, it can only be with the assistance of an 
underlying state of knowledge-how (Hornsby 2005; Wiggins 2012, §9-11) 
 
 What kind of picture of knowledge-how does Ryle need to have in order for 
knowledge-how to play the regress-stopping role? Ryle needs to be committed to the 
falsity of Intellectualism, since a position which identified knowledge-how with a species of 
knowledge-that would lead to the regress above. Beyond this things get a little murky. It is 
common to claim that Ryle identifies knowing how to do something with the ability to do 
it,27 but we also find interpreters claiming that Ryle has no positive account of knowledge-
how (Hornsby, 2011, p. 82). I think it is clear that Ryle does not endorse Abilityism, but I 
think that by connecting some hints we can extract a positive account of knowledge-how.28 
 
 Ryle does make some comments which suggest an identification of knowing how 
with ability.29 For example: 
 
What is involved in our descriptions of people as knowing how to make and 
appreciate jokes, to talk grammatically, to play chess, to fish, or to argue? Part of 
what is meant is that, when they perform these operations, they tend to perform 
them well, i.e. correctly or efficiently or successfully (Ryle, 2009b, p. 17). 
 
 In this passage and others Ryle is certainly suggesting that knowing how to do 
something is a kind of dispositional state, in line with his general dispositional account of 
knowledge, (Ryle, 2009b, pp. 116–7; Kremer, 2016a), and his dispositional picture of 
intelligence. However, Ryle himself warns against the over-simplistic picture of these 
dispositions involved in knowing-how:  
 
Epistemologists, among others, often fall into the trap of expecting dispositions to 
have uniform exercises. For instance, when they recognise that the verbs ‘know’ 
                                                            
27 (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, p. 416; Snowdon, 2004; Noë, 2005, p. 283; Kotzee, 2016, p. 219; 
Santorio, 2016, p. 36). 
28 See (Gustafsson & Backstrom, forthcoming; Kremer, forthcoming; Small, forthcoming) who 
share a picture of Ryle as offering a third way between a picture which explains intelligence in 
terms of thought (Rylean Intellectualism), and a picture which explains intelligence in terms of 
automation and associations (a position we might call Rylean Anti-Intellectualism). 
29 Here I gloss over the distinction between abilities and dispositions, as I will throughout this 
thesis. This distinction is potentially useful (see: Fantl, 2008) but it would take us too far afield to 
get a clear picture of what it amounts to. 
 17 
and ‘believe’ are ordinarily used dispositionally, they assume that there must 
therefore exist one-pattern intellectual processes in which these cognitive 
dispositions are actualised. (2009b, p. 32). 
 
 Following his own advice, Ryle claims that knowledge-how involves a multi-track 
disposition to perform a heterogeneous range of actions. He claims that knowing how can 
be exercised in i) appreciating others’ performances of the relevant activity,30 ii) explaining 
why a particular act succeeded or failed, iii) advising and teaching others, iv) imagining 
performing the activity, and v) predicting whether an attempt will succeed (Ryle 2009b, 
33, 42–43 especially the discussion of the marksman, and tying a clove-hitch knot). In his 
discussion of the distinction between skills and habits, Ryle contrasts the kind of automatic 
unthinking disposition which involved in a habit (such as reciting a multiplication table), 
with the kind of controlled thoughtful intelligent disposition which is associated with a 
skill or a piece of knowledge-how (2009b, p. 30). In these passages, Ryle clearly 
distinguishes knowing how from the wider class of abilities to do.31 
 
 Ryle offers a positive picture of the kind of activity which is involved in knowing 
how: 
 
Knowing how, then, is a disposition, but not a single-track disposition like a reflex 
or a habit. Its exercises are observances of rules or canons or the applications of 
criteria, but they are not tandem operations of theoretically avowing maxims and 
then putting them into practice. (2009b, p. 30) 
 
 If we thought that Ryle had no role for propositional states in his account of 
intelligence, it would be strange to see him glossing the kind of disposition associated with 
knowledge-how as involving the observances or rules or canons, and the applications of 
criteria. However, on the interpretation I am pursuing, Ryle is not opposed to rules, 
canons, or regulative propositions playing a role in intelligent or skilful activity, so long as 
the application of those rules is driven by a non-propositional dispositional state, such as 
the disposition to apply criteria to action.32  
                                                            
30 For more on the receptive dimension of knowledge-how, see (Montero, 2012). 
31 (Gustafsson & Backstrom, forthcoming; Small, forthcoming). 
32 Here I am drawing on (Waights Hickman, MS.) 
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 On this interpretation, Ryle is interested in offering a non-dualist picture of the role 
of thought in action. Ryle agrees with everyday language that intelligent or skilled action 
involves what he calls ‘thinking what one is doing’ (2009b, pp. 18, 30) but rather than 
positing an inner act of thought he claims that thinking what one is doing is an external 
manner of performing. As Hornsby puts the point, Ryle wants to ‘exteriorise’ the concept 
of thinking (2011, p. 87). Consider the following passage which characterises skilled 
activity: 
 
A mountaineer walking over ice-covered rocks in a high wind in the dark does not 
move his limbs by blind habit; he thinks what he is doing, he is ready for emergencies, 
he economises in effort, he makes tests and experiments; in short he walks with 
some degree of skill and judgment. If he makes a mistake, he is inclined not to 
repeat it, and if he finds a new trick effective he is inclined to continue to use it and 
to improve on it. He is concomitantly walking and teaching himself how to walk in 
conditions of this sort. (2009b, p. 30 italics added) 
 
 On Ryle’s view, thinking what one is doing is a way of attending to one’s activity by 
comparing it to regulative criteria, adjusting one’s action to the particularities of the 
situation (Ryle, 1976), and teaching oneself how to act as one goes along.33 The connection 
between improvement in skilled activity and thinking is made especially clear in a later 
essay Thinking and Self-Teaching, which argues that thinking just is a kind of self-teaching 
process, in which agents apply general purpose problem-solving techniques to deal with 
practical problems (Ryle, 1971, see also: 2009a). The appeals to learning by doing, 
applying regulative criteria, and self-teaching can all be understood as unpacking what it is 
to act intelligently without needing to appeal to inner acts of thinking, and hence as 
lending specificity to the account of what kind of activities one is disposed to engage in 
when one knows how to do something.34 
 
                                                            
33 For connected interpretations of Ryle, which stress the importance of regulative criteria in Ryle’s 
account of intelligence see (Löwenstein, 2014; Elzinga, 2016). For discussions of the nature of 
regulative criteria, see (Bianchi, MS; Waights Hickman, MS). 
34 For an account of the role of thought in skilled action which connects thinking to self-
improvement, see (Montero, 2016). 
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  Let’s sum up. Ryle’s principal target is Rylean Intellectualism — the view that 
intelligence stems from inner acts of thinking — and the need for a non-propositional 
notion of knowledge-how emerges from his criticism of this view. Because knowledge-how 
needs to be non-propositional in order to play the regress-stopping role, Ryle is committed 
to Anti-Intellectualism. His discussion does suggest a positive account of knowledge-how, 
which claims that knowing how to do something is a matter of being disposed to think 
what one is doing by applying criteria to that kind of activity in a distinctive way that 
involves a process of self-teaching. Ryle did not hold that knowing how to do something is 
identical to the ability to do it. 
 
 
3 The ‘Standard View’ and Linguistic Evidence 
 
 Before we consider the linguistic arguments for Intellectualism, I want to consider 
the way that linguistic evidence interacts with the post-Ryle consensus position, which — 
following Snowdon — I’ll call the Standard View. A good deal of the criticism of the 
Standard view was linguistic, and these criticisms point to a legitimate use of linguistic 
evidence.  
 
 In the second half of the twentieth century, the consensus position seems to have 
been that Ryle established that knowledge-how and knowledge-that are distinct states. In 
addition to Anti-Intellectualism, this consensus endorsed a number of further claims:  
 
• Linguistic distinction: the contrast between knowledge-how and knowledge-that 
matches the linguistic distinction between the knowledge picked out by ‘knows 
how’ and ‘knows that’ ascriptions; 
• Abilityism: Knowing how to V is identical to being able to V;35 
                                                            
35 Abilityism is distinct from what we might call Ability Correlation: S knows how to V iff S is able to 
V. Abilityism is a non-propositional theory of knowledge-how, whereas Ability Correlation just states 
a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge-how. An Intellectualist can endorse Ability 
Correlation, and some appear to do so (Pavese, 2015b). Glick argues that Stanley and 
Williamson’s picture of knowledge-how is actually committed to the necessity of ability for 
knowing-how (Glick, 2012, p. 137)  Hintikka suggests that ’S is able to V’ is an implicature of ’S 
knows how to V’, (Hintikka, 1975, p. 11), which is a claim that Intellectualists are also free to 
endorse. 
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• Logical structure: sentences of the form ’S knows how to V’ involve the logical 
structure — S (knows how (to V)).  
 
 Let’s call the combination of Anti-Intellectualism with these claims the Standard view. 
There are two important linguistic elements of this view. First, this view replaces Ryle’s 
philosophical characterisation of the distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-
that — something like the kind of knowledge which plays the regress stopper role and 
grounds application of intelligence adverbs versus the kind of knowledge which does not 
play this pair of roles — with a linguistic characterisation of this distinction — the kind of 
knowledge which is ascribed using the  ‘knows how’ construction, versus the kind of 
knowledge which is picked out using the ‘knows that’ construction. Secondly, as we shall 
see below, the primary motivation for Logical Structure is linguistic, stemming from the fact 
that ‘knows how’ ascriptions involve an infinitival verb phrase, rather than an indicative 
that-clause. 
 
 It is difficult to find authors defending all of Linguistic Distinction, Abilityism, and 
Logical Structure in print36, but it is fairly clear that a number of critics of received opinion 
have this combination of views in their targets.  
 
 Snowdon identifies the Standard View as the view that: 
 
That there are at least two types of knowledge (or to put it in a slightly different way, 
two types of states ascribed by knowledge ascriptions) identified, on the one hand, as the 
knowledge (or state) which is expressed in the 'knowing that' construction […] 
and, on the other, as the knowledge (or state) which is ascribed in the 'knowing 
how' construction. (Snowdon, 2004, p. 1 italics added) 
 
 In this quotation knowledge-how is identified with the linguistic category of 
knowledge picked out by ‘knows how’ ascriptions, demonstrating that Snowdon’s 
opponent is committed to linguistic distinction. He also claims that this view is also 
                                                            
36 Carr defends Logical Structure explicitly (Carr, 1979, pp. 399–400) but doesn’t endorse Abilityism 
(Carr, 1981). (Stanley & Williamson, 2001; Snowdon, 2004) give a host of references for 
Abilityism. 
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committed to Abilityism, casting this claim as one of the central parts of his opponent’s 
position (Snowdon 2004: 2).  
 Moore also puts a linguistically motivated Anti-Intellectualist view into the mouth 
of his interlocutor: 
We long ago learned to accept that “knowledge how” and “knowledge that” are 
entirely disparate kinds of knowledge. To know that something is the case is to be 
apprised of some truth. To know how to do something, by contrast, is to have a 
capacity. This is related to the fact that states of “knowledge how”, unlike states of 
“knowledge that”, are not states of belief, a fact which is evidenced in our language. 
(Moore, 1997, p. 167) 
 
 As in the quote from Snowdon, the quotation marks alert us to the fact that the 
view is interested primarily in a linguistic distinction, suggesting a commitment to 
Linguistic distinction.  
  Stanley and Williamson also claim that the target of their paper is Logical Structure 
(2001, pp. 416–7) and motivate this view by appealing to linguistic considerations that 
presuppose Linguistic Distinction. They identify their target by quoting a passage from 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen: 
In general, the expression 'knowing that' requires completion by a proposition, 
whereas the expression 'knowing how' is completed by an infinitive (e.g. 'to ride') 
specifying an activity. (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991, p. 151 quoted in Stanley and 
Williamson 2001, p. 417) 
 
 This quote demonstrates a commitment to Linguistic Distinction. Additionally, 
Stanley and Williamson take Bechtel and Abhrahamsen to be offering a linguistic 
argument for Logical Structure: 
On this [Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s] view, in a sentence such as (2) [Hannah 
knows how to ride a bicycle], ‘knows how’ forms a constituent, which takes as a 
complement the expression ‘to ride a bicycle’, which is a description of an action. 
‘Know’ has no clausal complement in (2). In (3) [Hannah knows that penguins 
waddle], on the other hand, ‘that penguins waddle’ is the clausal complement of 
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‘knows’, and denotes a proposition which is the object of the knowledge relation 
(Stanley & Williamson 2001, p. 417) 
 
 In this passage, the Anti-Intellectualist argues that the fact that ‘knows how’ 
ascriptions involve a relation to an infinitival verb phrase provides evidence that these 
ascriptions pick out relations to something non-propositional. 
 The Standard View faces three main criticisms, the first concerning Abilityism, the 
second concerning Linguistic Distinction, and the third concerning the linguistic argument 
for Logical Structure.  
 The most famous criticism of the Standard view stems from counterexamples to 
Abilityism. This argument is non-linguistic, and it would take us rather far astray to discuss 
all of these counterexamples at length, so I will just note the basic contours of this debate.  
 Against the necessity of ability for knowing-how we find the following examples: 
• Cases of agents who know how to do something, but lack a internal physical 
condition required to succeed (See Hawley’s Legless cyclist (2003, p. 23), 
Snowdon’s Raymond Blanc (2004, p. 8), Stanley and Williamson’s handless 
pianist (2001, p. 416). 
• Cases of agents who know how to do something, but are in an environment 
which prevents them from succeeding (See: Snowdon’s sugar case (2004, p. 8)). 
• Cases of agents know how to do something which is impossible for them to 
complete (See Bengson and Moffett’s π case (2011a, p. 170)). 
 Against the sufficiency of ability for knowing-how, we find the following examples: 
• Cases of agents who are able to do something, but do not realise that they are 
(see Snowdon’s crack in the rock case (2004, p. 11)). 
• Cases of agents who luckily succeed at some goal without knowing how to pull 
it off (see Hawley’s Susan, Shelly, and Susie cases, (2003, p. 27)), Bengson and 
Moffett’s Irina case (2007, p. 407, 2011a, p. 171), and Carr’s Miltiades case 
(1979, p. 404). 
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• Cases of agents how are able to do something in virtue of being in a position to 
work out how to do it as they go along, but do not know how to do it (see 
Bengson and Moffett’s Kytoon case (2011a, pp. 172–3)) and Snowdon’s 
improvisation case, (2004, p. 11). 
 There is a pretty sizeable literature on whether it is possible to rescue Abilityism 
from these counterexamples, but assessing which side of this debate comes out on top is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 Let’s now turn to the linguistic problems with the standard view. 
 One problem with Linguistic Distinction is that there are many sentences involving 
‘knows’ and ‘how’ which ascribe propositional knowledge. There are many finite ‘knows 
how’ ascriptions which pick out propositional knowledge: ‘Pico knows how coffee smells’, 
‘Ines knows how Hilary climbed Everest’, and ‘Rain knows how the getaway was made’ all 
ascribe propositional knowledge (D. G. Brown, 1970, p. 216; Hintikka, 1999, p. 14; 
Hornsby, 1980, p. 84; Moore, 1997, p. 168; Sgaravatti & Zardini, 2008, n. 4; Snowdon, 
2004, p. 7; Glick, 2011, p. 427). The existence of these sentences demonstrates that the 
philosophically interesting distinction is not between the species of knowledge picked out 
with the words ‘how’ and ‘that’. One might think that it is possible to recover a linguistic 
distinction by focusing in on the knowledge picked out in sentences with an infinitival 
‘how’ complement, leaving us with the distinction between ‘knows that’ and ‘knows how 
to’ (Hornsby, 1980, p. 84). However, this distinction is also problematic: the sentence 
‘Vida knows how to spell ‘comma’’ seems to pick out a state of knowledge-that (Moore, 
1997, p. 171; Sgaravatti & Zardini, 2008, n. 4; Glick, 2011, p. 427), and ‘Idris knows how 
to write’ has several readings which pick out propositional knowledge (about how writing is 
done, how one writes, and how he ought to write) (Brown, 1970, p. 235; Vendler, 1972, p. 104; 
Hornsby, 1980, p. 84; Stanley & Williamson, 2001, p. 424). Contra Linguistic Distinction, 
the distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge does not seem to be tracked by 
a linguistic distinction in English.37 
 A second problem with the Standard view concerns the linguistic motivation for 
Logical Structure. It is true that sentences of the form ’S knows that p’, and ’S knows how to 
                                                            
37 Perhaps this distinction might show up better in another language, perhaps correlating with the 
savoir faire constriction, or the use of ‘умеет’ in Russian or  in Cantonese. 
 24 
V’ have important linguistic differences. ‘Knows how’ ascriptions involve i) a complement 
in the interrogative mood, ii) an infinitival verb, and iii) the word ‘how’. However, these 
differences do not point toward ’S knows how to V’ picking out a state of non-
propositional knowledge because the linguistic differentia are possessed by other kinds of 
knowledge ascriptions involving an interrogative complement: what I will call ‘knows-
wh’38 (Moore, 1997, pp. 167–73; Stanley & Williamson, 2001, pp. 417–8). Consider the 
following sentences: 
(1) Ruth knows how to swim. 
(2) Shawn knows that Theresa May is the Prime minister. 
(3) Aliya knows where the coffee shop is. 
(4) Brunhilda knows where to dance. 
 Although there are differences between (1) and (2), they are the same differences 
which we find when we compare (2) to (3) and (4). Sentence 3 involves a grammatical 
complement in the interrogative mood — ‘where the coffee shop is’ — but what Aliya 
knows is plausibly just that the coffee shop is in such-and-such a place. Similarly, sentence 
4 involves an infinitival interrogative phrase — ‘where to dance’ — but again this sentence 
seems to pick out propositional knowledge. So, involving an interrogative complement or 
an infinitival interrogative are not sufficient grounds for a knowledge-ascription to pick 
out non-propositional knowledge. What about the third difference - the word ‘how’? 
We’ve already seen that there are many knowledge ascriptions involving ‘how’ picking out 
states of propositional knowledge.  
 These considerations establish that there is no basis in the linguistic structure of 
‘knows how’ ascriptions for thinking that they pick out a non-propositional state (Stanley 
& Williamson, 2001, p. 19). Although it might be right that knowledge-how is a species of 
non-propositional knowledge — and perhaps even some English sentences of the form ‘S 
knows how to V’ pick out this knowledge — the linguistic evidence does not to point 
towards this result. I do not think that these linguistic considerations demonstrate any of 
the following theses: i) that we should endorse a propositional theory of knowledge-how, 
                                                            
38 Throughout this thesis I will treat knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-wh, and ‘knows 
how’ ascriptions as a species of ‘knows wh’ ascriptions. If I need to pick out other species of 
knowledge-wh, I will talk about the non-how kinds of knowledge-wh. 
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ii) that all Anti-Intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how are untenable, or even iii) that 
the standard view is untenable.39 The arguments above target one non-propositional theory 
of knowledge-how, and point out that the linguistic evidence which the supporters of this 
view appeal to is implausible. These are linguistic considerations against one argument for 
the Standard view, and not in favour of Intellectualism. The fact that there is no linguistic 
evidence for the Standard View does not mean that there are not non-linguistic motivations 
for this view, or for elements within this view. The point of this section is to get some 
linguistic considerations on the table, in the hope that all participants in the debate about 
the nature of knowledge-how ought to be able to accept that these linguistic considerations 
knock out a bad argument for the Standard view.  
 
4 Linguistic Arguments for Intellectualism 
 
 In the previous section, I set out one use of linguistic evidence against the Standard 
view. In this section we will consider the more ambitious use of linguistic evidence in 
favour of Propositionalism. I will distinguish three ways in which linguistic evidence might 
be used to argue for a Propositionalist account of knowledge-how: i) the argument from 
uniformity, ii) the argument from truth-conditional semantics, and iii) the argument from 
semantic implementability. I will argue that the first and second arguments do not provide 
compelling arguments for Intellectualism, and that although the third argument does 
provide some evidence in favour of an Intellectualist-friendly treatment of knowledge-how, 
it does not rules out the possibility of there being compelling non-linguistic evidence 
against Intellectualism.40 
 
 
4.1. The Argument from Linguistic Uniformity 
 
                                                            
39 This point is especially clear in Moore’s discussion, which goes on to endorse a non-propositional 
account of knowledge-how on non-linguistic grounds. (Moore, 1997, pp. 70–6). Williamson’s 
review of Points of View is helpful as an example of the distinction between Moore’s negative use of 
linguistic evidence against argument for the standard view, and his own use of linguistic evidence 
in favour of Intellectualism (Williamson, 1999, p. 44). 
40 In thinking about these issues I have benefitted greatly from (Glick, MS). 
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 The first kind of argument for Intellectualism appeals to the linguistic similarities 
between ‘knows how’ ascriptions, and other ‘knows wh’ ascriptions. Stanley sets out this 
argument extremely clearly: 
 
In English, we say that people know how to do things via the construction “knows 
how + infinitive”. The fact that we speak of knowing how in this way in English 
raises a problem for the Rylean that has long been exploited by Intellectualists 
about knowing how (Brown, 1970, Stanley and Williamson, 2001). It is a common 
assumption between the Rylean and the Intellectualist that sentences involving 
constructions like “know where + infinitive”, “know when + infinitive”, “know why 
+ infinitive”, etc. all can be defined in terms of propositional knowledge. But given 
that ascriptions of knowing-how in English look so similar to such ascriptions, it is 
hard to see how they could ascribe a different kind of mental state. This provides a 
powerful argument in favor of the conclusion that our ordinary folk notion of 
knowing-how is a species of propositional knowledge. (Stanley, 2011c, p. 208) 
 
 Let’s call this the argument from Linguistic Uniformity.41 The core idea of this 
argument is that a grammatical uniformity in a class of sentences is ceteris paribus 
evidence of those sentences having an underlying structural uniformity, meaning that they 
pick out a uniform class of entities in the world (Bengson & Moffett, 2011b, p. 179). 
 
 Although the uniform view of knowledge-wh ascriptions has an appealing 
simplicity, considerations of linguistic simplicity do not provide a compelling argument for 
Intellectualism. 
 
 First, this kind of argument is neutral on what the underlying structure is, leaving 
open the possibility that linguistic uniformity is being generated by some non-propositional 
structure. For example, Bengson and Moffett (2011a, p. 180) suggest that the underlying 
linguistic structure might relate agents to non-propositional objects, meaning that 
knowledge-wh ascriptions pick out states of Objectual knowledge. Insofar as an Objectualist 
                                                            
41 The argument from Uniformity is explicitly endorsed by (D. G. Brown, 1970, pp. 221–3; 
Williamson, 1999, p. 44; Stanley & Williamson, 2001, pp. 417–20; Bengson & Moffett, 2011a, pp. 
179–80), and seems to be in the background in (Vendler, 1972, pp. 91–4, 103–4; Hintikka, 1975, p. 
14; Snowdon, 2004, pp. 6–8). 
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and a Propositionalist account of knowledge-wh equally explain the linguistic uniformity, 
both can claim equal support from this kind of uniformity consideration.42 
 
 Secondly, there are some pretty clear exceptions to the idea that surface 
grammatical uniformities are generated by uniformities in underlying structure. Consider 
the following example (from (Bengson & Moffett, 2011b, p. 42) attributed to Michaelis, 
(see also: Michaelis, 2011, p. 262)): 
 
(5) S tried to φ 
(6) S knew to φ 
(7) S understood to φ  
(8) S learned to φ 
 
 Although these sentences are grammatically similar they pick out different kinds of 
relations. In 5 S is related to an activity, whereas in 6 and 7 S is related to a proposition 
about how one ought to engage in some activity, and 8 has both deontic and activity-
relating readings. This counterexample brings home the important point that linguistic 
uniformity is at best a ceteris paribus consideration which can be overruled by other 
considerations. 
 
 A closer look at knowledge-how suggests that there are compelling non-linguistic 
differences between these species of knowledge which mean that the ceteris paribus 
consideration is not met. We can find Anti-Intellectualists arguing that knowledge-how 
fails to possess pretty much all one of the conditions which are thought to be necessary for 
knowledge-that: 
 
• Justification: (Glick, 2011, pp. 408–9) 
• Associated true belief: (Wallis, 2008, pp. 133, 139–40; Cath, 2011; Glick, 2011, 
p. 409; Brownstein & Michaelson, 2016) 
• Gettierisability: (Poston, 2009) 
• Sensitivity to defeaters: (Cath, 2011; Weatherson, 2016) 
                                                            
42 Although it’s worth noting that an objectualist account of all ‘knows wh’ ascriptions is extremely 
implausible. See Chapter 2. 
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• Safety: (Hills, 2009; Poston, 2009; Cath, 2011; Carter & Pritchard, 2015a, 
2015b) 
• Linguistic expressibility: (Schiffer, 2002; Wallis, 2008, pp. 132–3) 
• KK principle: (Wallis, 2008, p. 140) 
• Conscious accessibility: (Wallis, 2008, pp. 132–3; Devitt, 2011, pp. 210–2; 
Kumar, 2011, p. 146) 
• Availability for reasoning: (Moore, 1997; Sgaravatti & Zardini, 2008, pp. 244–
52; Glick, 2011, p. 410; Kumar, 2011, p. 146) 
 
 Perhaps not all of these arguments are successful. But the cumulative case seems 
overwhelming: we only need knowledge-how to differ in a few epistemic properties to 
have a philosophical difference between know-how and know-that to contrast with the 
linguistic similarities between ‘knows how’ and other ‘knows wh’ ascriptions. 
 
 Although the argument from Linguistic Uniformity provides some prima facie reason 
for thinking that knowledge-how of a kind with other kinds of knowledge-wh, it 
underdetermines the nature of the underlying uniformity, and the non-linguistic 
differences between knowledge-how and other kinds of knowledge-wh mean that the 
ceteris paribus consideration that this argument relies upon is not met. The argument from 
Linguistic Uniformity is not a compelling argument for Intellectualism. 
 
 
4.2. The Argument From Truth-Conditional Semantics 
 
 The most famous linguistic argument for Intellectualism comes from an appeal to a 
truth-conditional semantics for sentences of the form ’S knows how to V’ derived from the 
standard syntax and semantics for interrogative complements. Stanley and Williamson 
present their account as being motivated by this kind of consideration: 
 
The positive account’s most obvious benefit is that it is the account entailed by 
current theories about the syntax and semantics of the relevant constructions. 
Rejecting it would involve revising many well- entrenched beliefs about them in 
linguistics. This move would be legitimate if the account could be shown to face 
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serious difficulties. But we have been unable to uncover such difficulties. (Stanley 
& Williamson, 2001, p. 440) 
 
 Stanley and Williamson claim that their account is entailed by standard views about 
the syntax and semantics of embedded interrogative constructions, suggesting both that 
one can simply move from accepted views in linguistics to the surprising view that 
knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge, and that the fact that an account 
of knowledge-how is in line with the standard semantics is a decisive reason to prefer this 
account of knowledge-how.43  
 
 Stanley and Williamson argue that Intellectualism is entailed by standard linguistic 
views by giving a linguistic analysis of the ’S knows how to V’ construction in line with 
standard views in linguistics about the syntax and semantics of embedded interrogative 
phrases. They give a couple of different implementations of this idea appealing to different 
accounts of interrogatives: Stanley and Williamson (2001) follows (Karttenen, 1977), and 
Stanley (Stanley, 2011b, 2011c) follows (Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1984). Rather than 
following these discussions too closely I will give a schematic reconstruction of their 
argument that catches the central features of their account.44  
 
 To start off with, we need to know what the syntactic structure of a knowledge-how 
ascription is. Take a sentence like (1) ‘Ruth knows how to swim’. Stanley and Williamson 
claim that the standardly accepted structure for this sentence (using brackets to mark 
clausal boundaries) is: 
 
(9) Ruth (knows (how PRO to swim t)) 
 
 Giving us the structure: noun (verb (interrogative clause)). PRO is an 
unpronounced pronoun, which can refer to the subject of the verb, or to an arbitrary 
                                                            
43 (D. G. Brown, 1970) offers his own analysis of the meaning of ‘knows how’ ascriptions. Brown 
distinguished two readings: the standard reading, which does not relate to ability, and the ‘English 
reading’ for activities for which ability entails knowledge-how. Brown claims that the former kind 
of knowledge ascription involves knowledge of an imperative relative to a contextually supplied 
goal (an account which is close to those of Bhatt and Roberts), but his account of the ‘English’ 
reading is strikingly close to Stanley and Williamson’s. 
44 See (Pavese, 2016b)on the linguistic argument for Intellectualism. For good reconstructions of 
these arguments which do justice to the semantic detail, see (Glick, MS, 2011, 2012). 
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person, having a ‘one’-type reading, and ’t’ is a trace of syntactic movement, which is 
irrelevant to the truth-conditions of the overall sentence.  
 
 Given this syntactic structure, the content of the knowledge-ascription will be 
specified by the denotation of the interrogative clause. Whereas we can give an account of 
the meaning of indicative sentences or clauses (such as that-clauses), in terms of 
propositional contents, it is difficult to see how to give this treatment to interrogative or 
imperatival sentences. The sentences ‘where is the toilet?’ and ‘open the door!’ do not seem 
assessable for truth-value. Rather than denoting propositions, we might think that 
interrogatives denote questions. Just as ‘Ruth can swim’ denotes the proposition Ruth can 
swim, so ‘how to swim?’ denotes the question how to swim?.45 Just as we express 
propositions by engaging in assertoric speech acts, we express questions by engaging in 
questioning-related speech acts.  
 
 Since ‘knows-wh’ ascriptions involve interrogative complements, we ought to hope to 
understand what is known in a particular ascription by understanding what the question 
is. Although questions are not identical to propositions, they are closely related to them, 
since a proposition can resolve a question. Let’s call the set of propositions that resolve a 
question in some possible world its answers (using the term rather loosely). In linguistics it 
has been extremely common to suppose that we can build an account of the meaning of an 
interrogative phrase (inter alia, an account of what questions are) out of the answers to 
that question.  There are various options on the table here (for an overview, see 
(Higginbotham, 1996; Lahiri, 2002; Wisniewski, 2015)). Hamblin claims that a question is 
a set of all possible answers both true and false, both partial and complete (Hamblin, 1958, 
1973), Karttunen claims that a question is the one true and complete answer in the actual 
world (Karttenen, 1977), and Groenendijk and Stokhof claim that a question is a set of 
mutually incompatible complete answers (Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1984). The differences 
between these treatments will not be important for our purposes. What these treatments 
have in common is that they all treat a question as a set of propositions, meaning that they 
can say that a proposition answers a question when it is either a or the true answer to the 
question (depending on the framework).  
                                                            
45 ‘How to V?’ can sound odd as a standalone question: we don’t say ‘how to swim?’ except 
perhaps when asking ourselves rhetorical questions. However, the ‘how + infinitival verb’ 
construction is available in other languages. ‘Comment nager?’ is an acceptable direct question in 
French. 
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 Unlike verbs like ‘wonders’, which relate to the whole of a question, the standard 
view is that  ‘knows’ relates to a/the true answer to a question.46 This is suggested by the 
fact that we can substitute questions with their true answers within ‘knows’, preserving 
meaning. Consider: 
 
(10) Dipti knows who the Prime Minister is 
(11) Dipti knows that Theresa May is the Prime Minister 
 
 This allows us to give an account of knowledge-wh ascriptions in terms of 
propositional knowledge related to the correct answer to a question, along the lines 
suggested by (Higginbotham, 1996). This view is sometimes called Reductionism,47 but I 
will call it the Answer Theory (ANS for short) in reference to the fact that this theory 
explains knowledge of questions in terms of standing knowledge of the answers to those 
questions: 
 
ANS: A sentence of the form ’S knows Wh-F?’48 is true iff S knows that p, and p 
answers the question Wh-F? 
 
On the way I am using the terminology, ANS already entails Intellectualism about 
knowledge-how, because I am using ‘knows wh’ to include knowledge-how. However, in 
order to establish the plausibility of this view, Stanley and Williamson offer a specific 
Propositionalist analysis of knowledge-how. Applied to sentence (1), ANS yields: 
 
ANSHOW: ‘Ruth knows how to swim’ is true iff Ruth knows that p, and p answers 
the question how to swim? 
 
Because this claim connects knowledge-how to the answers to how to questions, we 
can use it to understand the object of knowledge-how by understanding the meaning of 
infinitival how-questions. Adding PRO back in, we need to analyse the following 
interrogative phrase: 
                                                            
46 For an overview of different classifications of ‘wonders’/‘knows’ type verbs, see (Lahiri, 2002, 
pp. 189–92). 
47 See (Higginbotham, 1996; Schaffer, 2007; George, 2013; Parent, 2014). 
48 I’ll use ‘Wh-F?’ as a variable for questions (see footnote 1). 
 32 
 
 ‘how PRO to swim?’ 
 
In most cases, we can derive the answers to a wh-question by treating the wh-word 
as a variable, and the rest of the phrase (what is sometimes called the question abstract) as 
a predicate. Depending on which account of the meaning of an interrogative we endorse, 
the answers to that question will consist of some kind of assignments of the predicate to 
the elements in the contextually supplied domain.49 For example, for Hamblin an answer is 
an assignment of one element in the domain to the predicate, whereas for Groenendijk and 
Stokhof an answer will be a complete (negative and positive) assignment of the predicate 
to all entities in the domain. Different kinds of question words seem to trigger restrictions 
to different domains — ‘why’ to reasons, ‘who’ to people, ‘where’ to places, ‘what’ to 
things, and so on — and ‘how’ triggers a restriction to ways, in this case ways of acting. 
There is a good deal to say about what ways of acting are, but I will put this topic off until 
chapter 3.  
 
With how-to questions, the predicate expressed by the rest of the wh-phrase can 
have various different meanings, due to the fact that PRO can either refer to the subject, 
or a generic agent, as well as the different modal flavours — deontic, counterfactual, or 
abilitative — which are associated with the infinitival phrase ‘to V’ (Stanley & Williamson, 
2001, pp. 422–5). Replacing ‘how’ with a variable for ways gives us the following menu of 
meanings for ‘how PRO to swim’ in (1): 
 
i. w is a way that Ruth can swim 
ii. w is a way that one can swim 
iii. w is a way that Ruth ought to swim 
iv. w is a way that one ought to swim 
 
 With this account of the possible meanings of ‘how to swim’, we can say that 
sentence (1) is true just in case Ruth knows a proposition of one of these forms. These 
different interpretations seem to neatly match up with different interpretations of ’Ruth 
knows how to swim’, which can mean that she has deontic knowledge, or knowledge about 
                                                            
49 In this chapter, I am ignoring some of the details of the context-sensitivity of ‘knows how’ 
ascriptions. We will return to this topic in chapter 3. 
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how one swims. Stanley and Williamson point out that interpretations ii through iv, are 
obviously propositional, meaning that by elimination that the interesting class of practical 
knowledge-how is picked out by interpretation i) (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, p. 425).50  
 
 The final complication in this account concerns how many answers one needs to 
know in order to count as knowing how. ‘Knows wh’ ascriptions can claim that the agent 
knows either one (the mention-some reading), or all (the mention-all reading) of the true 
(non-complete) answers to the question. Consider the following sentences: 
 
(12) The prisoner knows how to escape the prison. 
(13) The guard knows which prisoners escaped the prison. 
 
 On their most natural readings, (12) claims that the prisoner know that one way is a 
way to escape the prison, whereas (13) claims that for all the prisoners that escaped, the 
guard knows that they escaped (and also that she has no false beliefs about who escaped). 
Stanley and Williamson appeal to conversational aims to claim that the default reading of a 
‘knows how’ ascription will be the mention-some reading, meaning that knowing one 
answer suffices for knowing how (2001, p. 426). 
 
 Fixing in on reading i) of the how to question, and taking the mention-some reading 
we get to the following account of the meaning of sentence (1): 
 
ANSS&W: ’Ruth knows how to swim’ is true iff Ruth knows that w is a way in which 
she can swim 
 
 ANSS&W gives us an account of the nature of knowledge-how according to which it 
comes out as knowledge of a specific kind of propositional knowledge: knowledge about 
ways in which the subject can engage in activities. This propositional account of 
knowledge how entails that Intellectualism about knowledge-how is true. 
 
                                                            
50 I don’t find this argument especially plausible, and I think that at least some of the practical 
knowledge-how ascribing sentences involve the ought-reading. See the discussion of Bhatt in 4.2.4. 
However, I will put these worries to one side, since they do not concern the propositionality of 
knowledge-how. 
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 This isn’t quite Stanley and Williamson’s final account: they claim that ‘knows how’ 
involves de re knowledge of the way (Stanley, 2011b, pp. 56–60; Schroeder, 2012), and 
claim that the practical species of knowledge-how involves a special practical mode of 
presentation (PMP) of the answer to the question (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, pp. 429–30; 
Stanley, 2011b; Pavese, 2015b).51 I will these elements of the view to one side, leaving us 
with the bare bones linguistically motivated version of the view. 
 
It is one thing to demonstrate that standard views in linguistics entail that 
knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge, but Stanley and Williamson go 
further, claiming that the fact that their view is suggested by linguistics count in favour of 
it, providing a decisive reason to endorse Intellectualism about knowledge-how. 
 
Our view of ascriptions of knowledge-how is very straightforward. It is just that 
the standard linguistic account of the syntax and semantics of embedded questions 
is correct. Furthermore, it should not be radically altered to rescue philosophical 
views about an allegedly philosophically significant subclass of them. […]  
 
We take our view of ascriptions of knowledge-how to be the default position. From 
a linguistic perspective, very little is special about ascriptions of knowledge-how. It 
is hard to motivate singling them out for special treatment from the rest of a family 
of related constructions. Our view of ascriptions of knowledge-how is the analysis 
reached on full consideration of these constructions by theorists unencumbered by 
relevant philosophical prejudices. (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, p. 431) 
 
In this passage, and others like it (Stanley, 2011b, pp. 143–9), it can sound like 
Stanley and Williamson think that one can read off the correct metaphysical analysis of 
some phenomenon from the semantics of the sentences which are used to pick out this 
                                                            
51 In Stanley and Williamson (2001), PMPS are motivated on the basis of linguistic considerations. 
Stanley and Williamson appeal to (putative) Frege cases in which an agent knows that w is a way 
to V, but does not know how to V to support the idea that knowing most involve knowing this kind 
of proposition under a special mode of presentation (2001, pp. 428–30). Stanley 2011 claims that it 
is possible to explain the difference in truth values in the Frege cases by appealing to different 
readings of the modal involved in the infinitive (2011b, pp. 126–7), but maintains that there are 
still philosophical reasons for appealing to PMPs to explain other kinds of Frege cases (2011b, pp. 
123–6), and linguistic reasons for thinking that knowledge-how involves a kind of de se content 
(Stanley, 2011b, Chapter 3).  
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phenomenon. Furthermore, they seem to suggest that the semantic theories offered by 
linguists should have methodological priority over the considerations offered by 
philosophers — encumbered as we are with relevant prejudices — in case the two conflict. 
This kind of methodological attitude is understandably controversial, and it has generated 
a good deal of the heat in the knowledge-how debate. We will now turn to this controversy 
to consider what it can tell us about the legitimate role of linguistic evidence. 
 
 
4.2.1. Is Linguistics Relevant to Intellectualism?  
 
 Perhaps the most forceful criticism of Stanley and Williamson comes from Alva Noë 
who contends that the linguistic considerations which Stanley and Williamson consider are 
simply irrelevant to the distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that: 
 
It is difficult to see how the positive analysis offered by Stanley and Williamson 
entails the falsehood of Ryle’s distinction between knowledge how and knowledge 
that. Ryle’s distinction is not a thesis about the sentences used to attribute 
propositional and practical knowledge respectively. It is a thesis about the nature of 
practical and propositional knowledge. (Noë 2004: 286-7).  
 
  Noë’s contention is that Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge how is 
irrelevant to the debate about the nature of knowledge-how, being merely an account of the 
truth conditions of English sentences. The claim of irrelevance is hard to maintain. As 
Stanley points out, even if we decided that linguistic considerations were irrelevant to the 
nature of knowledge-how we would still need an account of the nature of knowledge-how, 
and ANSS&W is surely going to be a contender. Moving from an account of the semantics of 
a class of ascriptions to an account of the nature of the phenomena that they pick out is 
difficult to object to: 
Discussions of semantics are often in fact discussions of metaphysics, carried out in 
the formal mode. When semanticists give accounts of sentences containing 
embedded questions [interrogatives], are they giving an account of what it is to 
bear a relation to a question, or are they giving an account of the meaning of certain 
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sentences? The right answer is that they are doing both tasks at once; this is why so 
often linguistic semanticists treat philosophical discussions as contributions to 
formal semantics. (Stanley, 2011b, p. 144) 
 
 One way to think about this issue is that everyone ought to accept some version of 
the truth schema: 
 Truth: ‘S’ is true iff S 
 When applied to a knowledge-how ascription, this gives us: 
 TruthKNOWS-HOW: ‘Ruth knows how to swim’ is true iff Ruth knows how to swim 
 TruthKNOWS-HOW links together the correct account of the truth conditions of our 
ordinary knowledge ascriptions with the correct account of the nature of knowledge-how, 
meaning that our account of the metaphysics of knowledge-how needs to be answerable to 
the correct account of the semantics of ‘knows how’ ascriptions, and the correct account of 
‘knows how’ ascriptions needs to be answerable to the correct account of the nature of 
knowledge-how.  
 
4.2.2. Metaphysics or Linguistics First? 
 A different methodological criticism comes from Devitt (2011). Devitt accepts the 
relevance of linguistic considerations to the investigation of knowledge-how, but contends 
that they are not decisive evidence about the nature of knowledge-how: 
I think that we should always be suspicious of this [Stanley and Williamson’s] way 
of proceeding: our semantic theories should be guided by our theories of the world 
rather than vice versa. We should follow the methodology of “putting metaphysics 
first.” Why? Because we know much more about the way the world is than we do about the 
semantics of our talk about that world. (Devitt, 2011, p. 217) 
 
 Devitt accepts the connection between knowledge-how and ‘knows how’ 
ascriptions, claiming that his arguments demonstrate that some part of Stanley and 
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Williamson’s linguistic thesis must be incorrect (Devitt, 2011, p. 207). His worry concerns 
the proper way to read that truth schema. Stanley and Williamson read the truth schema 
from left to right, moving from an account of the semantics of our ordinary sentences to an 
account of the nature of knowledge-how, meaning that they put linguistics first. By 
contrast, Devitt claims that we ought to put metaphysics first by always starting our 
inquiry with metaphysical claims about the target phenomenon, using these claims to 
constrain our linguistic account.  
 We might think that it is just as implausible to always put metaphysics first as it is 
to always put linguistics first. The more reasonable position would be to assign neither 
linguistics nor metaphysics a special priority, instead playing metaphysical and linguistic 
considerations off against one another on a case-by-case basis. This is in line with Stanley’s 
point about the continuity of linguistics and philosophy — just as linguists might give 
philosophers reason to change their metaphysical accounts, philosophers might give 
linguists reasons to change their truth-conditional semantics. Consider a topic which both 
philosophers and linguists have spent considerable time working on: the correct 
understanding of adverbs in action sentences.52 Suppose that linguists all accept a 
Davidsonian analysis of adverbs as predicating properties of events, and philosophers 
discover that there are metaphysical reasons to be suspicious that there are any events. 
That would be a good philosophical reason for linguists to drop the linguistic analysis of 
adverbs as predicates of events, in favour of some other account. In this case philosophical 
considerations would motivate a change in the linguistics. 
 The challenge for critics of Intellectualism is then to find metaphysical reasons for 
thinking that knowledge-how is a relation to something non-propositional.53 Devitt claims 
that the psychological distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge provides 
such evidence for non-propositionality (2011, pp. 208–15). However, Stanley argues that 
the distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge is irrelevant to 
propositionality, since it concerns the way in which information is implemented, rather 
than whether knowledge has informational content (Stanley, 2011b, Chapter 7). As Glick 
points out, it would have been a surprise if empirical science came up yielded a result 
                                                            
52 (Parsons, 1990, 1995; Davidson, 2006). 
53 Note that that we need evidence for non-propositionality, not just for a distinction between 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that. The latter could be explained by positing two kinds of 
knowledge-relation (see 4.2.5.) without changing the standard semantics for interrogatives. 
 38 
concerning what kind of abstract objects can be the object of the knowledge-relation 
(Glick, 2011, p. 407). This isn’t to say that there might not be other reasons for thinking 
that knowledge-how involves a non-propositional object; only that Devitt’s reasons aren’t 
compelling. 
 A paper setting out this kind of linguistically revisionary response to Stanley and 
Williamson is (Santorio, 2016), which explores a fruitful analogy with the semantics for 
normative language offered by Metaethical Expressivism. Expressivists about some 
discourse claim that sentences in that discourse express attitudes rather than stating facts. 
A central problem for this view is the Frege-Geach problem, which one can see as a 
problem of semantic implementation concerning how this view is give a semantic theory 
for normative language which can explain the way that it functions in attitude contexts 
and with truth-conditional connectives. One important line of Expressivist response to the 
Frege-Geach problem is to offer a novel Expressivist semantics for normative language 
which is motivated on philosophical grounds. Santorio develops a possible revisionary 
semantics for ‘knowledge-how’ ascriptions in English, on which knowing-how is a kind of 
plan oriented state. Santorio’s paper is an important contribution to the linguistically 
revisionary line of response to Intellectualism, but by his own admission he doesn’t offer a 
compelling philosophical argument for the revisionary semantics. 
 
4.2.3 Which Language Should we Prioritise? 
 
 As I pointed out in the introduction, there are various different constructions 
employed for ascribing knowledge-how in different languages. Several of these 
constructions are not a natural fit for Stanley and Williamson’s proposed semantics, which 
a number of authors have taken to cause a problem for Stanley and Williamson’s proposed 
semantics (Rumfitt, 2003; Roberts, 2009; Hornsby, 2011; Glick, 2012; Wiggins, 2012; 
Abbott, 2013; Douskos, 2013; Ditter, 2016). The troublesome constructions for 
Intellectualism are: 
 
i. S + knows + infinitive (French, Portuguese) 
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ii. S + special epistemic verb + infinitive (Russian, Cantonese)54 
iii. S + can + infinitive (German, Danish)55 
 
 The worry is whether the obvious semantics for these constructions supports 
Intellectualism. On the face of it, the syntactic structure of the infinitival constructions is: 
noun+verb+verb phrase. The most obvious semantics for this construction would not 
involve a proposition-denoting term like an interrogative or that-clause, but rather to an 
activity or property denoting verb phrase.56 Given that sentences with this form are used 
to translate English ‘knows how’ ascriptions, if these sentences only have non-propositional 
readings, then there must be some non-propositional reading of English ‘knows how’ 
ascriptions. This line of criticism allows that linguistic evidence is relevant to the nature of 
knowledge-how, but questions which view of knowledge-how it supports. Just as the most 
obvious semantics for English ‘knows how’ ascriptions supports a propositional account of 
knowledge-how, the most obvious semantics for the infinitival construction in French or 
Cantonese supports a non-propositional account of knowledge-how as a relation to an 
activity, meaning that both views seem to have equal linguistic support. 
 
 An Intellectualist can insist that the fact that ‘knows how’ is propositional means that 
there must be some propositional reading of the ’savoir faire’ construction. In fact, Stanley 
has gone as far as offering a revisionary semantics for this construction, according to 
which it picks out a state of propositional knowledge (Stanley 2011b: 138-40). However, 
this move is also available to Anti-Intellectualists: they can offer a revisionary semantics 
for English, based on the semantics for other languages. If the English construction is a 
good translation for the French, Cantonese and Danish constructions, either we either 
need to posit a non-obvious non-propositional reading for ’Ruth knows how to swim’, or a 
non-obvious propositional reading for ’Ruth sait nager’, ‘’, and ‘Ruth kan 
svømme’. By itself, the linguistic evidence does not tell us which languages we ought to be 
positing a revisionary semantics for. I think at the end of the day, this issue is going to turn 
                                                            
54 Where the special epistemic verb is a verb like ‘умеет’ or ‘’ that would be translated by 
‘knows’, but is distinct from the verb used in ‘knows that’ ascriptions. 
55 Glick (2012, pp. 123–6) points out that some of these constructions can also be found in English. 
We occasionally use the gerund construction ’S knows V-ing’, and we also use an infinitival 
construction with ‘learns’ ’S learns to V’. 
56 Interestingly, these constructions seem to provide some linguistic evidence for the standard 
view’s Logical Structure. 
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on the plausibility of the revisionary semantics, which is an issue beyond the scope of this 
thesis.57 
 
 
4.2.4. Alternative Semantics for English 
 
 A different way to oppose Stanley and Williamson’s account is to claim that their 
semantics for the ‘knows how’ construction in English is incorrect. Like the criticism based 
on the cross-linguistic evidence, this objection allows that linguistic evidence is relevant to 
the nature of knowledge-how, but contends that Stanley and Williamson are wrong about 
the linguistic evidence. 
 
 Some of the alternative semantics for ‘knows wh’ ascriptions in English are 
compatible with Stanley and Williamson’s account. For example, Rajesh Bhatt posits a 
complex bouletic modal in ‘knows how’ ascriptions,58 in contrast to Stanley and 
Williamson who posit an ambiguity between the ‘ought’ and ‘can’ reading (Bhatt, 2006, 
Chapter 4). Bhatt’s account offers a unifying account of these two readings, as well as 
neatly explaining the way in which these readings can shift in response to conversationally 
salient goals.59 Although Bhatt’s account privileges knowledge of ways that achieve some 
contextually supplied goal,60 it agrees with Stanley and Williamson that ‘knows how’ 
ascriptions pick out states of propositional knowledge. We can also fiddle with the 
modality, the interpretation of PRO, or the mention-some/all distinction in ANSS&W 
without undermining the core Intellectualist claim. 
 
 However, there are a number of semantic treatments for ‘knows how’ ascriptions on 
the market which are opposed to a propositional account:  
 
                                                            
57 But see (Pavese, 2016b, sec. 1) who argues that the Intellectualist can explain the difference 
between the infinitival and interrogative constructions within the different readings of the 
interrogative construction. 
58 A bouletic modal concerns what is possible or necessary given a person’s desires or goals. 
59 For more on Bhatt’s semantics, see chapter 3 §3.3. The importance of contextual goals is noted 
by (D. G. Brown, 1970, p. 222; Moore, 1997, p. 169) 
60 In line with Brown’s account of the standard use (D. G. Brown, 1970) and Besson’s account of 
knowledge-how as knowledge of means-ends propositions (Besson, MS.). 
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i. Free Relative semantics: Bach (2012), and  Abbott (2013) suggest that the ‘how to’ 
clause in ‘S knows how to V’ does not function as an interrogative, but rather has a 
free relative noun phrase denoting an object. In a related vein, (Bengson & Moffett, 
2011a) argue that there are linguistic reasons for thinking that ‘how to V’ denotes 
an object. (We will return to the free relative view in chapter 2, where I will argue 
that this semantic account is linguistically implausible.)  
ii. Interrogative/Contrastivist Semantics: Masto (2010), suggests that ‘knows wh’ 
ascriptions in English involve a relation not to the answer to the question, but to the 
question as a whole — making knowledge-wh more like wondering-wh than 
telling-wh. Schaffer has also argued for the Contrastivist view that knowledge-wh 
is a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition and a question (Schaffer, 
2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009), and has defended a contrastivist semantics for 
‘knows’ (Schaffer & Szabó, 2014). Although Masto and Schaffer do not explicitly 
address the application of the Interrogative or Contrastive account to knowledge-
how, it opens the door to treating knowledge-how as a relation to a question, rather 
than to a set of propositions.  
iii. Predicative Semantics: In a series of papers, Brogaard has also argued on linguistic 
grounds that knowledge-wh is not a relation to a proposition, but is rather a 
relation to the property expressed by the question abstract (so, if I know where 
dinner is, then what I know is the place for dinner, not that the dinner is at such 
and such a place) (Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009), and applies this account of 
knowledge-wh to knowledge-how in her (2011) 
iv. Imperatival Semantics: Finally, Roberts (2009) builds on work by Dowty and 
Jacobson which treats infinitival wh-phrases not as interrogatives, but as verb 
phrases denoting a complex imperatival meaning concerning acts which can 
achieve some goal. 
 
 Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to assess the linguistic plausibility of all 
of these treatments (although see chapter 2 on the Free relative semantics, (Schaffer, 2009) 
on Predicativism, and (Aloni & Égré, 2010; Stanley 2011b, p. 61-5) on Contrastivism), the 
existence of these alternative semantics for knowledge demonstrates that Stanley and 
Williamson’s linguistic picture is not as uncontroversial as they make out. 
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4.2.5. Objects and Relations 
 
 A final objection to Stanley and Williamson’s argument — due to Ephraim Glick 
(2011)— concerns whether the linguistic evidence establishes the interesting kind of 
Intellectualism. Following Glick, let’s call any species of knowledge with a propositional 
object propositional knowledge, and let’s call a species of knowledge with a propositional 
object and all of the same epistemic properties as the standard examples of knowledge-that 
(justification, belief, Gettier proofing etc.) theoretical knowledge. This distinction gives us two 
ways to understand Intellectualism: 
 
 Strong Intellectualism: Knowledge how is a species of theoretical knowledge 
 Weak Intellectualism: Knowledge how is a species of propositional knowledge 
 
 Whereas Weak Intellectualism only makes a claim about the object of knowledge-how 
— that it is a proposition — Strong Intellectualism claims that the object of knowledge-
how is a proposition, and that the knowledge-how relation is identical to the theoretical 
knowledge relation, with all of the same properties. It seems clear that many of the critics 
of Intellectualism are interested in criticising Strong Intellectualism, and this certainly 
seems to be the claim that Ryle had in his sights. The interesting Intellectualist claim is that 
knowledge-how is a species of the ordinary kind of knowledge-that which we ascribe with 
sentences of the form ’S knows that p’.  
 
 Is Strong Intellectualism established by the linguistic evidence? Glick argues that it 
is not: the linguistic evidence given above concerned the proper interpretation of the ‘how 
to V’ clause, showing that it denotes a proposition. This evidence does not tell us what the 
correct semantics for ‘knows’ is. This means that the linguistic evidence is compatible with 
‘knows’ picking out both the theoretical knowledge relation in the case of ’S knows that p’, 
and some other relation in ’S knows how to V’, such as the seeming relation (Cath, 2011), 
or a special practical knowledge relation (Cath 2011; Glick, 2011). The linguistic evidence 
can tell us what kind of abstract objects we are related to in different kinds of knowledge-
ascriptions, but it does not tell us about what the epistemic properties of those relations 
are. This means that the truth-conditional semantics given by Stanley and Williamson are 
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compatible with significant differences between the epistemic properties of knowledge-
how and knowledge-that, of the kind proposed by Anti-Intellectualists in 4.1..61 
 
 Glick’s discussion brings out some important points that we will need to bear in mind 
below. First, investigation of the nature of knowledge-how connects in complicated ways 
to investigation of the nature of theoretical knowledge, and knowledge in general. 
Secondly, when we are thinking about the logical space in the knowledge-how debate, it is 
crucial to distinguish between claims about the object of knowledge-how, and claims about 
the knowledge-how relation, a point that we will return to in chapter 7. 
 
 
4.3. The Semantic Implementability Constraint  
 
 In this chapter I have set up the context for our discussion of knowledge-how in the 
rest of the thesis, setting out the main contours of the debate about the nature of 
knowledge-how with a focus on the importance of linguistic arguments. I have offered an 
interpretation of Ryle’s discussion of knowledge-how that shows him to be principally 
interested in non-linguistic issues, and argued that he doesn’t hold that knowing how to do 
something is just any kind of ability. I have suggested that – somewhat surprisingly – 
linguistic evidence entered into the knowledge-how debate on the side of Anti-
Intellectualism via linguistic motivations for the standard view, and argued that the 
linguistic motivation for this view is weak. 
 
 In §4, I set out what I take to be the linguistic arguments for Intellectualism and 
worked through some of the responses to this argument to get clearer on the legitimate 
uses of linguistic evidence in this debate. The overall assessment of these criticisms is 
partly concessionary to the Intellectualist. I have conceded that truth-conditional 
semantics are relevant to our account of the nature of knowledge, meaning that one can 
legitimately use linguistics as a source of evidence about the nature of knowledge-how. 
However, I have argued that we shouldn’t overstate the significance of linguistic evidence. 
For one thing, we should not expect linguistic uniformities to follow through to 
                                                            
61 Stanley accepts this this point (2011b, pp. 148–9), and it is natural to read chapters 7 and 8 of 
Know How as a defence of the idea that knowledge-how involves theoretical knowledge, rather than 
some other relation. 
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metaphysical uniformities. Furthermore the standard semantics offered by contemporary 
linguistics are not the final word in our account of the truth-conditions of knowledge-how 
ascriptions, and might be over-ridden by philosophical considerations. I have also 
suggested that the linguistic evidence — both concerning the correct semantics for English 
‘knows how’ ascriptions, and the cross-linguistic evidence — is more complex than Stanley 
and Williamson claim. Even if Stanley and Williamson’s semantics for English is correct, I 
have argued that it does not resolve some crucial issues about the nature of knowledge-
how: leaving open the question of how we should characterise the knowledge-how 
relation. 
 
  Going forward, it would be helpful to have a positive picture of what the legitimate 
role of linguistic evidence in this debate that accepts the relevance of linguistic 
considerations to the nature of knowledge-how, without endorsing the general priority of 
linguistic over philosophical considerations. I think that one helpful way to think about 
legitimate role of linguistic evidence is in this debate is as providing a semantic 
implementability constraint on accounts of knowledge-how. Supposing that knowledge-
how is the state which is picked out by our ordinary ascriptions of the form ’S knows how 
to V’, it is a condition on an acceptable account of the nature of knowledge-how that it is 
compatible with a linguistically plausible account of the truth-conditions of ’S knows how 
to V’. All we need to get this connection is the truth schema; we don’t need to be 
committed to the controversial linguistics-first methodology.  
 
 Stanley hints at this kind of implementability constraint: 
 
Suppose one produces an analysis of knowing how to do something. Surely, it 
would be a worry with such an analysis if there is no correct compositional 
semantics of English according to which ascriptions of knowing how to do 
something express that analysis. If there were no plausible compositional semantics 
for English ascriptions of knowing how that assigned to them one's favored 
analysis, then that would show that one's analysis could not possibly be what 
English speakers mean when they use such ascriptions. (Stanley, 2011 quoted in 
Bengson & Moffett, 2011b, p. 36). 
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 I think that this constraint provides a plausible picture of the role of linguistic 
evidence in this debate. We can understand the linguistic criticisms of the Standard picture 
as applications of this constraint. Supporters of the standard view claimed that a non-
propositional account of knowledge-how was the only semantically implementable account 
of knowledge-how, and their Intellectualist opponents quite reasonably pointed out that 
their view was not semantically implementable, given standard views about ‘knows how’ 
ascriptions. This constraint also gives some prima facie support to Propositionalism. Since 
an Propositionalist account can be semantically implemented, via Stanley and Williamson’s 
semantics, it has one up over other accounts of knowledge-how, for which there is not an 
obvious semantic implementation. 
 
 One place where I want to depart from Stanley concerns what happens if an 
account fails the implementability constant. If it turns out that an account of knowledge-
how is not compatible with any off-the-shelf semantics, then this is a strike against that 
account, because this provides evidence that our ordinary ‘knows how’ ascriptions are not 
picking out the state posited by that account, leaving the proponent of that account open 
to the change that they are changing the subject away from our ordinary notion of 
knowledge-how (Bengson & Moffett, 2011b, pp. 36–7; Stanley, 2011b, p. 144). However, 
there are a number of ways in which the supporter of an unimplementable account might 
respond to this challenge. One would be to offer a novel account of the semantics of 
ordinary ‘knows how’ ascriptions that is amenable to their metaphysics (perhaps along the 
lines of (Santorio, 2016)). Taking this option allows the supporter of this account to claim 
that their analysis connects to ordinary meaning; the point is just we needed to do some 
substantial philosophical work to get a grip on that meaning.  
 
 An alternative response is to disconnect their account of knowledge-how from the 
semantics of ‘knows how ascriptions entirely. One might opt for an error theory of our 
ordinary ‘knows how’ ascriptions, claiming that all sentences of the form ’S knows how to 
V’ are false, meaning that we need to employ other constructions to pick out knowledge-
how. Alternatively one might pursue a revisionary philosophical project, opting for an 
explication of knowledge-how, which aims to tidy up our ordinary notion of knowledge-
how in ways that deliberately depart from the ordinary concept (Bengson & Moffett, 
2011b, p. 44). If our ordinary knowledge-how ascriptions are simply false, or the 
philosophical project is to develop a new notion of knowledge-how, then the charge of 
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changing the subject loses its sting, and theories of knowledge-how can be developed 
independently of linguistic considerations. 
 
 In closing, I want to connect the criticisms of Intellectualism to the chapters to come. 
In §4.2.2. I argued that there might be philosophical reasons to think that knowledge-how 
is not a species of propositional knowledge. In chapter 3 I give an example of such an 
argument, contending that Intellectualism faces a significant problem in isolating a kind of 
propositional knowledge that is plausibly identical with knowledge-how. In §4.2.4. I 
pointed out that there are a number of alternatives to the interrogative semantics offered 
by Stanley and Williamson. In chapter 2 I will consider the Free Relative semantics 
suggested by Abbott and Bach, argue that it provides the only way for Objectualists to 
semantically implement their account of knowledge-how, and show that it is a linguistically 
implausible account of ‘knows how’ ascriptions. In §4.2.5. I considered Glick’s argument 
that linguistic evidence fails to establish the interesting kind of Intellectualism. In chapter 
7, I will build on his discussion, arguing that the linguistic evidence is compatible with 
knowledge-how being a species of ability — the ability to answer a question. 
 
 
 47 
Chapter 2: Knowledge-How: Interrogatives and Free 
Relatives 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, I consider what I take to be the most plausible non-interrogative 
semantics for ‘knows-how’ ascriptions, which treats the ‘how to V’ phrase as a free relative 
noun phrase (Bach, 2012; Abbott, 2013). According to the free relative semantics,  ‘how to 
V’ denotes not a question, but an object. If linguistically plausible, this semantics would 
provide a natural way to implement Bengson and Moffett’s Objectualist account of 
knowledge-how, which claims that knowing how to do something involves the 
understanding relation to a way of acting (Bengson & Moffett, 2011a). I argue that on 
balance the free relative semantics is not linguistically plausible. Although Bengson and 
Moffett consider a number of linguistic phenomena that suggest such a view, these 
phenomena can equally be explained by interrogative semantics. Furthermore, standard 
linguistic tests for detecting interrogative and free relative readings strongly suggest that 
sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ have a clear interrogative reading, and no free 
relative reading. The upshot is that Objectualists need to look elsewhere for a way to 
semantically implement their view. 
 
 The plan of action is as follows. In §1 I lay out the distinction between 
Interrogative and Free Relative readings of wh-phrases. In §2, I relate these two readings 
to the debate about the nature of knowledge-how, and show that the Free Relative 
semantics is the most plausible way for Objectualists to semantically implement their view. 
In §3, I consider Bengson and Moffett’s linguistic evidence that ‘how to V’ has an objectual 
reading, and in §4 I run through some standard linguistic tests for detecting Interrogative 
and Free Relative readings. 
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1. Interrogatives and Free Relatives 
We can get an intuitive grip on the distinction between interrogative and free 
relative wh-phrases by considering the different meanings that wh-phrases can have.62  
Consider the following sentences: 
(1) I asked what was for dinner. 
(2) I ate what I was given. 
We can give an account of the meaning of sentence (1) by reading the wh-phrase as 
having an interrogative meaning, denoting a question. Sentence (1) is true if I utter the 
sentence ‘what’s for dinner?’.  However, it would be wrong to treat the wh-phrase in 
sentence (2) in the same manner. Sentence (2) doesn’t claim that I ate the question what 
was I given?. Questions just aren’t the kinds of things we eat. Hence, in (2) the wh-phrase 
‘what I was given’ must denote something else, plausibly some stuff that I was given. 
Linguists standardly explain this difference in meaning by claiming that in sentence (1) the 
wh-phrase is functioning as an interrogative, denoting a question, whereas in (2) the wh-
phrase is functioning as a free relative, denoting an object. 
We can often work out how a wh-complement is functioning by considering the 
meaning of the embedding verb. Some verbs can relate only to questions, requiring an 
interrogative reading of their wh-complements, whereas other verbs can relate only to 
non-propositional objects, requiring a free relative reading. For example, ‘ask’, ‘inquire’ 
and ‘wonder’ can only relate to questions, whereas ‘eat’, ‘take’ and ‘give’ can only relate to 
objects.  
When a verb doesn’t make such a restriction in virtue of its meaning, we find 
sentences that are ambiguous between the free relative and embedded question readings.63 
Consider the following situation: Tariq and Mona are spies. Their job is to keep track of 
rival spies who are after their country’s nuclear codes, and to inform their superiors 
whenever the rival spies attempt to communicate with their handlers. Tariq and Mona do 
not themselves know the nuclear codes. They are tracking two spies: Jorge and Petra. It is 
common knowledge between them that Petra has a belief about what the codes are, 
                                                            
62 Standard linguistic treatments of this distinction can be found in (Bresnan & Grimshaw, 1978; C. 
L. Baker, 1995; Huddleston & Pullum, 2002, pp. 1068–79). 
63 For a parallel example with ‘ask’, see (Michaelis, 2011, n. 3) 
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although they don’t know the content of that belief, or whether it is true. Tariq utters the 
following sentence: 
(3) Jorge knows what Petra believes. 
 There are two interpretations of this sentence, which have different 
presuppositions, and make different commitments as to the relation of Jorge and Petra.64  
 
 If we read ‘what Petra believes’ as a free relative, it denotes the thing that Petra 
believes — that the nuclear code is XYZ. On this reading (3) says that Jorge knows the 
thing that Petra merely believes: that XYZ is the nuclear code. On this reading, this 
sentence presupposes that Petra’s belief is true, since Petra believes the proposition that 
Jorge knows, and knowledge is factive. However, this reading says nothing about Jorge’s 
knowledge of Petra: they might have the same beliefs without ever having heard of one 
another. 
 
By contrast, if we read ‘what Petra believes’ as an interrogative, the wh-phrase 
denotes a question, meaning that (3) says that Jorge knows the answer to the question of 
what Petra believes. This question might either be answered by a proposition like Petra has 
some belief about what the nuclear code is, or by a proposition like Petra believes that the Nuclear 
codes are XYZ. On this reading, (3) does not presuppose that Petra has a true belief, 
because it might be that Jorge only knows that Petra has some belief or other about the 
codes, without having any knowledge about what the code is.  However, this sentence does 
require that Jorge is aware of Petra, since he cannot know what she believes without 
having some idea about who she is.65 
 
                                                            
64 One way to make these readings salient is by shifting focus. Consider: 
 
 (3a) Jorge KNOWS what Petra BELIEVES 
 (3b) Jorge knows WHAT Petra believes 
 
The pattern of focus in (3a) favours the free relative reading, whereas the focus in (3b) favours an 
interrogative reading. 
65 Sentences like (3) pose an interesting problem for Brogaard’s account of knowledge-wh 
ascriptions. She treats interrogative wh-complements and free relatives as having the same kind of 
meaning (Brogaard, 2008b, p. 162, 2009, pp. 449–53), which means she doesn’t have the resources 
to explain sentences which are intuitively ambiguous between interrogative and free relative 
readings. She considers a related sentence – ‘what John is is boring’ (2008: example (30c) on p. 
165) – but her comments do not suggest a general strategy for explaining this ambiguity. 
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2. Free Relative Semantics for ‘S knows how to V’ 
 
 Having got clear on the difference between interrogatives and free relatives, let’s 
connect this distinction to the debate about the nature of knowledge-how. Applying the 
interrogative and free relative treatments to sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ 
gives us the following general truth conditions (with brackets used to pick out the object of 
the knowledge relation): 
 
KH-INT: ‘S knows how to V’ is true iff for some way w, S knows [that w is a way 
to V] 
KH-FR: ‘S knows how to V’ is true iff for some way w, S knows [w] and w is a way 
to V 
 Removing the quotation marks in these semantic treatments gives us two rather 
different accounts of the nature of knowledge-how. Disquotation on KH-INT yields the 
claim that knowledge-how is knowledge of a certain kind of proposition about the nature 
of knowledge-how, in line with ANSS&W. By contrast, disquotation on KH-FR yields the 
claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge of a relevant way of acting. 
Whereas KH-INT is a natural partner for Propositionalism; KH-FR is a natural partner 
for an Objectualist account of knowledge-how, as (Abbott, 2013) and (Bach, 2012) 
observe. 
 
 The best-developed version of Objectualism is Bengson and Moffett (2011a) (see 
(Bengson & Moffett, 2007) for a precursor, and (Michaelson, MS) for another way to 
develop this view). On Bengson and Moffett’s view, knowing how to do something 
consists in an objectual understanding relation toward a way of acting, together with a 
distinctive kind of action-guiding conception of that way of acting, which plays the same 
role as the practical mode of presentation in Stanley and Williamson’s account. Bengson 
and Moffett have an ambivalent relation with the Free Relative semantics. A good deal of 
the evidence for their view comes from linguistic arguments, which can easily be adapted 
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to support the free relative semantics, as we shall see in the next section. However, 
Bengson and Moffett are cagey about the connection, claiming that:66 
 
It is not clear to what extent the metaphysical distinction between propositions and 
ways of acting currently at issue corresponds to the linguistic distinction between 
embedded questions [i.e. interrogatives] and free relatives. (2011b footnote 42) 
 
 I think that this unclarity can only stem from general unclarity about the relation 
between linguistic distinctions and metaphysical distinctions. The discussion in chapter 1 
provides us a picture of the connection between metaphysical and linguistic distinctions, in 
the shape of the Semantic Implementability Constraint. This constraint requires that an 
Objectualist account of the nature of knowledge-how be compatible with a linguistically 
plausible semantics for ‘knows how’ ascriptions. The free relative semantics is an obvious 
option for the Objectualist to semantically implement their account, and if this semantics 
were plausible, then this would put Objectualism on par with Propositionalism with 
respect to the linguistic evidence. 
 
 In fact, the free relative semantics looks to be the only currently available semantics 
for ‘knows how’ ascriptions that allows the Objectualist to semantically implement their 
account. We have seen in chapter 1 that there are a number of semantics which depart 
from the Answer theory: interrogative semantics which treats wh-phrases as expressing a 
question (Schaffer, 2007; Masto, 2010), predicative semantics which treats wh-phrases as 
expressing a predicate nominal (Brogaard, 2009), and imperatival semantics which treats 
an infinitival wh-phrase as expressing a complex imperatival meaning (Roberts, 2009). 
None of these accounts are natural partners for the Objectualist account.67 (Ginzburg, 
2011) and (Michaelis, 2011) also depart from the standard account of ‘knows-wh’ 
ascriptions, although they both end up treating wh-phrases as expressing propositions. 
Although Ginzburg suggests that some non-English infinitival knowledge ascriptions are 
non-propositional, he treats ‘S knows how to V’ as involving a relation to a fact. Michaelis 
                                                            
66 (Michaelson, MS) is an example of an Objectualist view that is much clearer in endorsing the 
free relative semantics. 
67 Although the Predicativist semantics might be thought to work well with Objectualism, on this 
account one knows a predicate in virtue of knowing that certain objects fulfil that predicate. 
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treats wh-complements as presupposing an open proposition (of the form: x is F),68 and 
asserting that the agent knows the unbound variable in that open proposition. Although 
Michaelis’s view can sound close to Objectualism, she explicitly claims that her account is 
truth-conditionally equivalent to Stanley’s account (2011, p. 277) meaning that her 
account is not strictly speaking an alternative to the interrogative semantics. 
 
 By elimination, the free relative semantics is the only available semantics that is 
compatible with Objectualism, meaning that the most natural way for Objectualists to try 
to semantically implement their view is by endorsing this semantics. If this semantics is not 
plausible — as I shall argue below — then this is a strike against the Objectualist account 
of knowledge-how. As I observed in chapter 1 §4.2.3., the fact that an account of 
knowledge how is not semantically implementable does not mean that this account is 
untenable: one could offer a revisionary semantics which is compatible with one’s 
metaphysics, opt for an error theory, or embark on a project of explicating the concept of 
knowledge-how. However, the fact that an account is not implementable is a negative 
feature. 
 
 In the interests of accurately representing Bengson and Moffett’s discussion, it is 
worth pointing out that they offer a different interpretation of the argument from 
linguistics. They appeal to the Argument from Linguistic Uniformity (see chapter 1 §4.1.), 
claiming that positing a uniformly Objectualist account of knowledge-wh explains this 
linguistic uniformity just as well as a propositional account. One consequence of this 
argument is that it commits Bengson and Moffett to a general Objectualist account of 
knowledge-wh, meaning that they need to endorse an Objectualist-friendly semantics for 
all ‘knows wh’ ascriptions. Although we have seen above that at least some ‘knows wh’ 
ascriptions involve the free relative reading (in our discussion of sentence (3)), Bengson 
and Moffett need the much more ambitious claim that all ‘knows wh’ ascriptions involve 
this reading. There is lots of good linguistic evidence against this claim, stemming from the 
application of the linguistic tests considered in §4 below. However, in the interests of 
space, I will simply put the suggestion that all ‘knows wh’ has a free relative reading to one 
side. One exception: below I will assume that ‘knows whether’ ascriptions have only an 
interrogative reading, and use ‘knows whether’ as a test to calibrate whether Bengson and 
                                                            
68 On the difference between open propositions and sets of propositions, see (Friedman, 2013, pp. 
152–3). 
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Moffett’s linguistic evidence is really suggestive of a free relative reading. This is — I hope 
— not an especially controversial assumption. I find it difficult to even understand the 
suggestion that ‘knows whether’ ascriptions involve a free relative reading, in part because 
it’s not clear what kind of object is supposed to be involved. 
 
  
3. Evidence that ‘how to V’ is a Free Relative 
  
Bengson and Moffett appeal to four linguistic phenomena to build an argument for 
thinking that the ‘how to’ complement in knows how ascriptions denotes an object rather 
than a proposition (Bengson & Moffett, 2011a, pp. 178–85): 
 i. The availability of apparent objectual paraphrases for ‘knows how ‘ ascriptions,  
 ii. The fact that ’knows how’ ascriptions fail to take propositional modifiers,  
 iii. The oddness of raising the question of justification about knowledge-how, 
iv. The gradability of ‘knows how’ ascriptions.  
 Although Bengson and Moffett do not present these phenomena as evidence for a 
free relative semantics, they are suggestive of such a view, since these phenomena can be 
explained by a free relative semantics. I will argue that these phenomena do not provide a 
compelling argument for the free relative semantics, since all of these phenomena can also 
be explained by the supporter of an interrogative semantics. This is bad news for both 
Objectualism, and free relative semantics since it removes a central plank in the argument 
for both views. 
Bengson and Moffett’s first piece of linguistic evidence comes from the paraphrases 
for ‘knows-how’ ascriptions. They claim that the natural paraphrase for (4) is not Stanley 
and Williamson’s (4a), but rather (4b) (with brackets for clausal boundaries):  
(4) Ruth knows how to swim. 
(4a) Ruth knows [that w is a way in which she herself can swim]. 
(4b) Ruth knows [the way to swim]. 
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They point out that the naturalness of (4b) is good news for the objectualist, since 
in this paraphrase the object of knowledge seems to be an object-denoting noun phrase – 
the way to swim – rather than a proposition-denoting that-clause. This paraphrase is 
extremely close to the free relative reading of ‘how to swim’, which seems like good news 
for the free relative semantics. 
Although this paraphrase is suggestive, a supporter of the interrogative semantics 
can easily explain it. ‘Knowledge-the’ ascriptions like (4b) plausibly have a concealed 
question reading which is equivalent to an interrogative knowledge-wh ascription (White, 
1982, pp. 31–2; Brogaard, 2008b; Bach, 2012). Consider: 
(5) Jane knows the capital of Mali. 
This sentence has two readings: an objectual reading which says that Jane is 
acquainted with Bamako, and a concealed question or quasi-interrogative reading which 
says that Jane knows what the Capital of Mali is but makes no commitments about 
acquaintance. Given the concealed question reading of ‘knows-the’ ascriptions it is 
unsurprising that interrogative knowledge-wh can be paraphrased by ‘knowledge-the’ 
ascriptions, as Pavese points out (Pavese, 2013, n. 15). Taking a concealed question 
approach to (4b) it comes out as meaning something like ‘Ruth knows what a way to swim 
is’, which not only involves an interrogative, but is pretty close to Stanley and Williamson’s 
proposed paraphrase (4a).69 
Bengson and Moffett’s second piece of evidence comes from the observation that 
the complement in ‘knows how’ ascriptions fails to take modifiers that are appropriate for 
that-clauses. For example: 
(6) Noelle knows that the Prime Minister is a woman – so it must be true! 
sounds fine, but: 
                                                            
69 We also use ascriptions like ‘Jane knows loads of ways to swim’ which like (4b) suggest an 
objectual reading. Ascriptions of this form are also susceptible to a concealed question analysis, 
despite not involving ‘the’. ‘Jane knows loads of Capitals of African Countries’ has a reading which 
means ‘Jane knows what the capitals of loads of African countries are.’ On the parallel treatment, 
‘Jane knows loads of ways to swim’ means something like ‘Jane knows what loads of ways to swim 
are’. It is worth noting that whereas ‘knows-the’ sentences can take either a concealed question or 
an objectual reading, ‘learns-the’ sentences like ‘Joan learnt the capital of Mali’ can only take a 
concealed question reading, which suggests that ‘learns’ cannot take an objectual complement. This 
is an awkward result for the objectualist, given the close conceptual connections between learning 
and knowing (Pavese, 2016b, pp. 654–5). 
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(7) ?Ruth knows how to swim – so it must be true! 
seems grammatically odd.70 Following Bengson and Moffett, we might think that 
sentence (7) is odd because the how-complement denotes an object, and objects cannot be 
true. The supporter of the free relative semantics can appeal to the same explanation, since 
on their view ‘how to swim’ is an object-denoting noun-phrase. 
Bengson and Moffett also note that ‘knowledge-how’ ascriptions seem not to be 
‘bumped up’ to certainty, but rather seem to be bumped up to mastery: 
(8) ? Ruth knows how to swim — in fact, she’s certain of it!  
(9) Ruth knows how to swim — in fact, she's mastered it! 
There is a parallel argument in the offing here. The supporter of a free relative 
semantics can point out that one cannot be certain of ways, although one can master them.  
Although these arguments initially seem appealing, they end up significantly over-
generating.  It is easy to construct examples in which other kinds of ‘knows-wh’ 
ascriptions fail to take these modifiers. Consider: 
(10) ? Noelle knows whether the Prime minister is a woman – so it must be true! 
(11) ? Vesta knows who came to the party — so it must be true 
Sentences (10) and (11) sound just as weird as (7), which suggests that if one 
wants to take this evidence seriously, it supports the claim that a whole swathe of ‘knows 
wh’ ascriptions have a free relative reading, which is a contentious position. Bengson and 
Moffett do float the idea that all knows-wh involves objectual knowledge, so we might 
think that they would be happy to endorse a free relative semantics for (11). However, 
even they ought to baulk at the suggestion that ‘knows-whether’ ascriptions involve a free 
relative complement, as I observed above. 
 Furthermore, the supporter of an interrogative semantics can appeal to a fairly 
simple explanation for the oddness of these sentences. According to the interrogative 
semantics, a wh-phrase denotes not a proposition, but a question. And on the face of it, 
                                                            
70 I use ? to mark grammatically anomalous sentences.  
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questions aren’t the kinds of things that can be true or false.71 So, we might think that (7), 
(10), and (11) are odd because of anaphora failure. The modifying phrase ‘so it must be 
true’ involves the anaphoric ‘it’, which looks back in the sentence to find something which 
might be true. Since the interrogative phrase denotes a question, one might think that the 
anaphoric phrase is odd simply because ‘it’ fails to secure reference to anything. The 
general lesson is that although the Propositionalist is committed to thinking that 
‘knowledge-wh’ ascriptions are made true by states of propositional knowledge, they don’t 
need to think that ‘knows-that’ and ‘knows-wh’ ascriptions have precisely the same 
semantic or syntactic properties.72 
 
The supporter of an interrogative semantics can also explain the appropriateness of 
(9). Presumably one can master activities as well as ways of acting. And, on the standard 
interrogative semantics, (9) relates Ruth to a question about the activity of swimming. So 
on the standard interrogative semantics for (9) the first part of the sentence includes a 
term picking out an activity which can be the subject of anaphoric reference in phrases like 
‘in fact, she’s mastered it’.  
 
 Examples like (8) involving ‘in fact, she’s certain of it’ are a little trickier. 
Intuitively, one can be certain of questions — consider ‘Paul was certain of who came to 
the party’ —, so the interrogative semantics predicts that these sentences ought to be 
acceptable. Interestingly, the parallel examples for ‘knows-whether’ are a little strange but 
seem grammatically acceptable. For example: 
                                                            
71 For example, one plausible view of the denotation of interrogatives identifies questions with a 
partition consisting of mutually exclusive complete answering propositions (Groenendijk & 
Stokhof, 1984). Since a partition is not the kind of thing that can be true or false, this view can 
easily explain the weirdness of (7), (10), and (11). 
72 Bengson and Moffett consider this kind of response (Bengson & Moffett, 2011a, n. 43). They 
point out that this explanation predicts that anaphora with predicates of questions (like: ‘it is easily 
answered’, ‘it is a difficult question’, or ‘it is extremely interesting’) ought to be acceptable. They 
give an example of question-anaphora which seems bad: 
 
 (1) ? Michael knows how to swim, it is easily answered. 
 
However, there are other examples which seem grammatically acceptable, although baroque: 
 
 (2) Xenia knows how to solve the puzzle, although it is a difficult question. 
 (3) Paula knows how to prove the ABC conjecture, it is extremely interesting. 
 
It is also worth noting that part of the oddness of 1) might well come from the fact that how to swim 
is not an easy question, which is a semantic, rather than a grammatical issue with the sentence. 
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(12) Noelle knows whether the Prime Minister is a woman — in fact she’s certain 
of it! 
 
sounds fine. This sentence says that Noelle doesn’t merely know, but is certain of 
whether the PM is a woman.  Pretty much all of the examples here are controversial, but I 
think that at least some ‘knows how’ sentences can be modified by certainty. For example: 
 
 (13) Thorald knows how to pronounce ‘phở’ — in fact she’s certain of it! 
 
Sounds grammatically acceptable (at least, to me): it says that Thorald doesn’t 
merely know, but is certain of how to pronounce ‘phở’?.73 There’s certainly room for 
disagreement about the acceptability of this sentence, and I can easily imagine supporters 
of the free relative semantics sticking to their guns, and claiming that (13) is unacceptable. 
However, if there is disagreement about our intuitions, this is bad news for the supporter 
of free relative semantics. If there are conflicting or fuzzy intuitions about the acceptability 
of a class of sentences, then neither side of the debate ought to be relying on the 
acceptability (or unacceptability) of these sentences as motivation for their view, which 
means that examples like (8), (12), and (13) are not admissible evidence for either side.  
 
 Bengson and Moffett’s third piece of evidence is the fact that ‘knows-how’ 
ascriptions do not open up the question of justification, unlike ‘knows-that’ ascriptions 
(Austin, 1956). They point to the following exchange: 
 
 (14)  a) Martin knows how to get to the airport, 
b) Hmmm … is he really justified in believing that? 
The response in (14b) is certainly odd, and one might think that this is because 
knowledge-how is not the kind of knowledge which involves justification.  
                                                            
73 Incidentally, (12) sounds even better to me if we omit the final ‘of it’: 
 
 (12*) Ana knows how to pronounce ‘phở’ — in fact she’s certain! 
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However, the supporter of an interrogative semantics can explain the oddness of 
this exchange by appealing to the same kind of anaphora failure which occurs in sentence 
(7), (8), (10) and (11). The response in (14b) involves an anaphoric ‘that’ which looks for 
a proposition in (14a) about which one can raise the question of justification. However, if 
the interrogative semantics is correct, then (14a) ascribes knowledge of a question, 
meaning that there are no propositions available for the anaphoric ‘that’ to pick up on. 
Consider a parallel example with ‘knows-whether’: 
15 )  a) Martin knows whether to swim 
 b) Hmmm … is he really justified in believing that? 
 
 The response in (15b) is just as weird as (14b), suggesting that the weirdness stems 
from problems with anaphoric reference to interrogative phrases, rather than any special 
features of ‘how to V’ phrases. 
 
Putting the oddness of (14b) to one side, one might think that there remains a 
powerful non-linguistic argument for Objectualism in the offing here. It seems that there 
are many cases in which agents know how without having a related justified belief (Cath, 
2011; Glick, 2011, pp. 408–9; Weatherson, 2016, pp. 12–3). Since most theories of the 
propositional knowledge relation claim that it requires justification, one might take the 
observation that there are cases of knowledge-how without justification as evidence that 
the relation involved in knowledge-how is something other than propositional knowledge. 
In particular, one might take this as an argument for thinking that knowledge-how is non-
justification entailing objectual knowledge. This is an instance of a wider class of arguments 
which we might call divergence arguments, which are most familiar from the debate about the 
Gettierisability of knowledge-how (Poston, 2009; Cath, 2011, 2015; Carter & Pritchard, 
2015b). These arguments contend that knowledge-how cannot be a kind of knowledge-
that because the two kinds of knowledge have different epistemic properties (see chapter 1 
§4.1. for some more examples of divergences). 
A successful divergence argument establishes that knowledge-how involves a 
relation with different epistemic properties to standard examples of knowledge-that. 
However this result doesn’t establish that the object of knowledge-how is anything other 
than a proposition. Supposing that knowledge-how does not entail justification, it might be 
the case that knowledge-how is a special kind of non-justification-entailing propositional 
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knowledge, or that knowledge-how is a non-knowledge constituting relation to a 
proposition.74 Although positing that knowledge-how is a kind of non-justification 
entailing propositional knowledge seems rather ad hoc, there are various accounts of 
propositional knowledge on the market which claim that propositional knowledge does not 
require justification (Goldman, 1967; Kornblith, 2008).75 So, even if the divergence 
argument for justification goes through, it does not establish that the object of knowledge-
how is anything other than a proposition. 
Bengson and Moffett’s final piece of evidence comes from the apparent gradability 
of ‘knows-how’ ascriptions. We can say one person knows how to do something better than 
someone else, or that they know in part how to do something. These qualitative and 
quantitative modifiers don’t apply to ‘knows that’ ascriptions, suggesting that know-how, 
but not know-that, can come in degree (Ryle, 2009b, p. 46). A free relative semantics is in 
a nice place to explain this data, since objectual knowledge ascriptions also permit degree 
modifiers – one can have partial knowledge of Paris, or know Paris better than someone 
else. These modifiers can be neatly explained by pointing out that one can be more or less 
acquainted with an object, suggesting that these modifiers attach to the knowledge-how 
relation. 
However, a supporter of Interrogative semantics can also provide plausible 
explanations for the gradability of knowledge-how ascriptions, positing that these 
modifiers attach to the object of knowledge-how. For example, Stanley treats comparative 
modifiers like better than as grading the quality of the ways known (2011b, pp. 31–5) and 
Pavese argues that degree modifiers like ‘in part’ mark a partial answer to the embedded 
question (Pavese, 2013, 2017), (see also: Roberts, 2009). The upshot is that both 
Objectualism and Propositionalism can explain the gradability of ‘knows how’ ascriptions, 
although Objectualism posits a modification of the knowledge relation, and 
Propositionalism a modification of what is known. 
To sum up, although the four linguistic phenomena that Bengson and Moffett 
appeal to in support of Objectualism to are suggestive of a free relative semantics, closer 
attention shows us that a supporter of interrogative semantics can also explain these 
                                                            
74 Both of these moves are somewhat controversial, but are represented in the literature. For the 
analogue moves in the Gettierisability debate, see (Cath, 2015) and (Cath, 2011) respectively. 
75 Sections 7.2. and 7.3. in (Stanley, 2011b) are effectively an extended version of this response to 
various divergence arguments. 
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features, meaning that the ability to explain these linguistic phenomena is not a reason to 
prefer a free relative semantics.  
 
 
4. Tests for Distinguishing Free Relatives from Interrogatives  
 
 There are a number of linguistic tests that can be used to determine whether a 
‘knows wh’ ascription has an interrogative or free relative reading (Schaffer 2009: 486-91). 
These tests pose a serious problem for the free relative semantics for ‘know-how’, since ‘S 
knows how to V’ systematically tests positive for an interrogative reading and negative for 
a free relative reading.  
 There are five tests for detecting an interrogative reading of a wh-phrase: 
i. Wh-the-hell: If the wh-phrase can be extended to an exclamation like wh-the-
hell then it has an interrogative reading (Zwicky & Sadock, 1975); 
ii. Co-ordination: If the wh-phrase can be embedded within a verb which only 
accepts interrogative complements – like ‘wonder’, ‘ask’, or ‘inquire’ – then 
it has an interrogative reading (Bresnan & Grimshaw, 1978, p. 332; C. L. 
Baker, 1995, pp. 204–7); 
iii. Multiple questions: If the wh-phrase can be extended to include multiple 
question-words, then it has an interrogative reading (C. L. Baker, 1968; 
Bresnan & Grimshaw, 1978, p. 335); 
iv. Paraphrase: If the wh-phrase can be paraphrased in terms of a question-word 
that cannot take a free relative reading, then it has an interrogative reading 
(C. L. Baker, 1995, p. 217); 
v. Infinitive: If the wh-phrase is infinitival, then it is an interrogative, and not a 
free relative (C. L. Baker, 1995, pp. 216–8; Huddleston & Pullum, 2002, pp. 
1070–3).  
A couple of points about these tests. First, the tests detect readings of a wh-phrase, 
so testing positive for one reading doesn’t establish that the other reading is not available. 
Some wh-phrases are ambiguous between interrogative and free relative readings (as we 
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saw with sentence (3)). The exception to this is test (v), which does tell against a free 
relative reading.  Secondly, passing a test is a sufficient condition for a reading, but not a 
necessary condition. Failing one test is not a guarantee of the absence of a particular 
reading: for example finite wh-phrases do not pass (v), but may pass all of the other tests 
for an interrogative reading. However, if a wh-phrase fails all of the tests for a reading, I 
take this to be good evidence that that reading is not present. Thirdly, these tests detect 
readings of a given wh-phrase independently of the embedding verb. There may be 
sentences in which a wh-phrase can have two readings, but the embedding verb forces one 
of those readings (such as (2)). 
A typical know-how ascription – ‘Kasey knows how to get to Larissa’ – gives 
clearly positive results on tests (i), (ii) and (v). Tests (iii) and (iv) do not give clear 
positives, but don’t cause serious problems for the interrogative semantics. 
The wh-the-hell test (i) suggests an interrogative reading, since: 
(16) I don’t know how the hell to get to Larissa  
is an acceptable sentence. 
The co-ordination test (ii) also suggests an interrogative reading, since ‘how to get 
to Larissa’ can be moved into verbs that can only accept interrogative complements. 
Consider: 
(17) Kasey wondered how to get to Larissa  
(18) Kasey asked how to get to Larissa 
(19) Kasey inquired how to get to Larissa 
All of these sentences are completely acceptable. 
Whereas the patterning of the data on tests (i) and (ii) is robust, with all ‘know 
how’ ascriptions passing these tests, the multiple question test (iii) is less decisive. We can 
find some examples of infinitival know-how ascriptions with multiple question words. For 
example: 
(20) Kasey knows how to get to where 
(21) Kasey knows how to get to whom 
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However such examples are few and far between, and seem to be of doubtful 
acceptability. I don’t think that the rarity of multiple questions ought to be too much of a 
worry for an interrogative treatment. For one thing, these tests provide merely sufficient 
conditions for an interrogative reading. Furthermore, it is just as difficult to find multiple 
question examples for ‘who to’, ‘where to’, and ‘whether to’, suggesting that the underlying 
pattern is that it is difficult to construct multiple wh-phrases for sentences involving 
infinitival wh-phrases. 
The paraphrase test (iv) is based on the observation that different question-words 
seem to be more or less favourable to the free relative reading, with ‘whether’ never taking 
a free relative reading.76 We might try to paraphrase ‘Ruth knows how to get to Larissa’ 
with a ‘knows-whether’ ascription. Consider: 
(22) Kasey knows whether taking the road north is the way to get to Larissa. 
This does not seem like a particularly successful paraphrase for the original 
sentence. Again, because these tests provide sufficient conditions for an interrogative 
reading, the doubtfulness of this paraphrase is not a serious worry for the supporter of an 
interrogative reading.  
The infinitive test (v) is crucial, since it both supports an interrogative reading, and 
speaks against a free relative reading. We have seen (from example (3)) that ‘knows’ can 
take interrogatives and free relatives. However, when it comes to embedded infinitival wh-
phrases we can only seem to detect interrogative readings. The sentences: 
(23) Naomi knows when to turn off the road. 
(24) Ywieng knows why to take the high road to Larissa. 
(25) Dai knows whether to start off early or late. 
                                                            
76 As incidental support of the line that ‘knows how’ does not involve a free relative, it is worth 
noting that some linguists class ‘how’ along with ‘whether’ as a question-word which can never take 
a free relative reading (C. L. Baker, 1995, p. 217; Huddleston & Pullum, 2002, p. 1072). This claim 
is too strong (for example, ‘I was upset because of how he acted’ is pretty clearly a free relative, 
and ‘How she writes is unclear’ seems ambiguous between free relative and interrogative 
readings), but the fact that a number of prominent linguists have made this claim is indicative of 
how rare it is to find clear examples of ‘how’ functioning as a free relative. 
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 seem only to mean that Kasey knows the propositions which answer the various 
indirect questions, and do not have objectual readings.77 Additionally verbs that can only 
take free relative wh-phrases – like ‘take’, ‘ate’ and ‘gave’ – cannot be combined with an 
infinitival wh-phrase. Consider: 
(26) ? Aurelie takes what to use for cleaning the board. 
(27) ? Jeyla ate what to eat. 
(28) ? Yves gave what to use to write on the board. 
 Since there are no good examples of infinitival wh-phrases with a free relative 
reading, test (v) both strongly suggests an interrogative reading of ‘S knows how to V’, 
and speaks against a free relative reading. 
Let’s take stock. The results of tests (i), (ii), (v) strongly suggest the availability of 
an interrogative reading for sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’, and (v) also speaks 
against a free relative reading. Tests (iii) and (iv) are not so decisive, but in the context of 
the positive results on the other tests these failures do not speak against the interrogative 
reading. This means that the simple view according to which ‘how to V’ always functions 
as a free relative in ‘knows how’ ascriptions is implausible. There are two ways in which 
the supporter of the free relative semantics might respond to these results: to argue that 
the free relative reading holds true for some sub-set of ‘knows how’ ascriptions, or to argue 
that ‘knows how’ ascriptions are ambiguous between the two readings. 
The first move restricts attention to a sub-set of ‘knows how’, and suggest that 
some ‘knows-how’ ascriptions are interrogatives and others free relatives. Although it is 
true that the philosophically interesting class of knowledge-how is not all knowledge 
picked out with a how-complement, as noted above in chapter 1 §3 the most plausible way 
to linguistically delimit the philosophically interesting kind of know-how is to focus on ‘S 
knows how to V’, which test (v) suggests is an especially implausible candidate for a free 
relative reading.78 A more plausible move would be to appeal to ambiguity, claiming that 
                                                            
77 We shouldn’t be mislead by the ‘knows-the’ paraphrases for these sentences, which involve 
concealed questions, making them equivalent to the interrogative readings (see section 3). 
78 Perhaps finite ‘knows how’ ascriptions might provide better case for a free relative reading. For 
example, ‘Artur knows how coffee smells’, seems to have one reading which denotes acquaintance 
knowledge (Moore, 1997, p. 183), and passes test (vi) for a free relative reading. Since these 
ascriptions do not ascribe the practical species of knowledge-how, the existence of a free relative 
reading of these sentences is incidental to our main concern here. 
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‘knows how’ has both interrogative and free relative readings, like sentence (3). This kind 
of view could explain the positive results on tests (i) and (ii) since if ‘know-how’ were 
ambiguous, the addition of interrogative modifiers or embedding within a verb like 
‘wonder’ would force the interrogative reading.  
However, the ambiguity view runs into serious problems. For one thing, test (v) 
speaks both for the interrogative reading, and against the free relative reading. It is also 
worth noting that Bengson and Moffett have themselves pointed out that ‘knows how’ fails 
standard tests for ambiguity (Bengson & Moffett, 2007, pp. 28–40; Bengson, Moffett, & 
Wright, 2009, pp. 393–4). Furthermore, the standard tests for a free relative reading come 
up negative, suggesting that there is no available free relative reading. There are two tests 
for a free relative reading: 
vi. Wh-ever: If the wh-word can be extended to wh-ever, then the wh-phrase is a 
free relative (Bresnan & Grimshaw, 1978, pp. 334–5; Huddleston & Pullum, 
2002, pp. 986–7); 
vii. Co-ordination: if the wh-phrase can be combined with a verb which cannot 
take an interrogative complement – like ‘took’, ‘believes’, or ’ate’ – then it 
has a free relative reading (Bresnan & Grimshaw, 1978, p. 332; C. L. Baker, 
1995, pp. 204–7).  
Test (vi) gives a negative result for a free relative reading. For example: 
(29) ?Kasey knows however to get to Larissa. 
is not acceptable. 
The co-ordination test with ‘believes’ (vii) also brings bad news. If the ambiguity 
story were correct, we would expect that ‘how to V’ could combine with ‘believes’, and 
other predicates which cannot embedded interrogatives. Consider: 
(30) ?Kasey believes how to get to Larissa 
This result confirms Ryle’s observation that we don’t believe-how (Ryle, 2009b, p. 
17).79 
                                                            
79 Stanley suggests that ‘believes’ cannot take ‘how to V’ is because it cannot ever take interrogative 
complements (Stanley, 2011b, p. 33). This conjecture seems false. There are examples of the form 
 65 
 Kent Bach (2012) suggests an extension of this test, claiming that ‘practice’, 
‘demonstrate’ and ‘perfect’ cannot relate to propositions, meaning that the fact that these 
verbs can embed ‘how to V’ provides evidence for a free relative reading. It is certainly 
true that ‘practice’, ‘demonstrate’ and ‘perfect’ cannot take that-clauses as their objects.80 
However, if we look a little closer at the wh-phrases that can embed in these verbs, it 
becomes clear that they can embed interrogatives (Pavese, 2013, n. 15). These verbs can 
take infinitival wh-phrases, ‘whether’ questions, and multiple questions, which can only be 
interrogatives:  
(31) Somerton practiced what to say. 
(32) Arndt demonstrated whether to use ‘less’ or ‘fewer’ in the example sentences.81 
(33) Chrisjen perfected what to do when. 
 The acceptability of (31), (32), and (33) suggests that these verbs can take 
interrogatives, meaning that the fact that ‘how to V’ can embed in them does not provide 
evidence for a free relative reading.  
As I noted above, the failure to pass all of the tests for a given reading provides 
strong evidence that that reading is not present, meaning that the failure of ’S knows how 
to V’ to pass (vi) and (vii) gives us strong evidence that it has no free relative reading. 
Together with test (v) this establishes a strong case against the suggestion that ‘S knows 
how to V’ has a free relative reading. I conclude that the how-complement in ‘S knows 
how to V’ can take an interrogative reading, but not a free relative reading. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
‘I could hardly believe…’, which seem to be genuine interrogatives. If I say, ‘I could hardly believe 
what he was wearing,’ it isn’t the clothes, but that he was wearing them which is difficult to believe. 
(Glick, 2011, n. 9)Although this fact somewhat undermines the significance of the ‘believes’ data, it 
remains true i) that putting this special context to one side ’believes’ can embed free relative 
clauses, such as ‘what he said’ but not ‘how to’ clauses, and ii) other verbs which select for a free 
relative reading - such as ‘ate’, and ‘took’ do not embed ‘how to’ clauses. 
80 A caveat: one can demonstrate that p, but only with the sense which means ‘establish’, which is 
not the sense at issue here. 
81 Note that even if one is doubtful about (32), ‘demonstrate’ can take both infinitival wh-phrases, 
and multiple wh-phrases. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have argued that although a free relative semantics for 
knowledge-how ascriptions initially appears to be an attractive way to semantically 
implement a non-propositional account of knowledge-how, on balance this semantics is 
linguistically implausible. The linguistic data which Bengson and Moffett point to, 
although suggestive, can also be explained by the standard interrogative semantics. 
Furthermore, standard linguistic tests suggests that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to 
V’ have an interrogative reading, and no free relative reading.  
 
The linguistic implausibility of this view means that the supporter of an 
Objectualist metaphysics needs to look elsewhere to semantically implement their account. 
They can either: i) offer a revisionary semantics for ’S knows how to V’ on philosophical 
grounds (although these arguments will need to be different from those offered in §3), ii) 
opt for an error theory of ordinary ‘knows how’ ascriptions, or iii) undertake an 
explication of the concept of knowledge-how. Although the Semantic Implementability 
Constraint posited in chapter 1 is weaker than the uses of linguistic evidence proposed by 
Stanley and Williamson this chapter demonstrates that it nonetheless introduces an 
important role for linguistic evidence in the debate about the nature of knowledge-how. 
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Chapter 3: The Generality Problem for Intellectualism 
 
Introduction 
 
 According to Stanley and Williamson, knowing how to do something is a species of 
propositional knowledge: knowing how to do some activity is knowing of some way that it 
is a way in which one can engage in that activity. It is controversial whether there is a 
species of propositional knowledge which is sufficient for knowing how. Following Glick 
(2015, p. 538) let’s call the problem of isolating a kind of propositional knowledge about V-
ing which is sufficient for knowing how to V the Sufficiency problem for Intellectualism.  
 
One familiar and important aspect of the sufficiency problem concerns how the 
Intellectualist is to account for the practical character of knowledge-how. There is a great 
deal of propositional knowledge about how to swim that doesn’t have the right kind of 
practical character to be sufficient for knowledge how to swim. Consider the kind of 
propositional knowledge about skiing which one might pick up via testimony: there seems 
to be a considerable gap between having the knowledge gained from an instruction booklet 
and knowing how to ski, in the practical sense. Let’s call the problem of isolating 
knowledge about how to V that is relevantly practical the Practicality problem. The standard 
move in response to the Practicality Problem is to appeal to a distinctive practical mode of 
presentation (PMP). In this chapter, I want to put the Practicality problem to one side (we 
will return to it in chapter 7), in order to focus on a neglected aspect of the sufficiency 
problem.  
 
In this chapter I want to focus on the question of how to isolate propositional 
knowledge of the appropriate level of generality. In order to give an account of knowing 
how to swim in terms of propositional knowledge, the Intellectualist needs to be able to 
isolate a kind of propositional knowledge about swimming of the right level of generality: 
which concerns the whole activity of swimming, rather than just one of its aspects (like 
moving one’s arms), or some broader class of activity (like moving one’s body around).82   I 
will call this problem of isolating propositional knowledge of the right level of generality 
                                                            
82 For allusions to this problem, see Schaffer’s flute playing example (2007, p. 396), and Fridland’s 
discussion of granularity (2013). 
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the Generality Problem for Intellectualism, in deliberate allusion to the Generality problem 
for Reliabilism, since the problem for Intellectualism shares a basic structure with the 
Generality Problem for Reliabilism. I will argue that the Generality problem is a serious 
issue for Stanley and Williamson’s Intellectualism, since their theory does not have the 
theoretical resources to isolate propositional knowledge about V-ing which is of the 
appropriate level of generality to be sufficient for knowledge how to V. I will consider a 
number of ways to try to isolate the relevant kind of propositional knowledge, and argue 
that all are in some way unsatisfactory. 
 
The plan of action is as follows. In §1 I revisit Stanley and Williamson’s 
Intellectualism, focusing on their appeal to ways of acting. In §2, I argue that the fact that 
their theory appeals to ways of acting leads to a problem with a similar structure to the 
Generality problem for Reliabilism. In §3, I consider some candidate solutions to this 
problem, taking pointers from the debate about Reliabilism, and argue that none of them 
are satisfactory. In the final section, I consider where this problem leaves Intellectualism, 
and the scope of this Generality problem. This chapter provides one example of a non-
linguistic problem for Intellectualism that might be used to motivate a non-propositional 
theory of knowledge-how on philosophical grounds. 
 
 
1. Intellectualism and Ways of Acting 
 
 The bare bones of Stanley and Williamson’s theory of knowledge-how — bracketing 
the commitment to practical modes of thinking, the claim that know how is a kind of de re 
knowledge and some other twists83 — is the following claim: 
 
ANSS&W: Ruth knows how to swim iff Ruth knows that w is a way in which she can 
swim 
 
 This claim is derived from i) the answer theory of knowledge-wh, ii) the claim that 
‘how’ picks out questions which are about ways, and iii) a particular interpretation of PRO 
and the infinitive in the question-abstract of the embedded interrogative ‘how to V?’. In 
                                                            
83 Some of these complications will re-emerge later in the discussion, where I will consider whether 
these elements can solve the Generality problem. 
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chapter 1 §4.2. we focused on elements i) and iii) but left ii) to one side. I now want to 
return to this issue.  
 
 Above I pointed out that different question-words are associated with answers which 
concern different kinds of things: ‘where’ with propositions about places, ‘why’ with 
propositions about reasons, ‘who’ with propositions about people and so on. The general 
category of how-questions seems to be associated with propositions about ways. These 
might be ways of looking (how did she look?), ways of being (how is your brother?), or ways in 
which something happened (how did the fire start?). However, when it comes to how-
questions concerning actions, the relevant kind of ways are ways of acting (how did she enter 
the room?, how to open the safe?). Ways of acting are plausibly picked out by a subset of 
adverbial phrases such as ‘slowly’, and ‘by turning the knob’. Adverbs are a much 
discussed topic in the philosophy of action, which means that Stanley and Williamson can 
appeal to independently motivated accounts of ways of acting to supplement their account 
(Stanley & Williamson, 2001, pp. 427–8; Stanley, 2011b, p. 58). According to the standard 
Davisdon-inspired account of adverbs, adverbs are treated as predicates of actions 
(Parsons, 1990, 1995; Davidson, 2006).84 On this account a sentence like ‘Jane swam 
carefully’ predicates of the act of Jane’s swimming the property of being careful. This 
means that the question how did Jane swim? is answered by a proposition which 
characterises Jane’s swimming under a contextually appropriate adverb, for example Jane 
swam sloppily.85 If adverbs are predicates of actions, according to this account the ways of 
acting which figure in the propositions which answer the question how to V? will be 
properties of actions, or way-types.86 .87 
 
                                                            
84 Here, I am bracketing Davidson’s commitment to the claim that actions are events (for criticism, 
see (Steward, 2012; Hornsby, 2013), and sticking with the more general claim that adverbs are 
predicates of actions. 
85 This question concerns a particular act. How questions can also involve generics. Consider: how 
does Tahlia play the piano? Plausibly, such questions will be answered by generics, such as Tahlia 
plays with feeling. 
86 We will need way-tokens to make sense of various other kinds of sentence. For example the 
sentence ‘the way that Patti looks is very similar to the way Raul looks’ on the face of it says that 
the token ways of looking associated with Patti and Raul share many properties in common. 
87 The main alternative to the Davidsonian semantics is to treat adverbs not as predicates, but as 
predicate modifiers (Thomason & Stalnaker, 1973). I don’t think that the difference between these 
two treatments is significant for our purposes. The predicate modification account still treats 
adverbs as picking out features of action, the key difference between the two accounts is the 
question of what the linguistic mechanism for picking out features of action is. 
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It is not just any kind of way of acting which can figure as an appropriate answer to 
the question ‘how to V’. Consider the following line from Liberace in Behind the Candelabra 
(Soderbergh, 2013):88 
 
You know, I always get asked: How do you play the piano with all those rings on 
your fingers? And I always tell them: very well, indeed.89 
 
The interviewers’ question how do you play the piano with all those rings on your fingers? 
is intended to raise the issue of which techniques or adjustments Liberace needs to make in 
order to play the piano with so many rings on. But Liberace deliberately interprets the 
question as raising the issue of how to characterise his piano playing when he has so many 
rings on his fingers.90 The ambiguity in this kind of question seems to stem from two 
different kinds of ways of acting, which we might call manners and methods.91 Manners are 
the ways of acting which are most familiar from discussions of adverbs, which are 
associated with adverbs like ‘slowly’, ‘carefully’ and ‘gracefully’. By contrast methods are 
something like a directive, or a set of instructions, and are associated with the by-gerund 
construction, for example: ‘by lifting from the knees,’ ‘by taking a left at Pilrig street’. I will 
rely on an intuitive sense of this distinction, leaving space to substitute in a more 
developed theory of methods.92  
 
Intuitively manners do not seem to figure for the interestingly practical kind of 
knowledge-how, whereas methods do. Knowing that I can open the door gracefully is not 
sufficient for knowing how to open the door, whereas knowing that I can open the door by 
                                                            
88 Thanks to Mark Bowker for this example 
89 See (Jaworski, 2009) for some more examples. 
90 There is a whole family of jokes with this structure: 
 
1) My dog has no nose. How does he smell? Awful 
2) How do hedgehogs make love? Carefully 
3) How are we going to escape this planet? With great difficulty 
 
91 This distinction in the meaning of ‘how’ questions is noted by (D. G. Brown, 1970, pp. 239–340; 
White, 1982, pp. 22–3; Cross, 1991, p. 248), and is discussed in depth by (Jaworski, 2009; Sæbø, 
2016). Elizabeth Fricker also informs me that Gareth Evans stressed this distinction in lectures on 
modes of presentation. I will remain neutral on whether to understand this distinction as a 
metaphysical one (as Jaworksi does), or as a linguistic one (as Saebø does). 
92 There are a number of possible views of methods: one might take them to be a series of action 
types, a set of imperatival instructions, or something analogous to an algorithm (Pavese, 2015b). 
The Generality problem will emerge for any of these views of methods, since each are committed to 
a many-one relation between methods and activities. 
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jiggling the key in the lock is plausibly sufficient for knowing how to open it. Whereas finite 
how questions can be answered by either methods or manners, infinitival how questions 
can seemingly only be answered by methods.93 This means that an infinitival how question 
will be answered by a proposition concerning a method of engaging in some activity. Given 
Stanley and Williamson’s preferred interpretation of the question-abstract, this means that 
a how-to question will be answered by a proposition expressing a modal relation between 
the embedded verb and some contextually appropriate method. For example, the question 
how to swim? will be answered by a proposition like S can swim by moving her arms and legs in 
the water.94 
 
Although Stanley and Williamson don’t explicitly mark the distinction between 
methods and manners, it seems charitable to interpret them as claiming that knowledge-
how concerns methods rather than manners. Stanley switches between talk of methods 
and ways in several places.95 Putting together the Stanley and Williamson’s account of the 
meaning of ‘how’ questions ANSS&W, and the Davidsonian account of adverbs, we get 
following account of knowledge-how: 
 
                                                            
93 Note that adverbs which normally pick out a manner can pick out a method. Consider the 
following report: 
 
Sanjeet is really worried about not upsetting her mother. She asked me how to tell her mother 
than she was dating a women, and I told her: extremely gently 
 
This reply need not be a joke along the lines of Liberace’s one-liner. Rather the speaker might be 
offering a genuine piece of advice about what kinds of method Sanjeet ought to employ in order to 
tell her mother that she is dating a women without upsetting her: sensitive methods. 
94 In this case the method involves another action. If all methods involve other actions, then we 
might worry that Intellectualism leads to a regress in which one performs an intentional action by 
means of employing an infinite series of distinct actions. This kind of regress will be worrying for 
philosophers who want to endorse a category of teleologically basic actions which we do but not by 
means of doing anything else (Danto, 1965; Hornsby, 1980, Chapter 8). Hornsby employs this 
kind of consideration as an argument for a non-propositional species of knowledge-how relating to 
basic action (or basic activity, in her preferred terminology) (Hornsby, 2005, 2013). On this kind 
of picture, non-basic knowledge-how can be propositional knowledge concerning a means-ends 
proposition, but basic knowledge-how can only be propositional (for a related view which is 
motivated in somewhat different grounds, see (Setiya, 2012). However, the success of this kind of 
argument relies on there being a category of basic action, which some philosophers of action have 
recently denied (Thompson, 2008; Lavin, 2013). Intellectualists can also insure themselves against 
the possibility that there is basic action by claiming that methods need not involve other actions, 
but can instead claim that methods are something non-agential. 
95 “The question word “how” adds a λ-abstract over ways (or methods) […]”(Stanley, 2011b, p. 
122), “If someone shows me how to do something, before I learn how to do it from their 
demonstration, I must acquire a practical way of thinking of that method of doing it.”  (Stanley, 
2011b, p. 129) 
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ANSS&W+DAV: S knows how to V iff S knows that S can V by employing M 
 
This account claims that the practical species of knowledge-how concerns 
propositions about method types that are related to some activity by the can A by B-ing 
relation. ANSS&W+DAV extends Stanley and Williamson’s theory, but does so in a way that is 
supported by accounts of the meaning of adverbs, and different kinds of how-questions, 
meaning that the added detail has a linguistic motivation 
 
 
2. Generality Problems 
 
A Generality problem for a view has three basic elements: first, the analysis makes 
appeal to types, secondly, there are a range of types at different levels of generality which 
are available to be substituted into this analysis, and thirdly the available types must differ 
in whether they are sufficient for the phenomena in question. The problem arises when an 
account cannot distinguish types that are relevant for the phenomena at issue from those 
which are irrelevant. This kind of problem is an extremely general one. Any philosophical 
analysis which appeals to types runs the risk that the account will not have resources to 
determine which types instantiated by an object will be relevant for establishing the 
presence of the phenomena in question. In this section, I will run through the Generality 
Problem for Reliabilism, before demonstrating that Intellectualism faces a problem with 
the same structure. 
 
 
2.1. Reliabilism 
To start off let's consider how the Generality problem gets going in the case of 
Reliabilism.96 Process Reliabilists analyse a belief’s justification in terms of the reliability of 
the method by which it was formed, endorsing the following claim: 
 
REL: S is justified in believing p iff S’s belief that p was produced by a reliable 
process. 
                                                            
96 This problem was first observed by (Goldman, 1979), but the canonical statement is (Conee & 
Feldman, 1998). 
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How should we understand what it is for a process to be reliable? Intuitively, it is 
not token belief-forming processes that are the bearers of reliability, but types of belief-
forming process. For a process to be reliable is for it to tend to deliver the goods, but token-
processes are unrepeatable, meaning that it is difficult to make sense of their tendencies. 
This pushes the Reliabilist towards saying that a belief is justified just in case the token 
process which led to the formation of that belief instantiates a type which is suitably 
reliable. At this point a problem arises, since a token belief-forming process will instantiate 
an indefinite number of process-types.97 When I glance out of the window and form the 
belief that there is a bird outside, the process instantiates the type forming beliefs on the basis 
of perception but also the type forming beliefs on the basis of perception about objects behind solid 
barriers. While the first is reliable, the second is not. It is not at all obvious which type we 
should look to in order to determine whether my belief is a reliable one. 
 
The Generality Problem for Reliabilism is the challenge of giving a procedure for 
determining which belief-forming process-type instantiated by a process-token is relevant 
for assessing the reliability of the belief produced by that process. This problem is serious: 
without an account of relevant process-types Reliabilism is ‘radically incomplete’ since it is 
unable to determine whether a belief is reliable or not (Conee & Feldman, 1998, p. 3).  
 
There are three broad strategies for resolving this problem (Conee & Feldman, 
1998; Goldman & Beddor, 2015): 
 
i. Give an account of which process-types are relevant for assessing the reliability 
of a belief, either by appealing to common-sense (Goldman, 1979) or scientific 
classifications (Alston, 1995); 
ii. Reformulate the theory so that it doesn’t appeal to types in the first place, 
instead appealing to tokens (Comesaña, 2006, pp. 28–30), or to collections of 
types (Wunderlich, 2003); 
iii. Appeal to contextual mechanisms to select a process-type (Heller, 1995). 
 
                                                            
97 It might also be difficult to identify what the token belief-forming process which causes the belief 
is (Weatherson, 2012). 
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The mere fact of being faced with a Generality Problem does not mean that an 
analysis is untenable, because there might be one or more satisfactory accounts of which 
types are relevant for the phenomenon in question. What matters is whether there is an 
adequate response to the problem. Conee and Feldman offer three criteria on a successful 
response to the generality problem for Reliabilism (Conee & Feldman, 1998, p. 4), which 
naturally generalise. First, they point out that a response to a Generality problem ought to 
provide a principled selection criterion for types, avoiding cherry-picking types to get the 
right predictions. Secondly, the response must provide defensible predictions about the target 
phenomenon. Because the response to a generality problem will in large part determine the 
predictions of the theory, it matters that it gets the cases right. Thirdly, the account of 
which types are relevant must appeal only to the theoretical resources of the original 
theory, without illicitly relying on concepts from opposing theories. For example, it would 
be a failure of the Reliabilist project if one could only respond to the Generality problem 
by appealing to Evidentialist notions.  
 
In order to definitively establish that there is no satisfactory response to a 
Generality problem, one would need to consider all of the possible accounts of which types 
are relevant. This would be laborious, so I will follow Conee and Feldman’s lead, and 
consider only those responses that seem promising (Conee & Feldman, 1998, pp. 5–6). 
Establishing that this restricted set of responses are unsatisfactory does not show that 
there is no response to the Generality Problem for Intellectualism, but it does shift the 
dialectical burden onto the Intellectualist to give an account of which way-types are 
relevant, and shows that the Generality problem is something that they should take 
seriously.  
 
 
2.2. Intellectualism 
 
 With the structure of a Generality Problem on the table, we are in a position to 
explore the Generality problem for Intellectualism. We have already established that 
Intellectualism appeals to types in the form of ways of acting. In order to establish a 
generality problem we need to show that there are many way-types which can be 
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substituted into ANSS&W+DAV, and that at least some of these types are such that knowing 
that they are a way in which one can V does not suffice for knowledge how to V. 
 
As Fridland points out, ANSS&W+DAV is compatible with propositions of variable 
granularity figuring in the analysis (Fridland, 2013). This phenomenon can be traced back 
to the level of generality of the ways of acting that figure in these propositions. If the 
methods which figure in ANSS&W+DAV are very general, then the propositions which figure 
in knowledge-how will be coarse-grained, and if the ways of acting are more specific, then 
the propositions will be more fine-grained.98 The variable generality of ways of acting 
means that it is easy to generate a large number of way-propositions associated with any 
given activity. Imagine watching someone swim up and down in a pool. What answers to 
the question how are they swimming? could one give? Even restricting our attention to 
methods, there are still a huge number of answers to this question. One could say that they 
are swimming: by employing the backstroke, by cutting their arms through the water and scissoring 
their legs, by keeping their back straight, by moving about in the water and so on. On the face of it 
all of these methods are candidates to figure in the proposition M is a way in which the 
swimmer can swim, since each of the methods is in fact a way that the swimmer can employ 
in order to swim. Furthermore, any competent swimmer will know many of these facts, 
meaning that they are all candidates for being identified with knowledge how to swim 
 
Why does the existence of many propositions about ways of V-ing pose a problem 
for Intellectualism? For starters, ANSS&W+DAV appeals to the mention-some reading, 
claiming that knowledge-how is identical with knowledge of one way-fact about V-ing. The 
case of the swimmer suggests that there will be many way-facts known by any agent who 
knows how to V, which raises the question of which propositional knowledge about 
swimming is supposed to be identical to knowing how to swim. However, the more serious 
problem is that knowledge of some way-propositions does not secure knowledge how to V. 
Moving about in the water is certainly a method for swimming (in a suitably broad sense of 
                                                            
98 Fridland argues that the variable granularity of these propositions in itself points to a problem, 
since neither very finely or coarsely individuated propositions can by themselves explain intelligent 
action (Fridland, 2013, pp. 884–91). The basic thought is that if the Intellectualist appeals to fine-
grained propositions, they will need to invoke an intelligent faculty to select a proposition, whereas 
if they appeal to coarse-grained propositions, they will need to invoke an intelligent faculty to 
implement those propositions.  I am sympathetic to her worry, but it is a distinct issue from that 
which I am considering, which concerns the prior issue of how an intellectualist is to fix which 
propositions figure in the object of knowledge-how. 
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‘method’, and ‘swimming’), but someone who only knew that moving about in the water was a 
way to swim does not know how to swim. Blowing into the mouthpiece is a way to play the 
flute, but someone who only knows that blowing into the mouthpiece and moving one’s fingers is 
a way to play the flute does not know how to play the flute.99  
 
To illustrate how issues about the generality of ways lead to sufficiency problems 
for ANSS&W+DAV, consider Hornsby’s touch-typing example (2011, p. 91). Hornsby 
considers the case of Jim, a touch-typing novice, who is practicing by typing out 
‘Afghanistan’ again and again (he has heard it’s a good word to practice on). Through 
practice Jim has mastered typing this word, so that the method that he employs in typing 
this sequence is identical to that which a skilled touch-typist would use. However, he has 
yet to tackle touch-typing any other words. Now, Jim knows a number of facts about 
touch-typing. He knows that typing ‘A-F-G-H-A-N-I-S-T-A-N’ with the right fingers is a 
way to touch-type the word ‘Afghanistan’. This knowledge can plausibly be identified with 
Jim’s knowing how to touch-type ‘Afghanistan’. However, Jim also knows that typing ‘A-
F-G-H-A-N-I-S-T-A-N’ with the right fingers is a way to touch-type (that’s why he is 
practicing touch-typing by typing that word). This means that he also fulfils the conditions 
for knowing how to touch-type. The crucial point is that although Jim knows how to 
touch-type the word ‘Afghanistan’, intuitively he does not know how to touch-type.100 
Whereas knowing that tapping out the sequence ‘A-F-G-H-A-N-I-S-T-A-N’ is a way to 
touch-type ‘Afghanistan’ seems sufficient for knowing how to type ‘Afghanistan’, knowing 
that the very same method is a way to touch-type does not suffice for knowing how to 
touch-type. This example makes clear that many cases, possession of some general piece of 
know-how requires mastery of various different methods, and that knowledge of a fact 
about just one of the methods is not sufficient for possessing the general piece of know-
how; although knowledge of one of these methods might be sufficient for a more specific 
piece of knowledge-how.  
 
                                                            
99 This is the point of Monty Python’s ‘How to do it’ sketch: (Schaffer, 2007, n. 21). It might be 
possible to set up conversational contexts in which these propositions do answer the contextually 
relevant questions (see section 3.4). However, I don’t think that anyone seriously thinks that 
knowledge of this fact suffices for the practically important kind of know-how. 
100 One might think that the meaning of ‘touch-typing’ can be modulated by context to become 
much less demanding, such that in some contexts Jim does count as knowing how to touch-type. If 
this is right, then we can just restate Hornsby’s point by focusing on a context in which ‘touch-
typing’ means something reasonably demanding. 
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We are now in a position to see that Intellectualism provides all three elements of a 
Generality Problem. The basic commitments of the account include an appeal to way-
types, due to the plausible account of the meaning of how-to questions as denoting 
answers about ways of acting. The swimming example demonstrates how easy it is to 
generate many propositions of the relevant kind about any given activity. And, the 
sufficiency problem emerges when we notice that many of these way propositions of form 
M is a way to V are such that knowledge of them will not be sufficient for possessing 
knowledge how to V, as the examples of swimming, flute-playing and Jim the touch-typist 
show.  
 
What does the Intellectualist need to do in order to resolve this problem? Adapting 
Conee and Feldman’s criteria, what the intellectualist needs is a principled selection 
criterion which matches up pieces of know-how with ways of acting of the appropriate 
levels of generality, which gets the cases right about who knows how to do what, and 
doesn’t appeal to the theoretical resources of opposing theories. Although it would be 
unreasonable to expect the Intellectualist to provide us with an account of how people 
swim (this is a question for physiologists, or sports scientists), they ought to be able to 
provide us with criteria for selecting which kinds of propositions about swimming are of 
the right kind such that knowledge of them is sufficient for knowing how to swim 
 
3. Responses to the Generality Problem 
 
We can get a good start on the possible responses to the Generality Problem for 
Intellectualism by considering responses to the Generality problem for Reliabilism.101 This 
suggests the following responses: 
 
i. Give an account of which ways of acting are relevant for possessing knowledge-
how by appealing to common-sense or empirical science; 
ii. Reformulate Intellectualism so that it doesn’t appeal to way-types; 
iii. Appeal to contextual mechanisms in order to select relevant ways of acting. 
 
                                                            
101 Stanley and Williamson have already made moves along these lines in developing ANSS&W+DAV 
(excepting strategy (i)). I will introduce these refinements of their view piecemeal to avoid 
overwhelming the reader with exegesis. 
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There are also a couple of responses that do not have a clear analogue in the case of 
Reliabilism stemming from developments of INT: 
 
iv. Appeal to PMPs to select which ways of acting are relevant for the possession of 
knowledge-how; 
v. Adjust the account of the modality associated with knowledge-how in order to 
ensure that only methods with a certain kind of modal profile are available to be 
substituted into the Intellectualist account. 
 
I will consider each of these responses in turn. Although I make no claim to have 
exhausted the options for the Intellectualist, the parallel with Reliabilism suggests that 
these are the most plausible responses to the problem, meaning that the fact that the failure 
of these responses moves the dialectical burden onto the Intellectualist to show how they 
can respond to this problem. 
 
 
3.1. Giving an Account of Relevant Ways of Acting 
 
 The simplest solution to the Generality Problem would to be to appeal to a natural 
division amongst the methods for V-ing which isolated only those which were sufficient for 
knowing how to V. As in the case of Reliabilism, there are two versions of this strategy: to 
appeal to common-sense classifications, and to appeal to empirical science. I think 
appealing to common-sense types is a non-starter because it will leave too many way-types 
standing. All of the examples of ways of acting that I considered in the previous section are 
common-sense, which didn’t stop them from posing counterexamples to the Intellectualist 
account. 
  
 An appeal to empirical science holds out more hope. The idea here would be that 
inquiry in psychology or cognitive science might provide us with an account of the 
methods which underlie our ordinary activities, which the Intellectualist can slot into their 
account of knowledge-how. This gives the following account of relevant ways of acting: 
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W1: The method that figures in an agent’s knowledge how to V is the method for V-
ing that figures in the best scientific explanation of that agent’s (successfully) V-ing. 
 
 The Intellectualist who pursues this line can point to some apparent successes in 
empirical science. For example, one might understand research into the neural basis of 
grasping actions (Milner and Goodale 2004) as giving an account of the methods that 
underwrite the activity of grasping. A detailed assessment of this response would require 
looking in depth at the empirical literature, but there are a couple of reasons to be sceptical 
about the general strategy. For one thing, it is not obvious that empirical inquiry into 
methods will yield just one uniquely best explanation of successful activity. Instead it 
might turn out that there are several equally good explanations about the methods that we 
employ in engaging in a given activity, possibly at different levels of description (Conee & 
Feldman, 1998, pp. 17–18). A further issue is that it is not obvious that scientific inquiry 
will deliver methods that we have any claim to know, since the psychological explanation of 
how we engage in various activities might take place entirely at the sub-personal level 
without positing personal-level states (as with Milner and Goodale’s explanation of the 
neural mechanisms which underwrite grasping (Drayson, 2012, pp. 14–5)). So, although 
there is some mileage in this strategy, it relies on empirical inquiry delivering methods at 
the personal level that are in line with the Intellectualists’ theoretical goals. 
 
 
3.2. Appeal to Sets of Propositions 
 
 The basic picture given by ANSS&W+DAV identifies a given piece of knowledge-how 
with knowledge of just one proposition, due to Stanley and Williamson’s focus on the 
mention-some reading. However, there is nothing about the Intellectualist view that 
requires thinking that pieces of know-how match up one-to-one with pieces of 
propositional knowledge. Stanley exploits this fact in discussing the connection between 
know-how and skill: 
 
When we say that a skilled outfielder knows how to field a fly ball, we do not mean 
that he knows, of at least one way to field a fly ball, that it gives him counterfactual 
success in fielding fly balls. That is, we do not intend the mention-some reading of 
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the embedded question, “how to field a fly ball”. Rather, in such a case, we mean 
the mention-all reading of the embedded question. What we assert when we assert 
of a skilled outfielder that he knows how to field fly balls is that he knows all of a 
range of relevant ways that give him counterfactual success in fielding fly balls. 
(Stanley, 2011b, p. 183) 
 
Here Stanley modifies ANSS&W+DAV, suggesting that some (but presumably not all) 
knowledge-how ascriptions take a mention-all reading, meaning that some pieces of 
knowledge-how will consist in knowledge of a body of propositional knowledge. These 
comments suggest the following modification to the Intellectualist account: 
 
ANSS&W+DAV1: S knows how to V iff for all of some set of methods {M1, M2 …} S 
knows that Mn is a way in which she can V. 
 
This move is analogous to Wunderlich’s response to the Generality Problem for 
Reliabilism which offers an account of reliability in terms of all of the process-types 
instantiated by the process which leads to a belief (Wunderlich, 2003).102  
 
Thinking of knowledge-how as relating to a set of way-propositions does avoid the 
difficulty of finding one proposition to figure in the object of knowledge-how, but it does 
not solve the Generality Problem. Consider a twist on the Jim case in which Jim has 
learnt how to touch-type all words beginning with the letter ‘A’, but doesn’t know how to 
type any other words. He now knows a number of propositions which answer the question 
how can I touch-type?, but I think that we should still say that he does not know how to 
touch-type. Instead of the problem of finding a way of matching up pieces of know-how 
with single propositions, ANSS&W+DAV1 faces the problem of finding a way of matching up 
pieces of know-how with sets of propositions. This requires having specifying both the 
level of generality of the ways that figure in these propositions, and how many of them 
must be known.  
 
 
                                                            
102 Another way to drop way-types would be to claim that know-how is knowledge about way-
tokens (Comesaña, 2006, pp. 28–30). This view is implausible because it cannot account for the idea 
that knowledge-how is a kind of general knowledge that can be exercised in many different token 
actions. 
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3.3. Contextualism  
 
 Just as a Reliabilist might reject the demand for an account of which process-types 
determine reliability, and claim that conversational context determines which process types 
are relevant to a given reliability ascription (Heller, 1995), an Intellectualist might reject 
the demand to give a general account of relevant methods by claiming that conversational 
context determines which ways of acting are relevant to a given knowledge-how 
ascription.  
 
This kind of response naturally goes together with a Contextualist account of the 
meaning of interrogatives, which claims that which question an interrogative expresses 
depends on conversational context.103  There is a decent amount of linguistic evidence for 
the context-sensitivity of interrogatives. For example, the interrogative sentence: 
 
(1) What caused the Second World War? 
 
plausibly expresses different questions when it is asked in everyday conversation, and 
when it is asked in a history exam. We can see this by noting that in an everyday context, 
this question can be answered by a somewhat general proposition, whereas in a history 
exam a detailed and specific proposition is called for. A natural way to accommodate this 
data is to posit the influence of context on the semantic value of interrogative phrases.104  
This contextualist thesis bears on the debate about knowledge-wh, since contextualism 
about interrogative phrases means that which answers an agent needs to know to count as 
‘knowing Wh-F?’ will depend in part on features of the conversational context. This kind 
of contextualism about knowledge-wh is to be distinguished from well-known versions of 
contextualism about knowledge-that (Cohen, 1986; Lewis, 1996; DeRose, 2009). Whereas 
the established debate focuses on the context-sensitivity of the relation expressed by 
‘knows’, contextualism about interrogatives yields a kind of contextualism about 
interrogatives, or about what is known. 
 
                                                            
103 (Braun, 2006; Parent, 2014). 
104 Alternatively, one could appeal to warranted assertibility to explain this phenomenon. See 
(Hawley, 2003, p. 22; Braun, 2006, 2011; DeRose, 2009, pp. 69–79). 
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A Contextualist about knowledge-how might respond to the Generality Problem by 
contending that there is no need for a general account of which way-types figure in 
knowledge-how, since various contextual mechanisms will select which way-types are 
relevant in a given context. Here’s a toy example of how this contextual restriction on 
question-meanings can lead to a restriction in relevant ways of acting. Suppose that I utter 
the sentence: 
 
(2) Józefa knows how to get to London 
 
in a context in which we are deciding who should drive us there. By the 
Contextualist’s lights there will be some kind of restriction on the meaning of the 
embedded interrogative in this sentence, such that the question which it expresses is really 
something like how can one drive to London?. If this is the case, then the answers which will be 
relevant to the knowledge ascription will be restricted to those which concern ways of 
getting to London by driving, meaning that (2) will come out false if Józefa only knows a 
way to get to London by train. The restriction on the meaning of the interrogative leads to 
a corresponding restriction in which way-propositions can figure in the knowledge-how 
ascriptions. 
 
I think that the case for contextualism about Interrogatives is pretty compelling. 
However, in order to show that context can provide a fix to the Generality problem, the 
Intellectualist needs to offer an account of the contextual mechanisms at work in ‘knows 
how’ ascriptions. One option is to appeal to general contextual mechanisms at work in 
interrogatives. Here are two salient options: 
 
i. Interrogatives are associated with a domain restriction to a contextually salient 
set of objects, meaning that an interrogative expresses a set of answers 
concerning only contextually salient objects (Stanley, 2011b, pp. 56–8, 118). 
ii. The meaning of an interrogative phrase is affected by the interests and purposes 
of conversational participants, meaning that an interrogative only expresses a 
set of answers which are relevant to the speaker or hearer’s interests and 
purposes (Boër & Lycan, 1986).105 
                                                            
105 This isn’t quite Boër and Lycan’s view; they claim that it is the answerhood relation which is 
context-sensitive (Parent, 2014, n. 29). See also (Ginzburg, 1995a, 1995b, 2011). 
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These are plausible as accounts of the mechanisms of context-sensitivity in ‘knows-
wh’, but they won’t help solve the Generality problem. Both mechanisms place general 
restrictions on what counts as an answer to a how-question in a given conversational 
context, which will lead to a restriction on which ways of acting can figure in knowing 
how. However, this account runs into trouble due to the fact that we are able to make 
know-how ascriptions at different levels of generality in the same conversational context. 
Consider the following sentence said about Jim from Hornsby’s touch-typing example: 
 
(3)  Jim knows how to touch-type ‘Afghanistan’, but he doesn’t know how to 
touch-type. 
 
This sentence is true of Jim in Hornsby’s example. In order for the first half of the 
sentence to come out true, there better be some contextual mechanism which means that 
only relevant ways of touch-typing ‘Afghanistan’ figure as answers to the question how can 
Jim touch-type ‘Afghanistan’? (ruling out answers like ‘by using his fingers’). The problem is 
that once a relevant way of touch-typing ‘Afghanistan’ is available in the context, it will 
also figure in an answer to the question how can Jim touch-type?, (assuming that context does 
not shift between the two halves of the sentence). This entails result that the second half of 
the sentence comes out false, since Jim knows a contextually relevant way to touch-type. 
The lesson is that we seem to be able to switch between narrow and general know-how 
ascriptions without triggering a corresponding change of context, which suggests that 
general mechanisms of contextual sensitivity cannot resolve the Generality Problem.  
 
In response to this problem, the Contextualist might switch focus to more specific 
mechanisms of context dependence in the meaning of ‘how to’ questions. There are three 
accounts of this kind in the literature:  
 
i. That the modal ‘can’ involved in knowledge-how ascriptions takes a 
contextually supplied set of worlds as its modal base (Stanley, 2011b, pp. 126–
7); 
ii. That knowledge-how ascriptions are associated by an unpronounced task 
variable, which is filled out by context (Hawley, 2003, pp. 21–2); 
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iii. That infinitival knows-wh ascriptions involve context-sensitive goal-oriented 
bouletic modality, where goals are supplied by context (Bhatt, 2006, pp. 117–
58). 
 
We’ll consider Stanley’s account of context-sensitivity in (3.5), so let’s focus here on 
the kinds of context-sensitivity suggested by Hawley and Bhatt.  
 
Hawley suggests that knowledge-how ascriptions are associated with an 
unpronounced task variable which gets filled out by context, where tasks can pick out 
both engaging in an activity in a certain kind of environment, or more specific kinds of V-
ing (Hawley, 2003, pp. 21–2; Cath, 2015, n. 14). A task like driving can be contextually 
altered to concern driving in snow, or driving an automatic car. This view gives the 
following account of knowledge-how: 
 
ANSS&W+DAV2: S knows how to V iff for all of a contextually salient set of sub-tasks 
of V-ing {t1, t2, …} S knows that that some method M is a way in which she can 
perform task tn. 
 
This view can explain our pattern of judgements in the touch-typing case. Suppose 
that context provides us with a salient set of tasks associated with touch-typing ‘Afghanistan’, 
and another rather larger set of tasks associated with touch-typing. Jim’s limited knowledge 
might provide him with knowledge of how to perform the tasks associated with one 
activity, but not the tasks associated with the other. This view can also explain the 
possibility of truthfully uttering sentences like (3), since it can posit two different task-
variables in this sentence, which will get filled out by tasks associated with the two 
different activities. 
 
Although this seems a plausible account of knowledge-how, the question is whether 
context will provide the right kinds of material to make the appropriate knowledge-how 
ascriptions come out true. In order to take the sting out of the Generality Problem, it needs 
to be the case that for every knowledge-how ascription, contextual mechanisms winnow 
down the possible answers to the question ‘how to V’ to yield a set of answers such that 
knowledge of them (individually or jointly) is sufficient for the possession of knowledge-
how to V. Although we have evidence that context does cause variability in the knowledge-
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how ascriptions, it would surely be a coincidence if contextual mechanisms restricted the 
meaning of interrogatives in just the way that Intellectualists need to save their theory 
(Conee & Feldman, 1998, pp. 20–4).  
 
On Bhatt’s view, knowledge-how ascriptions are associated with a complex bouletic 
modal, which can take two readings: expressing either a circumstantial can (V is possible 
given the way the world is), or a bouletic should (V is a/the way to satisfy one’s goals). Bhatt 
suggests that the ‘can’ reading is the default for knowledge-how ascriptions (Bhatt, 2006, 
p. 125) and on this reading, his account yields a semantic value close to ANSS&W+DAV. 
However, he notes that in cases where there is a contextually salient goal, a ‘should’ 
reading is available (Bhatt, 2006, p. 125). To see this reading, consider sentence 4) in a 
context where the goal is to solve the problem but without violating any social norms: 
 
(4) Magnus knows how to solve this problem. 
 
Intuitively, in such a case, the correct paraphrase of 4) is deontic, expressing 
knowledge of a way that avoids norm-violation: 
 
(5) Magnus knows how he should solve this problem (in order to avoid violating any 
social norms). 
 
According to Bhatt’s account we should understand sentence 4) as saying (roughly) 
that Magnus knows i) that some way w is a way in which he can solve the problem, and ii) 
that employing this way will satisfy his goal of not violating any social norms.  
 
Bhatt’s notion of contextually supplied goals can restrict the level of generality of 
answers, offering a potential way to address the generality problem. For example, if Jim’s 
goal is to touch-type a manuscript accurately at a speed of at least 60 words per minute, 
then in order to know how to touch type, he better know a way of touch-typing which 
satisfies the goal of typing at least 60 words per minute, whereas if his goal is just to touch-
type, then any way of touch-typing will do. This means that in a context with goals are 
contextually salient, Bhatt can say that Jim doesn’t know how to touch-type because his 
way of touch-typing does not allow him to satisfy his goals. Generalising, we might suggest 
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that according to Bhatt’s account the relevant ways of acting are just those that lead to the 
fulfilment of contextually supplied goals. 
 
Appealing to goals can fix the level of generality ascriptions where there are rich 
goals available in the context, but does not solve the Generality Problem. On Bhatt’s 
account, rich contextual goals only play a role on the ‘should’ reading. In order to get a 
‘can’ reading out of the underlying bouletic modal, he relies on the idea that in some 
conversations the salient goals are trivial in the sense that acting automatically entails 
achieving the goal (Bhatt, 2006, pp. 129–31). If I say that I know how to swim, my salient 
goal might just be swimming, meaning that all I need to know is that some way is a way in 
which I can swim (since all such ways of swimming will lead to success in the goal of 
swimming, meaning that clause ii) in the account will be trivially satisfied). Since Bhatt’s 
account only appeals to (non-trivial) goals in cases where the ‘should’ reading is salient, 
this account cannot solve the generality problem for ascriptions with a ‘can’ reading, which 
Bhatt claims is the majority of knowledge-how ascriptions. Even for ascriptions with a 
‘should’ reading, it is a substantial empirical claim that conversational context will provide 
salient goals that are sufficiently rich to do the explanatory work of selecting a way of 
acting of the appropriate level of generality. This issue mirrors the problem for Hawley’s 
account: it would be a coincidence if conversational context happened to always provide 
salient goals which fixed the level of generality of ways of acting to the appropriate level.  
 
I take it that both Hawley’s and Bhatt’s accounts are plausible accounts of kinds of 
context-sensitivity at work in knowledge-how ascriptions. What I take issue with is the 
move of pushing the explanation of the generality of methods into the conversational 
context, on the grounds that without an argument that context always possesses relevant 
generality-fixing features, we shouldn’t rely on it to do this explanatory work. 
 
 
3.4. Practical Modes of Presentation 
 
I now want to turn to consider a response that is specific to Intellectualism: 
appealing to Practical modes of presentation to fix which propositions figure in 
knowledge-how. For the purposes of this section, I will assume that PMPs are genuine and 
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explanatory, since my goal is to show that PMPs cannot solve the generality problem. 
Effectively the goal of this section is to demonstrate the distinctness of the Practicality and 
Generality Problems. 
 
Let’s consider a simple way in which PMPs might be put to work in giving an 
account of the ways of acting which are relevant for knowledge-how. We might think that 
relevant methods must be thought about in a practical way: 
 
W2: The method that figures in an agent’s knowledge how to V is the method of V-
ing that she thinks about in a practical way. 
 
There is some plausibility to this proposal. One might think that it is part of the 
very idea of a practical way of thinking that it hones in on the one method for V-ing that an 
agent is in fact employing in her V-ing.106  
 
One preliminary issue with this proposal is that it is an oversimplification to think 
that an agent who knows how to do something will think of only one way of doing that 
activity in a practical way. A skilled swimmer will typically have mastered a number of 
different strokes, meaning that according to our everyday individuation of methods, by the 
Intellectualist’s lights they will think about a number of way-propositions in a practical 
way. In response to this, an Intellectualist might appeal to the idea that knowledge-how is 
identical to a body of propositional knowledge, and say that the relevant set of 
propositions are picked out by being thought of in a practical way. 
 
The more serious problem for this proposal stems from the fact that we can 
generate cases where an agent thinks about an irrelevant way of acting in a practical way.107  
Recall that knowing that moving about in the water is a way to swim is not sufficient for 
                                                            
106 (Pavese, 2015b) presents a richer account on PMPs, according to which the relationship 
between PMPs and ways is structurally analogous to the relationship between computer programs 
and algorithms. Although her account doesn’t face the problem of knowing irrelevant ways in a 
practical way, her account still faces the task of explaining which of the algorithms corresponding 
to a given activity (or task in her terminology) are relevant for knowing how to engage in that 
activity. See (Bianchi, MS) for another way to develop the notion of a way of acting. 
107 I will assume that it is the way of acting (rather than the whole proposition), which must be 
known in a practical way. This does seem to be the standard way in that Intellectualists think 
about PMPs (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, pp. 428–30; Stanley, 2011b, pp. 122–30), but see 
(Pavese, 2015b) for a Fregean account which makes the PMP part of the proposition known. 
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knowing how to swim. On the view under consideration, the explanation for this fact is 
that someone who doesn’t know how to swim will not think about the proposition that 
moving about in the water is a way for me to swim in a practical way. However, there are cases in 
which agents who do not know how to swim do think about this proposition in a practical 
way. Consider an agent who knows how to splash people around her, in virtue of knowing 
that moving about in the water is a way to splash people around you. According to the friend 
of PMPs, such an agent had better be acquainted with moving about in the water in a 
practical way. However, once the agent thinks of this method in practical way, the 
explanation of her ignorance about how to swim cannot be that she does not think about 
the method moving about in the water in a practical way.  
 
This example helps us to see why the Practicality Problem and the Generality 
Problem are distinct. A solution to the generality problem requires a matching procedure 
that relates pieces of know-how to ways of acting at the relevant level of generality, 
whereas a solution to the Practicality Problem a restriction amongst ways of acting to the 
relevantly practical species of propositions. These two restrictions are orthogonal. Even if 
we had a satisfactory account of the species of proposition that are relevantly practical, 
there would still be a question about which pieces of know-how match up with which 
practical propositions.  
 
A different way to put PMPs to work in responding to the Generality problem 
would be to rely on their connection with demonstratives and de re thought. On Stanley’s 
view, knowledge-how is a kind of de re knowledge (2011: 120). Furthermore, in a number 
of places Stanley and Williamson claim that the standard way of expressing knowledge-
how under a PMP will be by employing demonstratives of the form: ‘this is a way for me to 
V’ where ‘this’ refers to the agent herself V-ing (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, p. 433; 
Stanley, 2011b, pp. 161–2). Because ways of acting are types, Stanley and Williamson 
claim that this demonstrative functions as a kind of deferred ostension, in which pointing 
to an object which instantiates some type secures reference to that type itself (Stanley & 
Williamson, 2001, n. 29). This suggests that an Intellectualist might try to solve the 
Generality Problem by appealing to demonstrative thought:  
 
ANSS&W+DAV3: The method that figures in an agent’s knowledge how to V is the one 
that she refers to in sentences (and thoughts) of the form: ‘this is a way for me to V’. 
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The problem is that it isn’t obvious that (or how) the relevant class of 
demonstratives secure reference. Presumably there are instances of successful deferred 
ostension to types in ordinary language, but I suspect that they are restricted to fairly 
limited cases where conversational context is sufficiently rich to make clear what the 
intended type is meant to be. In the case of pointing at oneself engaging in some activity, 
there will be a huge number of ways of acting instantiated, and it is not obvious that any 
one of those types is referred to. If I point at myself cycling and say ‘this is a way for me to 
cycle’, a hearer would be legitimately confused. Plausibly, this confusion would stem from 
the fact that my speech act has failed to secure reference to a single type.108  The appeal to 
demonstratives transforms the Generality problem into a linguistic problem, but since it is 
not obvious that demonstratives in the relevant cases secure reference at all, hence this 
move doesn’t get any traction on the substantive philosophical issue of what the relevant 
ways of acting are.  
 
  
3.5. Counterfactual Success Condition 
  
 A final option is strengthening the modal involved in the relevant class of 
propositions. INT involves a ‘can’ type modal force, saying of a way of acting that it is a 
way in which the agent can engage in some activity. However, it is also open to the 
Intellectualist to offer a stronger modal condition on ways of acting. They might say that 
knowledge-how concerns methods for V-ing, and that it is essential to the idea of methods 
that employing them leads to reliable success in the relevant activity. 
 
In Know How, Stanley already goes some way toward pursuing this option; taking 
up Hawley’s claim that knowledge-how is related to counterfactual success, rather than a 
‘can’-type modal. On this view the relevant kind of proposition is one of the form that 
some method is a way in which the agent can perform some task in all of a contextually 
salient set of ‘normal’ worlds, which need not be close worlds (Hawley, 2003; Stanley, 
2011b, pp. 126–8). This tweak gives the following account of knowledge-how: 
                                                            
108 (Hornsby, 2011, p. 91; Wiggins, 2012, pp. 120–1). See (J. Brown, 1998) for an analogous 
problem about reference to natural kinds. 
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ANSS&W+DAV4: S knows how to V iff S knows that that some method M is a way in 
which she could V in all (or at least most) of a contextually salient set of normal 
worlds. 
 
 A first thing to notice is that since this account appeals to a contextual mechanism 
to specify the relevant set of worlds, it is open to the general criticism from the last section: 
that it is not obvious that contextual mechanisms will deliver the goods that the 
Intellectualist needs (i.e. a generality-fixing set of contextually available worlds). 
 
 One issue faced by leaning on modal properties to pick out the relevant class of 
ways of acting is that one needs to have a robust account of what the relevant modal 
properties are. This move faces a version of the problem that faced supporters of the 
ability theory. Just as it is difficult to give an account of the modal properties of the kind of 
ability to V which supporters of Ability theory claim co-ordinates with knowledge how to 
V, it is difficult to give an account of the modal properties of the ways of V which 
Intellectualists claim are known by someone who knows how to V. A weak ‘can’ type 
modal picks out too many ways of acting, allowing ways of acting which are only 
successful in one situation to count as relevant, leading to too many people counting as 
knowing how. By contrast, a strong reliability condition runs the risk of picking out too 
few ways of acting, ruling out ways of acting which occasionally lead to failure predicting 
that agents who employ a method for V-ing which leads to occasional failure at V-ing 
cannot know how to V. 
 
 A further issue concerns trivial ways of acting. Strengthening the modal condition 
on ways places a lower bound on the generality of the ways of acting that can figure in the 
object of knowledge-how, but it does not place an upper bound on their generality. In the 
limit case, the Intellectualist needs to be able to explain why trivial methods do not suffice 
for knowledge-how. For example, by swimming is an extremely reliable way to swim, 
securing success at swimming in all of the worlds in which swimming is possible.109 But it 
doesn’t seem true that someone who knows only that swimming is a way to swim should count 
                                                            
109 Is by swimming a way to swim? If someone asked ‘how can you swim?’ you wouldn’t answer by 
saying  ‘by swimming’; presumably because this is an unhelpful answer. However, by swimming 
certainly is a way of acting: one can answer the question ‘how are you going to get across the 
river?’ by saying ‘by swimming’. 
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as knowing how to swim. Appealing to a strengthened modal condition cannot explain 
why trivial way-propositions of the form V-ing is a way to V do not suffice for knowledge-
how, since a trivial way will be maximally reliable.  
 
There are two options to deal with the problem of trivial ways, both of which lean 
heavily on PMPs. On the one hand Intellectualists might claim that this trivial knowledge 
isn’t sufficient for knowledge how to swim because it is not possible to think about the 
proposition swimming is a way to swim in a practical way. This need to bring PMPs in just 
tells us that strengthening the modal condition by itself cannot solve the generality 
problem, and raises the question of why one cannot think of trivial propositions practically. 
Alternatively Intellectualists might bite the bullet and claim that trivial knowledge can be 
sufficient for having knowledge-how, but only when the trivial proposition is thought of 
practically.110 This view is pretty unattractive. For one thing, it requires having an 
adequate account of PMPs, which is a pretty tall order. Furthermore, this view runs the 
risk of making the content of knowledge-how irrelevant. If we can explain someone’s 
intelligent action by appealing to their practical knowledge of a trivial proposition, then 
the mode of presentation must by itself do all of the work of explaining intelligence. 
However, if PMPs can do all of the explanatory work in these trivial cases, one might 
worry that they will also fully explain intelligent action in cases where an agent knows a 
non-trivial proposition. This would make the content of these non-trivial propositions 
explanatorily irrelevant. The problem is that it looks like the content of propositions do 
have an important role in explaining intelligent action. When my trumpet teacher tells me 
to focus on not putting pressure on my mouthpiece, the obvious way to explain the 
improvement in my performance is by appealing to the content of the propositions which I 
have learnt.  
 
4. Conclusion 
  
I hope to have shown that the Generality problem is a serious problem for Stanley 
and Williamson’s version of Intellectualism, just as the Generality problem is a serious 
problem for process Reliabilism. The existence of a Generality problem challenges the 
basic explanatory power of a view, questioning whether it offers a satisfactory account of 
                                                            
110 See (Pavese, 2015b, pp. 14–16) for this suggestion in the case of basic know-how (see also 
(Sosa, 2010, p. 45). 
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the target phenomenon. Since Stanley and Williamson’s view doesn’t distinguish ways of 
acting which are relevant for a given activity, their view significantly over-generates 
knowledge-how. Furthermore, it fails to make clear predictions about which propositions 
are known when someone knows how to do something. I have argued that the obvious 
responses to the Generality problem for Intellectualism are unsatisfactory, meaning that 
the onus is on Intellectualists to provide an account of which ways of V-ing are relevant for 
knowledge how to V.  
 
It is worth briefly noting two kinds of responses that are worthy of further 
consideration. First, there are contextualist accounts that appeal to context to enrich the 
meaning of knowledge-how ascriptions. These theories explained how context interacts 
with knowledge-how ascriptions, and can provide the right kind of machinery to resolve 
the generality problem in cases where the context is sufficiently rich. The problem was 
that they did not provide us with reasons for thinking that context will always be 
sufficiently rich to fix the level of generality. Secondly, there is potential for an empirically 
influenced version of Intellectualism that takes the relevant ways of acting from empirical 
science. The task for this theory will be to give us substantive reasons to think that 
empirical explanation of successful action will appeal to just one way of acting, which is 
thought of at the personal level. Although both views address the generality problem, it is 
notable how different they are, and how much work one would need to do to satisfactorily 
defend them. 
 
Let’s now consider how general the Generality Problem is. I take it that the 
Generality problem will afflict any version of Intellectualism that endorses ANSS&W, since 
this minimal theory appeals to way-types as part of its account of the semantics of how-
questions. This means that the generality problem will arise for the various iterations of 
Stanley and Williamson’s view, as well as Pavese’s (2015a, 2015b) (see footnote 106) and 
Cath’s (2015) versions of Intellectualism (that said, I haven’t argued that Pavese’s or 
Cath’s accounts don’t provide them with the resources to resolve the generality problem; 
there’s a difference between facing a generality problem, and not being able to resolve that 
problem). To avoid the problem one could claim that knowledge how to V is knowledge 
about V-ing which doesn’t involve ways of V-ing, or one could claim that knowledge how 
involves way-tokens, and not way-types. Both views are options, but are implausible. A non-
way-involving Intellectualist account would be in tension with the linguistic evidence, and 
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an account that appealed to way-tokens would not be able to explain the fact that 
knowledge-how is a kind of general knowledge (see footnote 102).111 
 
There are also some Non-Intellectualist views which face the Generality Problem. 
Objectualist accounts treat knowledge-how as objectual or acquaintance knowledge of a 
way of acting, meaning that they face the issue of explaining which of the many ways of V-
ing are such that objectual/acquaintance knowledge of them is sufficient for knowing how 
to V. Brogaard’s Predicativist account also has an open variable for way-types in her 
account, meaning that she also faces this problem. Accounts that identify knowledge how 
to V with a kind of ability or disposition to V face the related problem of specifying a kind 
of ability or that is necessary and sufficient for knowledge-how (See chapter 1 §3). This 
problem isn’t strictly speaking a version of the Generality problem, but it does leave 
ability-theorists with a sufficiency problem that is just as difficult. This issue is dialectically 
important, since if all of the alternatives to Intellectualism cannot give conditions which 
are sufficient for knowledge-how, then Intellectualism is no worse off than the alternatives.  
 
However, not all Non-Intellectualist theories face this kind of problem. Consider 
the Actist view that knowledge-how is a knowledge-relation to an activity. According to 
this view, knowledge how to swim consists in standing in the knowledge relation to the 
activity of swimming. There is only one activity-type in question here – swimming – 
meaning that the Generality Problem cannot get off the ground. Since Actism does not 
face the Generality Problem, the Intellectualist cannot get off the hook by contending that 
all other accounts of knowledge-how face similar problems. 
 
It’s also worth noting that generality problems seem to also occur for other kinds of 
knowledge-wh. Consider the application of the answer theory to infinitival knowledge-
what: 
 
ANSWHAT: S knows what to do in a situation C iff S knows that V-ing is the thing 
that S ought to do in C. 
 
                                                            
111 “Learning is becoming capable of doing some correct or suitable thing in any situations of 
certain general sorts. It is becoming prepared for variable calls within certain ranges.” (Ryle, 2009b, 
p. 129).  
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In order to get a generality problem going for this account of knowledge-what, we 
need to be able to shift the level of generality of the action-variable to generate cases in 
which one can know that V-ing is the thing to do, without knowing what to do. It is not too 
difficult to set up an example with these features. If S is facing a difficult moral choice, 
they might know that the thing to do is the right action, without knowing which of the 
options they are faced with is the right action. In such a situation they would know that 
doing the right thing is the action they ought to do, without knowing what to do. One might 
think that the existence of this kind of case suggests that the Generality Problem 
ultimately targets the Answer theory of knowledge-wh. Although this is a tempting 
conclusion, I think that the target is somewhat narrower. The problem targets the 
application of ANS to kinds of knowledge-wh that quantify over types, and not ANS in 
general. This is evidenced by the fact that we cannot find generality-style cases for non-
type-quantifying knowledge-wh. For example, who came to the party? is answered by 
propositions about token individuals, and applying the Answer theory to ‘S knows who 
came to the party’ does not seem to lead to generality problems. This pattern of generality-
style cases is important, since my contention that the generality problem for Intellectualism 
stemmed from its appeal to types would be undermined if similar problems arose for non-
type-quantifying knowledge-wh. 
 
In chapter 1 §4.2.2., I argued that even if Intellectualism is supported by the most 
plausible semantics for ‘knows how’ ascriptions in English, there might be compelling non-
linguistic reasons to reject Intellectualism, leading one to endorse a non-standard 
semantics on philosophical grounds. This chapter has provided one example of such a 
problem. If Intellectualists cannot give a satisfactory account of which ways of acting are 
relevant for determining the presence of knowledge-how, then this would be a good reason 
to reject Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge-how, and their semantics for 
‘knows how’ ascriptions in favour of an account of the metaphysics and semantics which 
either does not lead to a generality problem — such as an Actist view — or a view which 
has a more tractable problem of generality. This brings home an important methodological 
point: it is possible that linguistic theory suggests a certain account of a phenomenon, 
which should be rejected for entirely philosophical reasons. Accepting that linguistic 
theory is a legitimate source of evidence about philosophical problems doesn’t mean that 
linguistic considerations always trump philosophical arguments whenever the two come 
into conflict.
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Part 2: A Genealogy of Knowledge-How 
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Chapter 4: What’s the Point of Knowledge-how? 
 
Introduction 
 
 In The Concept of Mind, Ryle introduces the notion of knowledge-how with a rebuke 
to philosophers: 
 
Theorists have been so preoccupied with the task of investigating the nature, the 
source and the credentials of the theories that we adopt that they have for the most 
part ignored the question what it is for someone to know how to perform tasks. In 
ordinary life, on the contrary, as well as in the special business of teaching, we are 
much more concerned with people’s competences than with their cognitive 
repertoires, with the operations [that they engage in] than with the truths that they 
learn. (Ryle, 2009b, p. 17) 
 
 Ryle is surely right that we care a great deal about knowledge-how and competence 
but he doesn’t consider why we should care about these notions. 
 
 In this chapter I want to consider why we care about knowing-how. To address this 
question I will follow Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the State of Nature, asking what the 
function of our concept KNOWS112 might be. I will focus on two pictures of the function 
of the concept of knowledge-how, which I will call Pooling Skills, and Mutual Reliance: 
 
Pooling Skills: We care about knowledge-how because we want to pick up skills 
which other people have; we use the concept of knowledge-how to make 
discernments amongst potential teachers. 
                                                            
112 I’ll follow the convention of capitalising concepts, so ‘KNOWS’ denotes the concept of 
knowledge. I will also talk about the concepts KNOWS-HOW and KNOWS-THAT below, taking 
take these to be complex concepts composed of KNOWS plus some other element. I won’t have 
very much to say about concepts — I take them to be some kind of representational device 
connected to natural language expressions. If you don’t think that there are concepts, then talk 
about them can be rephrased as talk about the practical interests which are part of the 
metasemantics of natural language terms.  
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Mutual Reliance: We care about knowledge-how because we need to be able to 
rely upon people to do stuff for and with us; we use the concept of knowledge-how 
to make judgements about who to rely upon.113 
 
 I will argue below that these two functional claims are closely connected to two 
epistemic norms which will form the focus of the two chapters that follow: the knowledge-
how norm of teaching (KNT), and the knowledge-how norm of intention (KNI): 
 
 KNT: One must: teach someone how to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
 KNI: One must: intend to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
 In §1 I introduce Craig’s function-first methodology for understanding knowledge. 
In §2 I sketch Craig’s account of the function of KNOWS-THAT, and connect it to the 
claim that knowledge is the norm of assertion. In §3 I consider Craig’s extension of his 
account to KNOWS-HOW, which leads to Pooling Skills, and connect this view to the 
claim that knowledge-how is the norm on teaching. In §4, I set out some problems for 
Pooling Skills, and introduce Mutual Reliance. In §5 I will suggest that KNOWS-HOW 
bears the marks of both Pooling Skills and Mutual Reliance, suggest that this means that our 
concept of knowledge-how is inconsistent. 
 
 
1. Function-First Methodology 
 
 There are various places at which one might start inquiring into the nature of 
knowledge (Here I follow (Gardiner, 2015)).  
 
                                                            
113 One might think that there is a Rylean alternative: 
 
Explaining Intelligence: We care about knowledge-how because we want to understand 
why people act intelligently.  
 
Although it is true that we do sometimes use knowledge-how ascriptions to explain an intelligent 
act, I do not think that Explaining Intelligence is a plausible picture of the function of KNOWS-
HOW. There appear to be a great many knowledge-how ascriptions which have nothing to do 
with intelligence. Consider knowing how to make a cup of tea, how to get to the shops, or how to 
raise one’s arm. 
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 An Extension-first approach starts with an extension for ‘knows’, most likely derived 
from our intuitive judgements, and builds an account of knowledge which aims to match 
and explain this extension. This approach goes well when there is agreement about an 
intuitive extension and one account which can explain that extension, but runs into trouble 
where the intuitive extension is fuzzy or unclear, where different accounts of knowledge 
can equally explain the extension, or when other theoretical values — such as simplicity or 
elegance — conflict with tracking the intuitive extension (Weatherson, 2003).  
 
 An Intension-first approach starts with platitudes about the nature of knowledge and 
aims to build an account of knowledge which can explain these platitudes. This approach 
will go well when we can agree on the platitudes about the nature of knowledge, but in 
cases in which there is conflict about the content of intensional intuitions, or intuitions 
about intension conflict with extensional intuitions, the approach will run into trouble. 
 
 We have seen some reasons to be sceptical about the application of either approach 
to the case of knowledge-how. There is no obvious consensus about the intuitive extension 
of knowledge-how. Knowledge-how does not seem to be picked out by any particular 
linguistic construction, and statement of the form ’S knows how to V’ are ambiguous. This 
means that intuitive judgements about whether some agent ‘knows how’ will be unreliable 
in determining whether the agent has the interesting kind of practical knowledge. There 
also appears to be disagreement about the intension of knowledge-how. Although 
Intellectualists and Anti-Intellectualists seem to agree that knowledge-how is a 
distinctively practical kind of knowledge, there is consensus around what this practicality 
comes to, and putative platitudes about the connection between knowledge-how and 
ability are extremely controversial.114 It is also not obvious whether we should expect 
knowledge-how to be governed by the same platitudes as knowledge-that; or to put the 
point a different way, whether the platitudes standardly posited for knowledge only govern 
knowledge-that.115 
 
                                                            
114 I will propose one way to cash out the practicality of knowledge-how in chapter 7. 
115 See (Carter & Pritchard, 2015b), which suggest that knowledge in general excludes luck, but 
that knowledge-how does not. 
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 In contrast to Extension-first and Intension-first approaches, Craig starts off 
inquiry by thinking about the function of KNOWS, employing what we might think of as 
a Function-first approach: 
 
Instead of beginning with ordinary usage, we begin with an ordinary situation. We 
take some prima face plausible hypothesis about what the concept knowledge does 
for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having a role 
would be like, what conditions would govern its application. Such an investigation 
would still have an anchorage point in the everyday concept: should it reach a 
result quite different from the intuitive intension, or one that yielded an extension 
quite different from the intuitive extension […] the original hypothesis about the 
role that concept plays in our life would of course be the first casualty. (Craig, 
1990, p. 2) 
 
 We can think of this kind of approach as a kind of reverse engineering. We start 
with a hypothesis about the practical need which a concept might address, and a picture of 
how that concept might address that practical need. We then set out to design a concept 
which explains how the concept meets that need, and then assess whether that concept 
matches the ordinary extension and intention for the concept in question. In Craig’s 
account, this story acquires a quasi-historical flavour, due to his employment of a state of 
nature narrative. 
 
 This approach raises a number of questions: 
 
i. Why think that concepts have theoretically interesting functions? 
ii. How should we assess a hypothesis about the function of KNOWS? 
iii. What does it mean to talk about the function of KNOWS? 
iv. What is the significance of the Genealogical elements of Craig’s account? 
v. How does Craig’s approach to KNOWS relate to other function-first approaches? 
 
 I will address these issues in turn. 
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1.1. Why think that Concepts have Interesting Functions?  
 
 If we think of concepts minimally as a cognitive and linguistic tool for marking a 
distinction in reality, then we might think that all concepts have the boring function of 
picking out the extension which they pick out (Craig, 1990, p. 3). There is a sense in which 
all concepts play this minimal role, but I don’t think that this means that they cannot also 
have more interesting functions.  
 
 A helpful way to frame the question of a concept’s function is by thinking about the 
practical value of thinking and talking with a particular concept. We are cognitively 
limited agents, and we can only think and communicate with a limited array of concepts. 
Reality far outstrips our capacity to represent concepts in language or mind. The mere fact 
that there is a distinction in reality does not explain why we operate with a concept to 
track that distinction; the fact that a distinction is ‘out there’ doesn’t explain why this 
distinction is an important one to represent in our conceptual scheme. In order to explain 
why we operate with a particular concept, it is natural to appeal to our practical interests. 
We operate with the concept FOOD which picks out (roughly) edible, nutritious, non-
poisonous objects, rather than FOOD* which picks out edible, nutritious, non-poisonous 
objects and ball-point pens because working with FOOD addresses our practical need for 
nourishment better by helping us to make better judgements about what to eat. The fact 
that our conceptual scheme is answerable to our practical needs does not mean that all of 
our concepts have revelatory functions: perhaps the function of natural kind terms is just 
to pick out their extensions, and it might be that other concepts only answer our practical 
needs only as part of a wider array of concepts. It might also be that one natural language 
term is used to track multiple distinctions in different contexts. What this picture does is 
open up the possibility of gaining insight into our concepts by thinking about their 
functions. 
 
 
1.2. How should we Assess a Hypothesis About the Function of KNOWS?  
 
 On Craig’s view we can assess the success of a functional hypothesis by comparing 
the constructed concept to our actual conceptual practice with knows. A successful 
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functional hypothesis gets the extension of the concept roughly right, explaining our 
intensional intuitions about the nature of that concept, and the ‘constellation of thoughts’ 
which go along with that concept (Craig, 1990, pp. 2, 14). We might also add to Craig’s 
criteria that it would be good if the account of the function of KNOWS answers to at least 
some of the pragmatic and speech act theoretic uses of knowledge ascriptions, or what it is 
that we actually use knowledge ascriptions to do (Haslanger, 1999, pp. 462–3, 2000, p. 
33). Craig also claims that since KNOWS is a very general concept, an account of its 
function ought to answer to very general features of human society (Craig, 1990, p. 2).  
 
 Unlike the Carnapian project of explication, which aims to constructs precise 
versions of our messy concepts, the goal of Craig’s project is to construct a version of our 
actual concept, including the ways in which that concept is unclear, indeterminate, and 
inconsistent. One way in which Craig tries to keep this messiness contained is by focusing 
on explaining the central cases of knowledge, allowing that things might get tricky and 
indeterminate around the fringes of the concept. Intriguingly, Craig suggests that we might 
add the messiness of a concept to our evidence base, the thought being that the 
indeterminacies in whether certain cases constitute knowledge might stem from the way in 
which KNOWS meets its conceptual function.116  
 
 
1.3. What does it Mean to Talk About the Function of KNOWS? 
 
 In order to talk clearly about the function of a concept, we need to get clear on the 
significance of talk about the functions of concepts. 
 
 Claims about the function of a concept need to be distinguished from claims about 
the function of the entities that that concept picks out. Consider knives. Plausibly the 
function of knives is to cut things. But this doesn’t mean that the function of KNIFE is to 
cut things; rather the function of KNIFE is (plausibly) to help us to make discerning 
judgements about what to use to cut things up. Let’s introduce the distinction between a 
concept’s semantic function, and its metasemantic function. A semantic function is a functional 
                                                            
116 See his discussion of Radford’s French-Canadian (Craig, 1990, pp. 37–8), and the diagnosis of 
the dispute between internalists and externalists (Craig, 1990, p. 63). 
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property which is part of the meaning of a given concept. Being suitable for cutting might 
be the semantic function of KNIFE because the functional property of being apt to cut is 
part of the meaning of ‘knife’. By contrast, a Metasemantic function is a functional 
property of the concept itself, which plays a role in fixing its meaning. For example the 
metasemantic function of KNIFE might be to help us to make discerning judgements 
about what to use as an implement for eating our dinner. This function of helping us to 
make discerning judgements about what to use to cut up food is part of the meaning-
determining conditions for KNIFE, but not itself part of the meaning of KNIFE.  
 
 Claims about the function of a concept also need to be distinguished from claims 
about the function of the speech acts which we make employing the term which 
corresponds to that concept. We might use ascriptions employing a certain concept for all 
kinds of pragmatic purposes beyond its metasemantic function. For example, the 
exclamation ‘Knife!’ might serve the function of warning those nearby of some kind of 
danger relating to knives. But that does not mean that the metasemantic function of 
KNIFE is to warn of danger. Although we shouldn’t expect pragmatic uses of a concept in 
speech acts to stem from a metasemantic function, we should expect that a concept’s 
metasemantic function shows up in its pragmatics. 
 
 The distinction between semantic and metasemantic functions is often unhelpfully 
blurred. It is common to say that on Craig’s view the function of KNOWS is to pick out good 
informants.117 This gloss of Craig’s view is problematic at a couple of levels. For one thing, it 
is pretty clear that being a good informant can come apart considerably from being a 
knower.118  But the underlying issue is that the functional claim ends up as a claim about 
what knowledge is, rather than a claim about the way in which having a concept of 
knowledge addresses our practical needs. This claim presents an account of the semantic 
function of KNOWS as an account of its metasemantic function. If we want the function-
first approach to motivate accounts of our concepts on the basis of our conceptual needs, 
then it is crucial that we allow distance between a claim about a metasemantic function and 
the account of the target phenomenon. A functional hypothesis cannot simply smuggle in 
an account of the target phenomenon. There should be some theoretical work to 
                                                            
117 (Neta, 2006, pp. 266–7; Greco, 2007, p. 68; Kelp, 2011; Lackey, 2012 especially RIVKA; 
Pritchard, 2012; E. Fricker, 2015; McGrath, 2015). 
118 (Kelp, 2011; Lackey, 2012; E. Fricker, 2015). 
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explaining how having a concept that picks out a certain set of objects helps us to address 
our practical needs.119  
 
 
1.4. What is the Significance of the Genealogical Element of Craig’s 
Account? 
 
 In order to understand the practical needs behind KNOWS, Craig employs a state 
of nature story. Craig often presents this state of nature story as a hypothetical genealogical 
story about the conceptual development of KNOWS, and many of Craig’s interpreters 
have taken his account of knowledge to have an important historical flavour, involving a 
real or hypothetical account of the conceptual history of KNOWS.120 This way of thinking 
about his project is misleading: the state of nature story is not historical, nor is it merely 
hypothetical.  
 
 In Knowledge and the State of Nature, Craig is clear that we shouldn’t think of his 
treatment as a history of KNOWS: 
 
I shall not treat its [i.e. KNOWS’s] development diachronically, and that is not just 
an omission: if what I shall say is along the right lines, the core of the concept of 
knowledge is an outcome of certain very general facts about the human situation; 
so general, indeed that one cannot imagine their changing whilst anything we can 
still recognise as social life persists (Craig, 1990, p. 10) 
 
 In a later piece surveying different kinds of genealogical approaches, Craig also 
warns against a historical interpretation of his project. 
 
It was only in so far as I hoped to explain the presence of the concept of knowledge 
– our present everyday concept of knowledge – in early cultures and their 
                                                            
119 Instead of saying that the function of KNOWS is to pick out good informants, I will say that the 
function of KNOWS is to help us pool information, and that the way that KNOWS plays this role 
is (roughly) by picking out agents who are good informants. 
120 For this interpretation of Craig see (Kusch, 2009, pp. 64–7, 2011; Kappel, 2010, pp. 69–71; 
Kelp, 2011; E. Fricker, 2015; Gardiner, 2015). 
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languages that I needed to think in terms of historical examples at all, and then only 
historical, not putatively prehistorical, examples. […] Reference to mankind’s 
prehistory was no essential part of my argument, but so to speak epiphenomenal to 
it. (Craig, 2007, pp. 191–2) 
 
 Craig claims that the features of social life to which KNOWS answers are 
extremely general, which means that he is committed to historical societies having these 
features. But, the fact that these societies are in the past plays no important role in his 
explanation of the nature of KNOWS.121 
 
 The role of the appeal to a ‘primitive’ society in Craig’s account is to present us with 
a simplified general picture of human society, which makes it easier to see certain 
epistemically important features: 
 
State-of-nature theories are “imaginary” then, at most in the sense that they weave 
fictions around factual claims about human nature. (Craig, 2007, p. 193) 
 
 In order to play this role the state of nature story must make some claims about the 
nature of real historical societies, meaning the state of nature story is not merely 
hypothetical, but contains important factual claims.  
 
1.5. Comparison to Other Accounts 
 
 By downplaying the historical elements of Craig’s discussion, it becomes clear that 
his project is related to various other projects that appeal to the functions of concepts. I 
want to focus on two theories: Haslanger’s Ameliorative Project, and Bratman’s planning 
theory of intention.  
 
 In a series of papers, Haslanger develops what she calls the Ameliorative project. 
Her application of this project to KNOWS sounds strikingly similar to Craig’s project: 
 
                                                            
121 Although one might think of Objectivisation as a historical stage, Craig is clear that 
Objectivisation is a general conceptual pressure which operates on all of our concepts, rather than 
a specific historical phase in the development of KNOWS (Craig, 1990, p. 82). 
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 On an [Ameliorative] approach the task is not simply to explicate our ordinary 
concept of X; nor is it to discover what those things we normally take to fall under 
the concept have in common; instead we ask what our purpose is in having the 
concept of X, whether this purpose is well-conceived, and what concept (or 
concepts) would serve our well-conceived purpose(s) assuming there to be at least 
one best. (Haslanger, 1999, p. 467) 
 
 One important difference between Craig’s project and Haslanger’s implementation 
of the Ameliorative project is that Haslanger is more pessimistic about whether the 
concepts we employ currently in fact answer to our legitimate purposes, meaning that she 
is much happier to endorse deeply revisionary accounts of various concepts, as her account 
of Race and Gender concepts make clear (Haslanger, 2000). Haslanger appeals to 
conceptual functions as part of a project to improve our concepts, making her approach a 
kind of conceptual engineering, or conceptual ethics. 
 
 Craig mentions this kind of revisionary approach, but puts it to one side: 
 
Some may also wish to ask a very different normative question: where, if the 
concept of knowledge is to be developed or rendered more precise this ought to be 
done in one way rather than another; clearly, there are parallels in political theory. 
Again I shall not offer an opinion; in any case, unless we are told the purpose of 
such development, we do well to have no opinion to offer. (Craig, 1990, p. 9) 
 
 Craig seems to think that our default position should be that KNOWS addresses 
our legitimate purposes. There are good reasons to be sceptical about this claim 
(Haslanger, 1999, pp. 462–66). One way to understand the literature on testimonial 
injustice demonstrates how patterns of credibility attributions that track social identities 
rather than purely epistemic features can undermine the role of KNOWS in helping us to 
pool information (M. Fricker, 2007; McKinnon, 2016). There are good reasons for 
thinking that our knowledge-how attributions are similarly perverted (Hawley 2011).122  
 
                                                            
122 See also (Stanley, 2016, Chapter 7) on the way that the distinction between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that might further social divisions between manual and intelligent tasks. For criticism 
of Stanley, see (Kremer, 2016b). 
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 Another reason for thinking that KNOWS might need amelioration is if it plays 
different functions which are in tension (Fassio & McKenna, 2015). Consider some 
alternatives to Craig’s proposed: that KNOWS functions as an inquiry-stopper (Kappel, 
2010; Kelp, 2011), or that KNOWS functions to regulate patterns of blame (Beebe, 2012). 
If it turns out that we use KNOWS to play several of these roles, we may need to employ 
it to pick out different extensions, leading to inconsistencies, and opening the door to 
amelioration. 
 
 Another illuminating comparison is with Bratman’s planning theory of intention 
(Bratman, 1987). Bratman talks primarily of the function of having intentions, rather than 
the function of the concept INTENDS. I don’t want to get caught up in whether Bratman 
intends these claims as referring to semantic or metasemantic functions. All that I want to 
point out is that there is a natural interpretation of the planning theory as an account of the 
function of INTENDS which meshes nicely with Craig’s account of the function of 
KNOWS. 
 
 Here’s a version of Bratman’s theory translated into an account of the metasemantic 
function of INTENDS. Start with our practical needs. We are cognitively limited agents: 
we have relatively little knowledge about how the future will be, we have a limited 
capacity to make branching plans for contingencies, and a limited capacity for 
deliberation. We are also temporally and socially extended agents: we need to be able to 
co-ordinate across time with ourselves, and we need to be able to co-ordinate with other 
agents. How are we to deal with our need for interpersonal and interpersonal co-
ordination, whilst taking full account of our cognitive limitations? The planning theory 
claims that INTENDS addresses these practical needs by picking out a state which is the 
upshot of practical deliberation, and has a distinctive functional profile: roughly, the role of 
being stable across time, relatively resistant to reconsideration, and being a constraint on 
our planning. Having a concept that picks out this state allows us to plan on the basis of 
what other agents will do — and for that matter what we will do — by attributing a state 
that is relatively stable in the face of reconsideration. Working with this concept also 
allows us to shape our planning, by making sure that we avoid inconsistent plans, and fill 
out our plans when the time comes. This claim can be dressed up in a state of nature 
narrative. Perhaps the central situation for the supporter of the planning theory is a 
situation of joint planning. Consider the situation of two flat-mates who want to co-
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ordinate when each uses the shower in the morning to ensure that neither has to wait. The 
concept INTENDS helps these agents to address their co-ordination problem by allowing 
each agent to form and communicate a plan about when they will use the bathroom.  
 
 There are a couple of striking similarities between Craig’s story about the function 
of KNOWS, and the Bratmanesque story about INTENDS. Both accounts appeal to our 
needs for co-ordination: Craig argues that KNOWS functions to address our need for 
epistemic co-ordination by helping us to pool information, and Bratman claims INTENDS 
to address our need for practical co-ordination by helping us to plan together. Both 
accounts claim that the concepts help us to plan: KNOWS helps us to tap other peoples’ 
stores of information about questions relevant to our plans, and INTENDS by allowing us 
to plan on the basis of what other agents will do by allowing us to predict what they will 
do. Finally, both concepts aim to play a certain kind of inquiry-stopper role: KNOWS 
aims to end uncertainty about a factual question by delivering its answer via testimony, 
and INTENDS aims to end uncertainty about what someone (including oneself) will do 
via the expression, attribution, or formation of intention.  
 
 
2. The Function of KNOWS-THAT 
 
 In this section, I lay out the central elements of Craig’s account of KNOWS, and 
argue that his account of KNOWS supports the claim that knowledge is the norm of 
assertion. 
 
 Craig starts with our practical needs. Each of us has a need for true information 
about our environment, in order to allow us to bring our practical projects off successfully. 
But our access to information about the environment is limited, and information is 
distributed between agents. It would be helpful for agents to be able to tap the information 
possessed by others as and when it becomes pertinent. This gives us a practical need: the 
need to pool information between agents. Craig’s hypothesis is that this need is addressed 
by KNOWS, positing the following metasemantic function: 
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Pooling information: the function of KNOWS is to help us to pool information 
between different agents. 
 
One way to understand this need is by considering the situation of an inquirer,123 
someone who has an open question of practical significance, and faces a number of 
different agents who might be in a position to resolve that question for her.124 What an 
agent in this kind of situation needs is a concept that can help her to assess potential 
informants on her question. Craig’s central hypothesis is that KNOWS addresses our need 
to pool information by providing us with a state which provides a standard on potential 
informants (Craig, 1990, p. 11).  
 
Craig primarily focuses on how KNOWS can facilitate informant choice, but he 
actually considers a couple of other mechanisms by which KNOWS helps us to pool 
information: 
 
i. An agent who is among various potential informants for some inquirer can apply 
the concept KNOWS to herself in order to determine whether she is in a 
sufficiently good epistemic position to assert (Craig, 1990, pp. 63–5); 
ii. An agent who is neither inquirer nor informant, can KNOWS in order to 
recommend someone else as a good informant (Craig, 1990, pp. 82–97); 
 
 To these we might also add: 
 
iii. After testimony has taken place, agents can use positive knowledge ascriptions to 
praise the speaker, and negative knowledge ascriptions to censure the speaker. 
These positive and negative ascriptions provide social pressure to drive up the 
general epistemic standards for testimony (Reynolds, 2002, 2008). 
 
 I think that the best gloss of Craig’s functional story is that KNOWS helps us to 
address our need to pool information between agents by picking out an epistemic standard 
on information-provision. This means that the claim that the metasemantic function of 
                                                            
123 On the distinction between the situation of inquirers and examinars, see (Williams, 1973, p. 149; 
Craig, 1990, p. 19). 
124 This question-based situation means that knowledge-wh ascriptions are much better 
illustrations of Craig’s picture than knowledge-that ascriptions (Craig, 1990, p. 12). 
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KNOWS is to pool information gives us a gloss on the semantic function of knowledge — 
that knowledge is associated with the functional property of being a standard on good 
informants. 
 
 This gloss on the functional properties of knowledge is closely related to the 
knowledge-norm of assertion.125 Supporters of the knowledge-norm of assertion endorse 
the following claim (Williamson, 2000, Chapter 11; DeRose, 2002; Hawthorne, 2004; 
Turri, 2011): 
 
 KNA: One must: assert that p, only if one knows that p126 
 
 This norm says that an agent’s assertion is permissible only if she knows what she 
says. If a speaker says that something which is false, unjustified or not known, then there 
is something inappropriate about that assertion. Crucially, KNA makes a claim about 
epistemic permission: an ignorant or false assertion can still be morally or prudentially 
permissible, and a knowledgeable assertion can still be morally or prudentially 
impermissible.127  
 
 One might have thought that KNA and Pooling Information were in competition. It is 
true that the examples of knowledge ascriptions used to illustrate KNA and the pooling 
view are importantly different: Craig focuses on the perspective of the inquirer, considering 
prospective knowledge-ascriptions which are used to flag good informants, whereas 
supporters of KNA focus on the perspective of the examiner, considering retrospective uses 
of knowledge-ascriptions to assess whether an assertion fulfilled an epistemic rule. These 
families of examples do demonstrate two different kinds of pragmatic functions of 
knowledge-ascriptions: a flagging use, and a evaluating use (McGrath, 2015). However, if 
                                                            
125 A number of authors have also suggested that Craig’s account supports the knowledge norm of 
practical reasoning. (Greco, 2008, 2012; Hannon, 2013; McKenna, 2013, 2014). 
126 The knowledge-norm of assertion is formulated in several different ways: as an imperative or 
must claim (Williamson, 2000, pp. 241–3), as a claim about appropriateness (J. Brown, 2008b), or 
as a claim about permissibility (Turri, 2011). There is also debate about whether the norm should 
be formulated as a sufficiency claim (J. Brown, 2008b, 2012), and how we should understand the 
notion of assertion (E. Fricker, 2015). For the purposes of my discussion of epistemic norms, the 
differences in formulation will not be significant, and I will focus on the weaker necessity direction 
of the norm. 
127 From this point on, I will use unqualified claims about permission to refer to epistemic 
permission. 
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we look a little more carefully, it should become clear that KNA and Pooling Information are 
not in competition.128 For one thing, the two views are about different things: Pooling 
Information concerns the function of the concept KNOWS-THAT, whereas KNA is a view 
about the functional properties associated with the state of knowledge-that. Pooling 
Information is a claim about metasemantic functions and KNA is a claim about semantic 
functions. Not only are these two views not in conflict: endorsing KNA provides a 
plausible way to unify the various ways in which we can use knowledge ascriptions to 
facilitate the pooling of information. One way to put the point is that KNOWS facilitates 
the pooling of information in part because it picks out a state which is the norm of assertion: 
KNA is a semantic function which naturally supports the metasemantic function posited 
by Pooling Information.129 
 
 
3. The Function of KNOWS-HOW 
 
 Craig presents the Information Pooling account as a general account of the 
function of KNOWS. However, one might worry that Craig has merely given an account 
of the concept KNOWS-THAT, neglecting the function of KNOWS as it occurs in the 
objectual and ‘knowledge how to’ constructions. In the last two chapters of Knowledge and 
the State of Nature (Craig, 1990, Chapters 16, 17), Craig addresses this worry by extending 
Pooling Information to account for the these two constructions. (From this point I’ll treat 
Pooling Information as an account of the function of KNOWS-THAT). 
 
 In the case of objectual knowledge, this extension is fairly unproblematic. The idea 
is that objectual knowledge ascriptions flag the subject as someone who is a good 
informant on questions about the relevant object (Craig, 1990, pp. 140–8). In the case of 
                                                            
128 One potential conflict in the background is between Craig’s function-first approach, and the 
knowledge-first approach employed by KNA (Williamson, 2000). Craig recognises that these two 
approaches are in conflict (Craig, 1990, pp. 94–7). Williamson criticises Craig’s claim that our 
basic epistemic interest is for information, claiming that our basic need is for knowledge (Williamson, 
2000 p.31 note 3). I don’t think that this conflict undermines the interest in this discussion: if 
knowledge is prior to the function of KNOWS, then we can simply endorse a knowledge-first 
version of Pooling Information, according to which the function of KNOWS is to help us pool 
knowledge. 
129 See also (Kelp, 2011; E. Fricker, 2015, pp. 74–84). Williamson also claims that the point of 
having a speech act governed by the knowledge-norm is to facilitate the pooling of knowledge 
(Williamson, 2000, pp. 266–9), which suggests that he endorses the knowledge-first version of this 
connection. 
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knowledge-how, the straightforward extension is not plausible. Although there is an 
information-provision sense of ‘knows how’ where the ascription marks a capacity as an 
informant a good proportion of our ascriptions do not seem to be connected to capacity as 
an informant (Craig, 1990, p. 150). When we say that a child knows how to get home we 
don’t seem to be flagging them up as an informant. If these were merely peripheral cases, 
then the supporter of Pooling Information might reasonably write them off, but these appear 
to be central cases of knowledge-how. Another data-point is that knowledge-how 
ascriptions seem to have a clear capacity sense, or at least a capacity implicature (Craig, 
1990, p. 149), which distinguishes knowing-how from knowing-that. Against the 
suggestion that ‘knows’ is ambiguous, Craig observes that cross-linguistically knowledge-
how appears to be picked out by the verb ‘knows’, or at least a closely related verb (Craig, 
1990, p. 141). Although the ambiguity hypothesis would explain the differences between 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that, it would not explain why we use the same word to 
pick out both kinds of states.  
 
 Taking these points on board gives Craig three data-points to explain: 
 
i. Knowledge-how ascriptions are sometimes used to flag informants, and sometimes 
used in a way that seems to not pick out informants; 
ii. Knowledge-how has a sense which seems to pick out, or at least implicate, a 
capacity to do some activity; 
iii. It is a robust cross-linguistic data-point that knowledge-how ascriptions involve a 
verb closely related to that which is used in other knowledge-ascriptions. 
 
 This leads to a puzzle for Pooling Information. The fact that ‘knows how’ involves the 
word ‘know’ (iii) suggests that these ascriptions ought to work to address our need to pool 
information, but on the other hand the capacity sense (ii), and the fact that these 
ascriptions diverge from the ability to act as an informant (i) suggest that knowledge-how 
ascriptions do not address our need to pool information, but instead address some distinct 
need.  
 
 In order to resolve this puzzle, Craig extends Pooling Information to apply to the 
pooling of other kinds of states. Craig suggests that we might understand the function of 
KNOWS-HOW by taking up the perspective of the Apprentice: 
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We may start with the obvious point that human beings need both true beliefs and 
capacities to act, since every action calls for both. The inquirer seeks a true belief 
on the question whether p; the apprentice, as we may call him, seeks the capacity to 
do A. His purposes may be furthered either by someone who tells him, or by 
someone who shows him, how to do A. (Craig, 1990, p. 156). 
 
 Just as the inquirer needs a concept to help her to evaluate potential informants, the 
apprentice needs a concept to help her evaluate potential teachers.130 Craig highlights two 
ways in which a teacher can inculcate knowledge in her students: by telling the apprentice 
how to V, and by showing the apprentice how to V.131 Given this disjunctive conception of 
teaching, the conditions required to be good teacher will also be somewhat disjunctive: 
some teachers will be able to tell, others to show, and others to engage in something in 
between.  
 
 This gives us an analogue function to Pooling Information: 
 
Pooling Skills: the function of KNOWS-HOW is to help us to pool skills and 
capacities between different agents. 
 
 This function corresponds to an important pragmatic function of knows-how 
ascriptions. Consider the following exchange: 
 
Anika: I’m looking to learn to play the recorder: do you know anyone who could 
teach me? 
Marta: Sure! Parzifal knows how to play the recorder. 
 
 Although Marta’s response doesn’t directly address Anika’s question about who 
might teach her, there is an implicature from the claim that Parzifal knows how to play the 
recorder to her being in a position to be a reasonable teacher. Pooling Skills suggests a 
natural analogy with the metasemantic and semantic functions of KNOWS-THAT: that 
                                                            
130 Reynolds makes a closely related move, suggesting that the function of KNOWS-HOW is to 
flag someone up as a good teacher (Reynolds, 2002, pp. 158–9). 
131 For a discussion of teaching-how and testimony, see (Hawley, 2010). For an argument for 
scepticism about gaining knowledge-how via testimony, see (Poston, 2016). 
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KNOWS-HOW helps the apprentice to choose teachers by picking out a state which is 
the standard on teaching. 
 
 Craig’s functional hypothesis is in a nice position to explain data points i), ii) and iii). 
  
 This disjunctive conception of teaching-how helps to explain data-point i). 
Knowledge-how is sometimes connected with being an informant, because some teachers 
are good informants, but knowledge-how does not require being a good an informant, 
because other teachers are not good informants, instead teaching by showing.  
 
 The connection between showing and doing explains data point ii). Because showing 
will often involve the teacher engaging in the activity herself, we should expect 
knowledge-how to have an important capacity sense. The capacity implicature is messy, as 
the literature on counterexamples to the ability theory demonstrates. The importance of 
teaching by showing suggests that there will be an important connection between ability 
and knowing-how. But, the fact that one can teach by merely engaging in testimony 
suggests that we should expect there to be cases of unable knowers. For example, an 
ageing teacher might remain a very good teacher, in virtue of the fact that they can teach 
by telling their students how to perform the relevant task, despite not being in a position to 
pull off the relevant tasks. 
 
 This leaves us with iii). Effectively what Craig has given us is two conceptual 
functions. He claims that although these functions address distinct needs, these concepts 
‘huddle’ together because of the underlying connections between being a good informant 
and being a good teacher (Craig, 1990, p. 156). What the apprentice is looking for will in 
many cases be the same kind of thing that the inquirer is looking for — a good informant. 
The two conceptual functions have come to be connected to the same word because the 
states which we need to pick out in order to address those needs overlap in important 
ways. One way to understand this idea is to say that Pooling Information and Pooling Skills 
are instances of a more general conceptual function: 
 
Pooling Epistemic States: the function of KNOWS is to pool epistemic states 
between agents. 
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 On this way of understanding things, the concepts KNOWS-THAT and KNOWS-
HOW are connected in virtue of the fact that they address particular aspects of our need 
to pool epistemic states.  
 
 Craig’s story about KNOWS-HOW appeals to the idea that it picks out a standard 
on good teachers. As with the account of the function of KNOWS-THAT, he focuses on 
the application of that concept by someone who is looking for a teacher, but he ought also 
be open to the self-application of that concept, its use in recommending teachers to others, 
and to the praising/censuring use of ‘knows how’ ascriptions to provide social pressure. 
This suggests an analogue of the knowledge norm of assertion, which I’ll call the 
knowledge norm of teaching or KNT for short: 
 
KNT: One must: teach how to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
 This norm is suggested by Buckwalter and Turri (2014) in a discussion which will 
form the basis of the next chapter. Just as KNA claims that knowledge that p is a 
necessary condition on asserting p with epistemic propriety, KNT claims that knowing 
how to V is a necessary condition on teaching how to V with epistemic propriety.  
 
 Putting KNA and KNT together suggests a general knowledge-norm on pedagogy 
(Buckwalter & Turri, 2014, pp. 18–9).132 Let’s call this claim the knowledge norm of 
pedagogy, or KNP for short: 
 
KNP: One must: teach X, only if one knows X (where X is a variable for 
propositions, question-phrases, objects, subject-matters, and whatever else it might 
possible to teach). 
 
 This norm has a number of attractive features. It holds out promise for a unified 
explanation of our evaluative practices with respect to pedagogical activities. If KNP is 
right, then knowledge is the standard for all kinds of pedagogy. Furthermore, if 
                                                            
132 This way of connecting KNT and KNA means that both normative claims are inherited from a 
more general norm. There are other ways in which the two norms might be connected: it might be 
that KNT is an instance of KNA, if we think that all teaching requires assertion of the relevant how 
fact (perhaps a demonstrative assertion, see (Stanley, 2011b, pp. 162–4). For a classification of 
arguments for common normative standards, see (J. Brown, 2012). 
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knowledge-how and knowledge-that are associated with the being the norm of X functional 
role, this would give us a rather nice general functional characterisation of knowledge, 
explaining why we should think that knowledge-how and knowledge -that are both species 
of knowledge.133 
 
 
4. Knowledge-How and Mutual Reliance 
 
 Craig’s account of the function of KNOWS-HOW does a good job explaining his 
data points, and naturally combines with his account of the information pooling function of 
KNOWS-THAT to provide a general account of the function of KNOWS. However, I 
think that there are two serious worries about this account: 
 
i. Knowing how to do something and being a good teacher of that activity come 
apart; 
ii. Pooling Skills neglects an important function of knowledge-how ascriptions: flagging 
collaborators. 
 
4.1. Knowing How to Do and Knowing How to Teach 
 
 One problem with Pooling Skills is the divergence between knowing how to do 
something, and being a good teacher of that activity. It is a familiar point that many agents 
who know how to do something are largely inarticulate about how to engage in that 
activity.134  Craig is aware of this fact, and this is part of what motivates his disjunctive 
conception of teaching: the thought is that someone who is inarticulate can still transmit 
their skill via demonstration. I don’t think that appealing to showing rescues the 
connection between knowing how and teaching.  
 
 There are cases in which it is possible to transmit a capacity or skill simply by 
performing a particular routine, and saying ‘this is a way to V’, but these are special cases. 
I might be able to teach you how to make a cup of builder’s tea just by making one, since 
                                                            
133 Pooling Skills can also yield a general norm by combining the knowledge norms on intention, and 
action. 
134 For some nice examples of this phenomenon, see (Brownstein, 2014; Montero, 2016). 
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the steps are fairly obvious to an observer. However, it would be bizarre to suggest that I 
could teach you how to play the trumpet or how to write a decent philosophy paper just by 
performing the relevant activities.  
 
 This point is connected to our discussion of the use of demonstratives to pick out 
ways of acting in chapter 3: a token performance will instantiate a great many possible 
methods, meaning that without further hints the apprentice will be unable to determine 
which methods at which level of generality she ought to be replicating in her own 
performance. One general feature of successful demonstrations that is that they require the 
teacher to decompose her performance into simpler elements which she can highlight to the 
student. This decomposition might take a number of forms: the teacher might draw a 
diagram, pantomime the activity, or narrate her performance as she goes along. Without 
decomposition, a learner will not be able to pull out the important aspects of the 
performance or the method that they need to be able to employ themselves. Given enough 
time, a bystander might be able to reconstruct the central elements of an activity just by 
trial and error. However, it would be strange to think about this case as one of teaching; 
rather in this case the actor merely plays the role of being a rich source of evidence.135 The 
cases in which knowing-how comes apart from being a good teacher are fairly common. I 
know how to ride a bike, but I couldn’t teach someone else. I know to play Haydn’s 
trumpet concerto, but I don’t think that I’d be any use in teaching someone else to play it.  
 
 One way to put the challenge against Pooling Skills is to that there is an important 
difference between knowing how to do something, and knowing how to teach other people 
how to do something. Both kinds of knowledge can plausibly be treated as species of the 
general category of practical knowledge, but they concern different activities: doing, and 
teaching others to do.136 Our consideration of the difficulties of teaching by showing shows 
that knowing how to do does not entail knowing how to teach, and suggest that being a 
good teacher of some activity relies on knowing how to teach that activity, rather than 
knowing how to teach it (we’ll return to this distinction in chapter 5). This gives us a 
powerful argument against Pooling Skills. 
 
                                                            
135 This point echoes Craig’s distinction between informants and sources of information (Craig, 
1990, Chapter 5). 
136 This distinction is also noted by (Noë, 2005, pp. 283–4; Stanley, 2011b, p. 128; Brownstein, 
2014, pp. 557–8; Montero, 2016, pp. 87–91). 
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4.2. Clients and Collaborators 
 
 Although Craig isolates one pragmatic function of our knowledge-ascriptions, it is 
not the only use of knowledge-how ascriptions, and it is not obvious that it is their central 
function. Consider the following exchange:  
 
Nat: I need someone to record a Trombone part for a piece that I’m working on. 
Do you know anyone who could help? 
Guiditta: Sure! Trenton knows how to play the Trombone 
 
 As with the exchange between Anika and Marta above, Guiditta’s response does 
not directly answer the question of who might record the line for Nat, instead making a 
claim about Trenton’s knowledge. The natural way to understand this exchange is to think 
that Guiditta’s response implicates that Trenton will be able to help out with Nat’s 
recording (perhaps given some presuppositions about how hard the Trombone part is). In 
this exchange, the knowledge-how ascription plays the role of flagging up someone not as 
a good teacher, but as a competent agent. 
 
 This function of knowledge-how ascriptions is noted by Moore and Hawley: 
 
On this [Craig’s] conception there is something basic about situations in which one 
wants to acquire some information, or a skill, and one is looking for reliable 
instruction. Is there not something yet more basic about situations in which one is 
looking, not for someone who is a reliable instructor, but just for someone who is 
reliable? Suppose I need someone who knows how to fix the plumbing. I am 
probably not the least bit interested in acquiring the skill myself. (Moore, 1997, pp. 
173–4) 
 
There is, however, a further kind of motive for seeking someone who knows how, a 
motive that may be very central to our thinking about knowledge how. When I 
seek a plumber, hairdresser, or architect, usually this is because I need the drains 
fixed, my hair cut, or a building designed. I need have no interest in learning how 
to do these things myself, nor in finding someone who can either teach or assess 
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others. Perhaps I know how to do such things already but am too busy or too lazy 
to get them done myself (and I can’t reach to cut my own hair). I call this ‘the 
client's situation,’ in contrast with the inquirer's and the apprentice's situations. 
(Hawley, 2011, p. 287)137 
 
  Moore and Hawley are both pointing toward an alternative perspective on the 
function of KNOWS-HOW. This perspective connects knowledge-how not to our need to 
pool skills, but rather to our need for responsible co-operation between agents, suggesting 
the following function: 
Mutual Reliance: the function of KNOWS-HOW is to help us to engage in 
responsible practices of co-operation 
 
 It’s worth noting that Mutual Reliance is in an important way broader than Moore’s 
and Hawley’s examples. They both focus on what Hawley calls the Client’s perspective: that 
of someone who is looking for someone else someone to do some task for you. Mutual 
Reliance also applies to cases where the agent is after someone to collaborate with them on 
some project which they either do not have the time, knowledge, or capacity to pull off 
alone. I will call the basic situation involved in this perspective that of the Collaborator. 
 
 The natural suggestion would be that KNOWS-HOW addresses our need for 
collaboration by picking some kind of standard on collaborators. There are a number of 
different dimensions of evaluation of collaborators: how good their work is, how much 
they will charge, how likely they are to show up for work, and so on. It is fairly clear that 
knowledge-how is not connected to the evaluation of the cost of collaborators. Rather, it is 
connected to whether a collaborator is trustworthy. It is common to distinguish two 
dimensions of trustworthiness: whether the potential trustee is sincere, and whether she is 
competent.138 The natural suggestion is that knowledge-how relates to the evaluation of the 
competence of potential collaborators.139 
                                                            
137 See also (Kotzee, 2016). 
138 (Jones, 1996). 
139 We should distinguish competence from the simple notion of reliability. Someone can be 
competent at performing some act, but be unable (in a sense) to perform that activity, because 
enabling conditions are not met. We might think competence is a kind of normal worlds reliability 
condition (Hawley, 2003; Stanley, 2011b, pp. 126–9). 
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 Here we find a nice connection to the planning theory. The planning theory claims 
that INTENDS addresses our need for co-operation by picking out a mental state that 
marks a distinctive kind of commitment to performing some act. We can use INTENDS to 
facilitate collaboration by picking out other peoples’ commitment, thereby assessing their 
sincerity. But INTENDS doesn’t help us to address the competence of those who we are 
relying on. The natural suggestion is that KNOWS-HOW fills this hole in the planning 
theory. Consider again the situation of the flatmates who want to co-ordinate in order to 
avoid waits for the shower. It’s all very well for the flatmates to express intentions to 
shower at particular times, but this plan will be useless if one or both of them is 
incompetent at telling the time, having reliably long showers, or planning their morning 
routine to avoid last-minute dashes for the bathroom. In order to make a successful plan, 
they need to rely not only on each others’ plans, but also on their respective competences. 
To co-operate, we need both INTENDS, and KNOWS-HOW. 
 
 The idea that KNOWS-HOW picks out a standard on intentions suggests a 
normative connection between knowing-how and intending, which I will call the 
knowledge-how norm on intention, or KNI for short: 
 
KNI: One must: intend to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
 KNI claims that knowledge is a necessary condition on appropriate intention. We 
will return to this norm in chapter 7. 
 
 The Collaborator is interested in finding people who can perform various tasks for 
her, and teaching her how to V might easily be one of those tasks. The Collaborator can 
address this need by determining whether various agents in her vicinity know how to 
teach others to V. Note that whereas Pooling Skills claimed that we evaluate teachers of V-
ing by determining whether the know how to V, this extension of Mutual Reliance to the 
activity of teaching suggests that we evaluate teachers of V-ing by determining whether 
they know how to teach V-ing. This puts this view in a better position to explain the gap 
between knowing how to do and being in a position to teach.140  Craig makes this 
                                                            
140 We will return to this suggestion in chapter 5, §3.3. 
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observation (Craig, 1990, p. 160), but he doesn’t make very much of it. I think that this 
point suggests that a version of KNOWS-HOW shaped in the image of Mutual Reliance 
can do all of the work of one shaped in the image of Pooling skills. 
 
5. On the Inconsistency of KNOWS-HOW 
 
 We have seen two functions for KNOWS-HOW: Pooling Skills, and Mutual Reliance. 
The question is: which function represents the function of our concept of knowledge-how? 
There are three options to consider: 
 
i. Pooling Skills is the genuine function of KNOWS-HOW, and the connection 
between knowledge-how and competence is illusory; 
ii. Mutual Reliance is the genuine function of KNOWS-HOW, and the connection 
between knowing-how and teaching is illusory; 
iii. Our conceptual practice is confused; we use KNOWS-HOW to address our need 
to pool information and our need to collaboration.141 
 
 Both the teacher-flagging and collaborator-flagging functions seem to have left their 
mark on the concept of knowledge-how. We use knowledge-how ascriptions to flag up 
potential teachers suggesting a connection with teaching, Pooling Skills can nicely explain 
the messy connection between knowledge-how and ability, and suggests an epistemic norm 
which meshes with an interesting picture of the normative role of knowledge, KNP. On 
the other hand, we also use knowledge-how ascriptions to flag people up as potential 
collaborators, and if knowledge-how didn’t play the role of picking out a standard of 
competence on intentions, we’d need to come up with some other concept to play this role. 
However, both views face problems. Pooling Skills  faces problems due to the divergence 
between knowledge-how and the ability to teach, which point toward Mutual Reliance. 
Mutual Reliance also seems to predict the knowledge-how should entail some kind of 
reliable ability condition, and it is not clear that there is any plausible ability condition on 
knowledge-how (Bengson & Moffett, 2011a). 
                                                            
141 Note that option iii. remains on the table even if it is possible to reconstruct the perspective of 
the Apprentice from within the perspective of the Collaborator. Pooling Skills predicts that ’S 
knows how to V’ flags S as a good teacher, whereas version of the Apprentice’s perspective which 
we can construct from within the perspective of the Collaborator predicts that ’S knows how to 
teach V-ing’ flags S as a good teacher. 
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 This points toward hypothesis iii..142  According to this hypothesis, KNOWS-HOW 
is a concept that has attracted two conceptual functions: Pooling Skills, and Mutual 
Reliance.143 In some contexts, we use knowledge-how ascriptions to pick out potential 
teachers, and in other cases we use it to pick out potential collaborators. This wouldn’t be 
a problem if the two conceptual functions meshed nicely or were confined to non-
overlapping contexts. But there is not good reason to think that either condition holds. 
There will be competent teachers who are poor collaborators, and competent collaborators 
who are poor teachers, and in these cases our judgements about knowledge-how will be 
torn.  
 
 We can get a nice illustration of this tension in by considering some passages in 
which Snowdon and Noë discuss whether unable teachers possess knowledge-how:144 
 
To construct such examples [i.e examples of unable knowers] we need to describe 
cases in which the subject can show, teach, or tell (or otherwise convey to) us how to do 
something, and hence must be credited with knowing how to do it, but is for some reason or 
other unable to do it. There is no assumption here that the presence of knowledge 
entails that it can be passed on by the knower, but it makes a denial of the 
knowledge ascription very hard when the subject can, apparently, convey the 
relevant information to someone else. (Snowdon, 2004, pp. 9–10 italics added) 
 
As the date of the accident recedes in Maestra’s personal history, it becomes less 
and less plausible to think of her as retaining knowledge of how to play; what at 
first seemed like the failure of an enabling condition on her exercise comes to seem 
like a failure of ability itself. The fact that she remains an expert judge of play, or an expert 
teacher, or that she retains her knowledge of music, is irrelevant to this assessment of her 
practical knowledge. […]  Teachers and critics, although very knowledgeable, do not, by that 
very fact, have the relevant practical knowledge. (Noë, 2005, pp. 283–4 italics added) 
 
                                                            
142 (Hawley, 2003; Kotzee, 2016) also suggest a two-function picture of KNOWS-HOW. 
143 For a parallel discussion of KNOWS-THAT see (Fassio & McKenna, 2015). 
144 I take the contrast between these passages from (Small, 2014). 
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 Snowdon takes the fact that someone can teach other people how to do something 
via some mechanism or other to be a sufficient criteria for knowing how to do that thing: 
how else could they teach others how to V if they didn’t know how to V. By contrast, Noë 
wants to clearly distinguish skill at doing from skill at teaching, and takes it that of the 
two, we ought to associate knowing-how with skill at doing, or what he calls practical 
knowledge.  
 
 Here’s a diagnosis of this disagreement. Snowdon is working with a concept of 
knowledge-how tied to our interests in pooling epistemic states, meaning that his concept 
realises Pooling Skills. It is obvious to him that someone who’s in a position to teach others 
how to V must themselves know how to V. By contrast, Noë is operating with a concept of 
knowledge-how which connects knowing how to competence at acting, meaning that his 
concept realises Mutual Reliance. It is obvious to him that someone who is not competent at 
performing the relevant activity cannot have knowledge-how, no matter how good a 
teacher they are. On this diagnosis, the disagreement between Snowdon and Noë is 
metasemantic. They agree about the facts of Maestra’s case, but disagree about how we 
ought to employ the concept of knowledge-how.145 
 
 We should expect to find a similar disagreement about whether agents who are 
extremely competent at some activity, but inarticulate about how to engage in it have 
knowledge-how. Consider the following exchange from an interview with Kimberly Kim, 
the youngest person to win the US Women’s amateur golf tournament: 
 
Q. You're 5 down going into the 16th hole this morning. You finish with three 
birdies. I mean they weren't even long birdie putts. What did you do to motivate 
yourself to win three holes in a row? 
 
KIMBERLY KIM: I have no idea. I guess it was like God playing for me. I don't 
know how I did it. Thinking back, I don't know how I did it. I just hit the ball and it went 
good.146 
 
                                                            
145 On metasemantic disagreements in philosophy, see (Chalmers, 2011; Plunkett, 2015) 
146 Quoted in (Brownstein, 2014, p. 555). Original interview at (Kim, 2006). It’s worth noting that 
some denials of responsibility for their sports performances might be driven by extraneous social 
factors, such as the ‘dumb jock’ stereotype or imposter syndrome. 
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 Does Kim know how to score birdies on the last three holes of the course she was 
playing on?147 We want to say that it was obvious that Kim knows how to score three 
birdies in a row on that course — after all she did it, and there was no luck involved.148 But 
there is a temptation to say that Kim doesn’t know how to score three birdies in a row: she 
didn’t know how to do it, she just did it, and everything worked out in the end. As with the 
disagreement between Noë and Snowdon, I want to suggests that this is a metasemantic 
disagreement about how to use the concept of knowledge-how. 
 
 We are faced with a choice. Should we continue to work with a concept of 
knowledge-how which serves two metasemantic functions, or should we choose one 
function? I think that we should plump for one function or other in the interests of 
avoiding a concept of knowledge-how which gives indeterminate or conflicting judgements 
about whether unable teachers or inarticulate agents have knowledge-how. I will spend the 
next two chapters arguing that we should favour Mutual Reliance over Pooling Skills. The 
argument for this claim is somewhat indirect. I will argue that KNT gets into trouble with 
cases of agents who know how to teach but not how to do, undermining Pooling Skills. By 
contrast KNI can be developed in a way that it is defensible. 
                                                            
147 Note that this question is distinct from the question of whether she knows how she did it, which 
is a question about her memory, not about her practical knowledge. 
148 This idea might be what lies behind Polyani’s claim that we ‘know more than we can tell’ 
(Polyani, 2009). 
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Chapter 5: Knowledge-How is not the Norm of Teaching 
 
Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapter we considered an epistemic norm connecting knowledge-
how to teaching, which we called the knowledge norm of teaching, or KNT for short.  
 
 KNT: One must: teach how to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
 In a recent paper, Buckwalter and Turri (2014) have made the case for a norm close 
to KNT, arguing that: 
 
 Just as knowing that is the norm of information transmission, knowing how is the 
norm of skill transmission. In brief, just as knowing is the norm of telling, so too 
knowing is the norm of showing. (2014, p. 17) 
 
 I think that their use of ‘showing’ pretty closely matches my use of ‘teaching’ as a 
generic term for skill teaching, so I will l treat Buckwalter and Turri as arguing for a 
knowledge-norm on teaching.149 Buckwalter and Turri point out that one can adapt the 
arguments used in favour of KNA to KNT, and contend that there is an explanatory virtue 
to positing a unifying epistemic norm of pedagogy, which we are calling KNP: 
 
KNP: One must: teach X, only if one knows X.  
 
 My central goal in this chapter is to argue that KNT is false. This norm faces 
counterexamples of agents who know how to teach but not how to do, who can 
successfully and appropriately teach others, despite not having the relevant knowledge-
how. The cases are rather similar to Jennifer Lackey’s cases of selfless or generative 
assertors, who transmit knowledge to others which they do not themselves possess and 
pose the same kind of challenge for KNT as her examples do to KNA (Lackey, 2008). In 
                                                            
149 To make things a little more confusing, I will later introduce a distinct category of showing, 
which picks out the kind of teaching that involves non-linguistic communication (i.e. all non-
testimonial teaching). It should be borne in mind that this way of using ‘showing’ is considerably 
narrower than Buckwalter and Turri’s. 
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order to mark this similarity I will call the kind of teaching that causes problems for KNT 
Generative Teaching.150  The falsity of KNT entails the falsity of KNP, and puts pressure on 
Pooling Skills, which as I argued in the last chapter predicts that KNT is true. I will also 
argue against two fall-back positions, which claim that knowledge-how is the norm on 
specific kinds of teaching. I will consider two kinds of teaching that might be governed by 
a knowledge-norm: showing, and demonstrating. These labels are largely arbitrary, and do not 
purport to track ordinary language usage: showing picks out the category of teaching via 
non-linguistic communication, and demonstration picks out the category of teaching in 
which the teacher performs the relevant activity in order to teach her student how to do it. 
I will argue that a knowledge norm on showing falls foul of cases of generative teaching, 
and that the apparent connections between knowledge-how and demonstration can be 
explained away by more general connections between knowledge-how and intentional 
action. 
 
 The plan of action is as follows. In §1 I will make some clarificatory comments about 
how to understand KNT, and lay out Buckwalter and Turri’s conversational arguments for 
KNT. In §2, I consider the alternative conditions that might figure in a norm on teaching, 
and distinguish a number of different activities which knowledge-how might be the norm 
of. In §3 I argue that knowledge-how norms on teaching and showing are vulnerable to 
counterexamples of generative teaching, and that the apparent connection between 
knowledge-how and demonstration can be explained away by appealing to more general 
connections between knowledge-how and action. 
 
 
1. The Knowledge-How Norm of Teaching 
 
 Before we start, some clarificatory comments about how to understand KNT.151 To 
reiterate, KNT is the following claim: 
 
                                                            
150 Another analogy:  Lackey’s selfless assertor cases do double duty: acting both as 
counterexamples against KNA, and to the view that successful testimony is the transmission of 
knowledge from speaker from hearer. The cases of Generative Teaching I consider below also 
function as counterexamples to the view of teaching as the transmission of knowledge-how (Small, 
2014). 
151 These points apply equally to the norms KNS and KND discussed below. 
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 KNT: One must: teach how to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
 In order to understand this claim, we need to get clear on: i) the notion of teaching, 
ii) how KNT relates to the claim that knowledge-how is necessary for teaching, iii) the kind 
of knowledge which is supposed to figure on the right hand side of this norm, and iv) 
which cases this norm negatively evaluates.  
 
 First, how should we understand teaching? For starters, we should be clear that the 
relevant sense of ‘teach’ is the imperfective activity-denoting sense, rather than the 
perfective achievement sense. KNT kicks in as soon as an agent begins to teach; it does not 
say that a successful instance of teaching is permissible only when the teacher knows how 
to teach. The notion of teaching here is also presumably intentional teaching. In a case in 
which A secretly watches B make a tomato rose without B’s knowledge there is a sense we 
can say that B shows or teaches A how to make a tomato rose (Hawley, 2010, p. 402), but 
I take it that this is not the sense of ‘teaching’ that figures in KNT. Moreover, KNT only 
concerns teaching-how, and not teaching that.   
 
 Another complication in thinking about teaching comes from the fact that the 
teach+wh construction appears to be factive. The verb ‘teach’ is not in general factive – 
consider: ‘my secondary school chemistry teacher taught us that electrons were tiny 
particles, but that’s false’ – but it does seem to behave in a factive manner when combined 
with a wh-complement. Consider the following sentence: 
 
(1) Raimo taught me how to move the bishop in chess 
 
 This sentence seems to either entail or presuppose that the method for moving the 
bishop that Raimo passed on to me is in fact the correct way to move the bishop. This is 
borne out by the wait a minute test: if I’ve been moving the bishop like a knight, you could 
reply to 1) by saying ‘hey - wait a minute, you’ve been moving the bishop wrong all 
match’. ‘Teach’ seems to fall into a class of verbs which are (or at least appear) factive with 
a wh-complement, although they are not factive with a that-complement (for parallel 
discussion of tell+wh see (Karttenen, 1977, p. 11; Vendler, 1980, pp. 283–4; Holton, 
1997)). To avoid talk of apparent teaching in cases in which a teacher provides her student 
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with a method that is not a way to perform the relevant activity, I will treat the ‘teach+wh’ 
construction as non-factive. 
  
 Second, how does KNT relate to the idea that knowledge-how is necessary for 
teaching? KNT is a claim about the necessary conditions for appropriate teaching, and not a 
claim about the necessary conditions on teaching itself. The relevant necessity claim about 
teaching is NEC-T: 
 
NEC-T: If S teaches how to V, then S knows how to V. 
 
 NEC-T is not especially plausible (especially if we remember that we are interested 
in the activity, not the achievement sense of ‘teach’). In fact, the truth of KNT requires that 
NEC-T be false. If engaging in the activity of teaching entails having knowledge-how, then 
it is not possible to teach without knowing, meaning that it is not possible to flout the norm 
posited by KNT. Epistemic norms on an activity and the corresponding necessity claims 
about that activity crowd one another out. 
 
Third, what is the kind of knowledge involved in KNT? In this chapter I will use 
‘knows-how’ and ‘knows-that’ to refer to the kinds of knowledge with practical and 
theoretical bundles of properties. As noted above, this category of practical knowledge 
may considerably diverge from the class of knowledge which ordinary language picks out 
using the locutions ‘knows how’ or ‘knows how to’. If Jared reads an instruction booklet 
about skiing there is some sense in which he counts as ‘knowing how to ski’. However, I 
take it that there is a kind of practical knowledge which he lacks until he straps on some 
skis and gets out on the slopes. This restriction means that KNT claims that it is not just 
any knowledge that is the norm on intention, but specifically the species of knowledge 
with the distinctive set of practical properties. In this chapter I will remain neutral on how 
we should understand the practical bundle of properties associated with knowledge-how, 
importantly leaving open whether knowledge-how entails ability. I will also remain neutral 
on the question of whether knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge, on the 
grounds that the question of the normative role of knowledge-how is orthogonal to the 
question of whether knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge.   
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 Finally, let’s get clear on which cases KNT negatively evaluates. As formulated KNT 
gives a negative evaluation only to teaching which is accompanied by ignorance, but does 
not require any connection between the teacher’s knowledge, and what it is that she 
teaches to her students. This means that as stated KNT evaluates negatively someone who 
gives correct instructions about how to V, despite not knowing how to V, but does not 
negatively evaluate someone who knows how to V, but gives false instructions about how 
to V (either due to an innocent mistake, or an intention to mislead). There does seem 
something inappropriate about a case in which I know how to get to Edinburgh castle, but 
give you false instructions, and it seems plausible that this is a negative evaluation that 
ought to stem from our epistemic norm on teaching (much as the evaluation of false 
assertions stems from the norm of assertion). We can modify KNT to cover such cases by 
adding that an episode of teaching must express knowledge-how (Turri, 2011), since 
mistaken instructions concerning how to V will not express knowledge how to V. I leave 
this complication implicit below. 
 
 
1.1. Conversational Evidence for KNT 
 
Buckwalter and Turri appeal to four pieces of conversational evidence in support of 
KNT, which closely parallel arguments for KNA (Williamson, 2000, Chapter 11; Turri, 
2010, 2011, 2014): 
 
i. The fact that we can request someone to teach us by asking them about their 
knowledge-how;  
ii. The fact that claiming that one doesn’t have knowledge-how can function as an 
excuse from a request to teach; 
iii. The fact that offering to teach opens one up to questions about whether one has 
knowledge-how; 
iv. The existence of Moorean sentences for offers to teach. 
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First, they point out the possibility of requesting someone to teach152 you by asking 
about whether they have knowledge-how.153 For example, it is possible to request someone 
to teach you how to make a campfire by asking ‘do you know how to make a campfire?’. 
They argue that this conversational move is possible because in general one can request 
someone do something by asking about whether she is in a good enough position to do so 
permissibly.154  
 
Secondly, they observe that one can excuse oneself from a request for instruction 
by claiming that one lacks the requisite know-how. If you ask me to show you how to tie a 
Sheepshank knot, I can excuse myself by saying that I don’t know how to tie one. They 
explain this by pointing out that the knowledge-norm predicts that ignorant instruction is 
inappropriate, meaning that claiming ignorance functions to excuse.  
 
Thirdly, they point out that someone offering to teach how to do something opens 
up the possibility of challenging whether they have know-how. If I offer to teach you how 
to make soufflé you can challenge me by saying ‘I didn’t realise you knew how to make 
soufflé!’ or ‘are you sure you know how to make soufflé?’. KNT predicts this, since if 
showing were governed by a knowledge norm, someone who offered to teach would 
represent themselves as having know-how, which might be challenged by a hearer who has 
doubts.  
 
Finally, Buckwalter and Turri claim that there are sentences involving knowledge-
how analogous to Moorean sentences for assertion (‘p, and I don’t believe/know that p’). 
Their example of such a sentence is: 
 
(2) I don’t know how to do this, but [watch me now:] this is how it’s done (2014, p. 
18). 
                                                            
152 Buckwalter and Turri generally frame the conversational phenomena as concerning 
demonstration or showing, but in order to avoid confusion, I will present these phenomena as 
concerning teaching (see footnote 149). 
153 This relates closely to the idea that a standard pragmatic function of know-how ascriptions is to 
implicate that the target is a good teacher. See chapter 4, §3 
154 (Searle, 1979; McGlynn, 2015, p. 93). 
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They claim that the oddness of this sentence stems from the fact that the speaker’s 
offer to demonstrate represents her as having some know-how that she denies that she 
possesses.  
I don’t think that we need to take these arguments as definitive, but it is true that 
they provide a good preliminary case for KNT, especially when put alongside Pooling Skills, 
which provides a more general reason for thinking act knowledge-how is the norm of 
showing, 
The fact that the conversational arguments parallel the conversational case for 
KNA raises the question of whether a supporter of KNT needs to endorse the package of 
both norms. Strictly speaking, it is possible to endorse one norm, but not the other. 
However, the fact that the arguments for KNA and KNT work in parallel provides a 
further reason for thinking that the two norms ought to come in a package, in addition to 
the reasons considered in the last chapter, which concerned the function of KNOWS, 
whether KNA and KNT might be instances of the more general norm KNP, and whether 
teaching is a special kind of assertion (see chapter 4 §3 especially note 132). 
 
2. Alternatives to KNT  
 
In this section I consider some alternatives to KNT. First, I consider what the 
alternative conditions in a norm of teaching might be, arguing against Buckwalter and 
Turri that there are a number of alternatives to knowledge-how that might figure in the 
norm on teaching. Secondly, I consider some ways to distinguish different kinds of 
teaching, leaving us with some fall-back positions that claim that knowledge-how is the 
norm on some specific kinds of teaching 
 
 
2.1. What are the Alternatives to Knowledge? 
 
In the case of assertion, the task for the supporter of a knowledge-norm is not only 
to show that the knowledge-norm is plausible, but that it is more plausible than alternative 
norms that posit different conditions on permissible assertion, such as truth, belief, and 
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justification. Buckwalter and Turri claim that supporters of KNT do not need to take up 
this task: 
We see no hope for straightforward analogous alternatives when it comes to the 
norm of instructional demonstration [teaching]. Truth and justification do not 
straightforwardly pertain to procedural knowledge. If there is a standard common 
to both main forms of human pedagogy – telling and showing – then it is 
knowledge (Buckwalter & Turri, 2014, p. 19). 
Buckwalter and Turri’s argument for the uniqueness of the knowledge-norm 
doesn’t work. For one thing, it is an open question whether truth, belief, or justification 
pertain to knowledge-how. It is easy to find views on which knowledge-how is connected 
to truth (Stanley & Williamson, 2001), belief (Brownstein & Michaelson, 2016), and 
justification (Hawley, 2003; Brogaard, 2011). Putting this issue to one side, even if it 
turned out that these conditions do not pertain to knowledge-how, this would not rule 
them out as candidates for an epistemic norm on teaching. The plausibility of a norm on 
teaching turns on whether the relevant condition pertains to teaching, not whether it 
pertains to knowing-how. It is pretty clear that truth, belief and justification do pertain to 
teaching. The kind of teaching we’re interested in is teaching-how, and it is true that the 
interrogative phrase ‘how to V?’ is not the kind of thing that can be true, believed, or 
justified. However, if we follow the linguistic evidence to take seriously the thought that 
interrogative phrases are systematically related to their answers — propositions of the 
form w is a way to V—we can take these propositions to figure in the relevant norms. This 
suggests the following truth (TNT), belief (BNT), and justification (JNT) norms on 
teaching: 
TNT: One must: teach (how to V in way w), only if w is a way to V. 
 
BNT: One must: teach (how to V in way w), only if one believes that w is a way to 
V. 
 
JNT: One must: teach (how to V in way w), only if one has a justified belief that w 
is a way to V.  
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 As in the case of assertion, these norms need not be mutually exclusive. If 
knowledge-how turns out to be a kind of propositional knowledge which entails justified 
true belief, then KNT will entail all of these norms. As in the case of norms of assertion, 
the proponent of one of these norms is not just interested in the truth of the normative 
claim, but in the claim that their norm is the logically strongest norm on showing; that the 
condition that they care about is the one doing the work of explaining out evaluations. For 
example, the proponent of TNT not only thinks that truth is a condition on appropriate 
teaching, but that truth is the strongest condition on appropriate teaching. 
 
With these norms on the scene, it is fairly easy to generate analogues to any of the 
putative norms on assertion. Adding in higher-order belief or knowledge condition to JNT 
or KNT gives norms analogous to the higher-order norms considered by Williamson 
(2000, pp. 260–3). There will be a version of the reasonable-to-believe norm, which shifts 
from the doxastic justification in JNT to propositional justification (Lackey, 2008). One 
might also think that the condition on permissible teaching is safe success in teaching 
(Pelling, 2013). There will even be norms that have no analogue in the case of assertion, 
such an ability norm, and a knowledge of ability norm. 
KNT is not even the only possible knowledge norm on showing. In the 
introduction of this paper, I made the point that both Intellectualists and Anti-
Intellectualists think that there is a distinction between practical knowledge and the class 
of knowledge picked out by sentences involving ‘knows how’. KNT works with the 
narrow notion of practical knowledge. However, one might think that appropriate 
teaching requires non-practical knowledge about how to V, yielding the following norm: 
KNT*: One must: teach how to V in way w, only if one knows that w is a way to V. 
KNT* is a knowledge norm on showing, but it is not a knowledge-how norm on 
showing, in the sense that it does not claim that permissible showing requires knowledge 
with the distinctive practical properties associated with knowing how.155  
KNT* negatively evaluates agents who show how to V, but have no beliefs about 
how to V, or have only beliefs about how to V which are unjustified, false or Gettiered. 
                                                            
155 In fact, there are many possible knowledge-norms on teaching. One might think that knowing 
that it is possible to V is a condition of appropriately teaching someone how to V. In the interests of 
space, I will concentrate on the norms which have the most prima facie plausibility. 
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However, as soon as someone knows any proposition about how to V, by the lights of 
KNT* they are in a position to appropriately show (all other things being equal).156 The 
kind of propositional knowledge which KNT* deals in is extremely easy to come by. If 
Jared reads his skiing manual, and learns that the way to ski is to bend your knees and 
lean forward, then he knows of some way that it is a way to ski. In fact, even before he has 
read the skiing manual we might think that Jared knows the relevant kind of proposition, 
so long as he knows that skiing is a way to ski. According to KNT* Jared is in a position to 
appropriately teach having read the skiing manual – or even before he has read the 
manual. But, Jared seems like exactly the kind of teacher who ought to be negatively 
evaluated by the epistemic norm on showing. KNT* does not provide this negative 
evaluation because the kind of propositional knowledge it deals in is too easy to come by.157 
I take this observation to demonstrate that that KNT* does not state a sufficiently 
demanding standard on teaching. 
The existence of alternatives to KNT is significant for two reasons. For starters, it 
means that the supporter of KNT needs to argue that not only can a knowledge-how norm 
explain the conversational data, but also that this norm can explain the conversational data 
better than the alternatives. I will not embark on the somewhat lengthy process of 
comparing how these different norms do in explaining the conversational data; this is an 
argumentative burden that the supporter of KNT needs to take on. Furthermore, the 
existence of alternatives means that any view about the norm of assertion can be extended 
to a unified norm of pedagogy, thereby gaining the virtue of generality that Buckwalter 
and Turri claim is distinctive of the knowledge norm. For example a supporter of a 
justification norm of assertion can endorse JNT, thereby getting her to an epistemic norm 
of pedagogy with the same virtue of generality as KNP. 
 
                                                            
156 KNT* says that knowing is necessary for appropriate teaching, but not that it is sufficient for 
appropriate teaching. This means that it is compatible with KNT* that even when an agent has 
knowledge, their showing can be inappropriate for some reason other than ignorance. For 
example, we might think as the cases of assertion and action there are high-stakes teaching cases, in 
which more than knowledge is required for appropriate teaching (J. Brown, 2008b, pp. 174–81, 
2012, pp. 555–6). 
157 The supporter of KNT* might argue that there is some other explanation for the 
inappropriateness of Jared’s teaching (see footnote 156) but it is difficult to see what that 
explanation might be: Jared’s teaching seems to be a paradigm case in which teaching fails 
precisely because it does not meet the relevant epistemic standard. Jared’s case certainly seems 
rather different from the high-stakes cases in which knowledge is insufficient for assertion. 
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2.2. What is Teaching Anyway? 
 
Pooling Skills predicts that knowledge-how is a norm on teaching in general getting 
us KNT, which connects to a general knowledge norm on pedagogy. However, it is also an 
option to think that although knowledge-how is not the norm on teaching, there is a 
specific species of teaching which knowledge-how is the norm of.  
In order to get clear on the options, let’s introduce some stipulative terminology to 
distinguish different species of teaching. Skill teaching is heterogeneous (Hawley, 2010, 
pp. 400–1). One can teach skills by giving instructions, by engaging in guided practice, by 
explaining principles, by giving constructive criticism, or even by telling someone how to 
do it. We are calling the general species of pedagogy involved in skill-transmission teaching, 
which involves all of the kinds of pedagogy listed above. Within this general category, we 
can distinguish a category of showing, which excludes testimony, but includes all non-
linguistic representations, such as the use of diagrams and teaching by doing. Finally, let’s 
distinguish a category of demonstration, which picks out only teaching by doing, of which 
the paradigm will be doing the activity whilst saying ‘this is the way to V’.  
 These are by no means the only distinctions which we can make between different 
kinds of teaching, but they do yield two knowledge-how norms which have at least some 
plausibility: a knowledge-how norm on showing (KNS), and a knowledge-how norm on 
demonstration (KND): 
 
KNS: One must: show how to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
KND: One must:  demonstrate how to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
If the general knowledge-norm faces problems, then KNS and KND will be natural 
fall-back positions for someone who is interested in defending a normative connection 
between knowledge-how and teaching. Below, I will argue that KNS faces problems with 
generative teaching, and that the data that appears to support KND can be explained 
away by general connections between knowledge-how and intentional action. 
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3. Against Knowledge Norms for Teaching 
 
 Having distinguished various knowledge norms relating to teaching, I want to 
argue that all of these norms are false. The more ambitious norms — KNT and KNS — 
face counterexamples of teachers who know how to teach but not to do, who can 
successfully and appropriately teach their students how to do something. The narrower 
norm on demonstration — KND — avoids worries about generative teaching, but the 
apparent normative connection between knowledge-how and demonstration can be 
explained away by general connections between knowledge-how and action, leaving the 
norm unmotivated. 
 
 
3.1. Generative Teaching 
  
 Let’s first focus on the broadest norm: KNT. I will argue against this norm in two 
stages: first arguing that it is possible to teach someone else how to V without knowing how 
to V by considering some real-life examples of generative teachers, and secondly 
contending that generative teaching can be epistemically permissible by considering a 
hypothetical example of generative teaching.  
 
 It is not that uncommon to find people teaching others how to do things that they 
themselves do not know how to do. A prominent example from music is Carmine Caruso, 
one of the most celebrated brass teachers of the last century. Julie Landsman, a famous 
Caruso student and proponent of the ‘Caruso Method’ describes Caruso thus: 
 
Although he played Saxophone, Violin, and Piano, his specialty was teaching, and 
he particularly specialised in teaching brass players to have great chops.158 
 
 The important point is that although Caruso was a specialised brass teacher, he did 
not play—or know how to play—any brass instruments.  In an interview, Landsman 
reports that Caruso would take her to musical conventions in order to demonstrate his 
                                                            
158 (Landsman, 2014). 
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exercises for brass instruments, because Caruso couldn’t play any of his own exercises.159 
Caruso’s teaching was generative: he taught his students skills that he did not himself 
possess. Caruso’s case is striking because he is a legendary teacher who developed a whole 
school of brass teaching and many of his students were world-class musicians. However, I 
take that it is not at all unusual for young children to be taught by someone who doesn’t 
play that instrument. An online guide to the Suzuki method makes this point nicely: 
 
Do parents need to learn how to play first? No. Parents are not required to learn to 
play the violin first, […] My job as a teacher is to teach the parent how to teach the 
child. My goal is to prepare the parent for this challenging task, and the musically 
inexperienced parent can become an excellent home teacher.160 
 
 There are also examples of sports coaches engaging in generative teaching. Many 
para-sports coaches are non-disabled. For example, a wheelchair rugby team might be 
taught by a non-disabled coach who doesn’t even know how to get about in a 
wheelchair.161 Competitors in artistic gymnastics often have coaches of the opposite gender, 
although the male and female disciplines involve different apparatus and scoring systems. 
This means that a male coach might teach a female competitor how to use apparatus that 
he has not himself mastered.162 It is also common to find coaches who switch sports during 
their coaching career, coaching in sports that they haven’t competed in. For example, Team 
Sky’s performance manager Tim Kerrison started out competing in rowing, before going 
on to coach Olympic swimming, then cycling.  Plausibly Kerrison teaches cyclists various 
high-level techniques which he does not himself know how to do: for example, how to 
descend mountains on a bicycle at speeds over 90km/h.  
 
Just as the cases of skilled sportspeople who are unable to teach others considered 
in the previous chapter show us that being skilled at doing does not entail being skilled at 
teaching, the cases given in the previous paragraph show us that being skilled at teaching 
does not entail being skilled at doing. Following Noë (2005: 283-4) and Stanley (2011: 
                                                            
159 (HipBoneMusic, 2016). 
160 (Maine Suzuki School, n.d.). 
161 In a piece about the role of non-disabled athletes in para-sports, Chuck Aoki relates that whilst 
he was playing for the US wheelchair rugby team, half of the coaches were non-disabled (Aoki, 
2013). 
162 Of the female artistic gymnasts currently profiled on the British Gymnastics webpage, 3 of 13 
have male coaches. (Gynmastics, 2017) (Accurate October 2016). 
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128), I suggest that some teachers know how to teach without knowing how to do. Although 
in some cases successful teaching may be informed by knowledge how to do, in other cases 
successful teaching can be informed by merely knowing how to teach.163 When a teacher 
who knows how to teach V-ing, but not how to V teaches a student how to V their 
teaching will be generative, because the teacher will inculcate in their student knowledge 
which they themselves do not possess. 
 
 We can get further support for the distinction between knowing how to do and 
knowing how to teach from the empirical literature on the psychology of skill (Brownstein, 
2014, pp. 557–8; Montero, 2016, pp. 87–91). (Flegal & Anderson, 2008) found that skilled 
golf players who describe their performance before acting end up performing less well, 
whereas novice golf players are not adversely affected by describing their performance 
(see also (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002)). Flegal and Anderson explicitly 
connect this result to teaching, saying: 
 
To the extent that instructors themselves are skilled in what they teach, the 
recurring need to reflect upon and articulate the basis of their skill [in order to 
teach] may pose costs to their performance. (2008, p. 931) 
 
Their thought is that at a certain level of skill, teaching actually undermines skilful 
performance; meaning that those who teach can’t do. This suggests that skill at doing and 
skill at teaching are distinct capacities. There is also evidence suggesting that the more a 
skill is proceduralised, the less an agent is able to describe or remember their performances 
(Keele & Summers, 1976; T. Brown & Carr, 1989; Beilock & Gray, 2012). If we think that 
the ability to describe—or at least decompose—one’s own performance is an important 
part of being a successful teacher, this suggests that being highly skilled at doing also 
presents a barrier to teaching.  
 
The existence of cases of generative teaching is interesting, but the question that 
matters to the supporter of KNT is whether there are cases in which generative teaching is 
epistemically permissible. Prima facie, there is nothing inappropriate about the teaching in the 
                                                            
163 Here’s a recipe for counterexamples to KNT. Whatever one thinks of the distinction between 
skill at doing and skill at teaching, take a case of someone who is skilled at teaching something but 
not at doing it, and ask whether that agent’s teaching is epistemically permissible. I take it that 
there be at least some cases in which this kind of teaching is permissible. 
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cases discussed in above, but to get clear on this issue let’s consider a cleaned-up 
hypothetical example of a teacher who doesn’t know how to do: 
 
COACH: Janine is a trampoline teacher who specialises in teaching advanced 
students to perform a double back somersault. This is a difficult move to learn, and 
requires a good deal of careful practice. Janine is very skilled at giving instructions 
and constructive criticism and has a very high success rate at teaching this move. 
However, although she has the physical capacity to perform the move, Janine has 
never taken the time to learn to do it herself, because of her heavy teaching load.164  
 
This case is structurally similar to the real-life cases considered above. Janine has 
mastered the activity of teaching other people to do a double back somersault, and she can 
successfully teach her students to do this move. However, she has never actually learnt to 
do it. The fact that Janine hasn’t learnt to do the move—together with the reasonable 
assumption that this knowledge is not innate—means that it is built into the case Janine 
does not know how to do a double back somersault. Janine lacks one of the necessary 
conditions for knowing how to do the move: having learnt to do it. Furthermore, there 
seems to be nothing at all inappropriate—epistemically or otherwise—about her teaching. 
Janine’s teaching is intuitively just as permissible as that of her colleagues who do know 
how to do the move. This means COACH is a counterexample to KNT: it is a case of 
someone who doesn’t know how to do something successfully and crucially permissibly 
teaching someone else how to do that activity.165 
 
There are three ways in which a supporter of KNT can respond to COACH. They 
can argue: i) that Janine really does know how to do the move, ii) that Janine’s teaching is 
not properly generative, or iii) that her teaching is impermissible. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
164 (see Stanley, 2011b, p. 128). 
165 Here is another recipe for counterexamples to KNT. If one thinks that knowledge-how can be 
undermined by Gettier-type luck (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, p. 435; Poston, 2009; Cath, 2011; 
Carter & Pritchard, 2015b), then there will be cases in which someone lacks knowledge how due 
to the presence of luck, but is otherwise well-placed to teach. 
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3.1.1. Response 1: Teachers Have Know-How 
 
First, the claim that Janine knows how to do a double back somersault. This line 
can seem pretty appealing. It would be natural to say: 
 
(3) Janine knows how to do a double back somersault. 
 
and unnatural to say: 
 
(4) Janine doesn’t know how to do a double back somersault. 
 
which we might take as evidence that Janine really does know how to do a double 
back somersault. In thinking about this issue we need to bear in mind the limitations of 
conversational evidence for determining whether an agent has genuine knowledge-how. As 
Stanley and Williamson observe, Sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ admit of a 
number of readings, and it is widely accepted that at least some of these readings do not 
pick out the philosophically distinctive kind of propositional knowledge (Stanley & 
Williamson, 2001, pp. 422–5; Noë, 2005, n. 4), instead picking out knowledge how one can 
do something, or knowledge how something ought to be done (see chapter 1 §4.4.). This is 
just one of many respects in which the concept of knowledge-how is messy. The ambiguity 
of ‘knows how’ ascriptions means that when we are interested in finding out whether 
someone has know-how, what matters is not just whether we can utter a truth by saying 
that they know how, but whether their knowledge has the properties distinctive of 
practical knowledge. If the supporter of KNT starts saying that any knowledge picked out 
by ‘knows how’ counts as practical knowledge, then they quickly end up working not with 
KNT, but with KNT*, which claims that appropriate teaching requires only non-practical 
propositional knowledge. As observed above, KNT* is implausible because it does not 
provide a sufficiently demanding standard on teaching. 
 
Intellectualists and Anti-Intellectualists will have different things to say about what 
makes knowledge-how distinctively practical. Intellectualists typically claim that practical 
knowledge requires knowing a proposition under a practical mode of presentation, whereas 
Anti-Intellectualists often claim that practical knowledge requires the ability to perform the 
activity known. Either way, Janine’s knowledge about the double back somersault fails to 
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qualify as practical knowledge. Janine can recognise a double back somersault and she 
can distinguish good instances of the move from bad ones. But it seems implausible that 
she thinks about a way of doing the move in the distinctively practical way. After all, she’s 
never done the move. Janine also seems to lack the kind of ability that might be associated 
with practical knowledge. As things stand Janine is not in a position to do a double back 
somersault: she’s never learnt to do one. Both Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualists 
ought to agree that Janine does not know how to do a double back somersault. There is an 
appealing general explanation for this fact - we can say that she doesn’t have practical 
knowledge because she has not gone through the right kind of process of practical 
learning. 
 
It’s worth stressing that Janine’s case is significantly unlike the cases of ageing 
teachers in which an agent has learnt how to do something but can no longer do it because 
of physical incapacity (Carr, 1981, p. 53; Stanley & Williamson, 2001, p. 416, Snowdon, 
2004, p. 9-10; Noë, 2005, p. 283-4). An ageing teacher is in a sense able to act,166 in that in 
the closest worlds in which their epistemic state is kept the same, but they have relevant 
physical capacities, and external conditions for performance are met, they will successfully 
act. In the actual world their ability is masked by external conditions or bodily incapacity. 
Janine meets all of the physical and external conditions for doing a double back 
somersault in the actual world: she is strong enough, she has access to a trampoline, she 
isn’t afraid of bouncing, and so on. What stands in the way of her doing the move is not 
some environmental barrier or physical impairment, but just not having done enough 
practice. I suggest that not having done practice presents an epistemic barrier to success, 
rather than masking Janine’s underlying ability. What Janine acquires by practicing is not 
greater physical strength—we can imagine that she is already strong enough to do the 
move—but knowledge how to do the move. One way to put the general point is that both 
Intellectualists and Anti-Intellectualists ought to think that at least some practical 
knowledge—such as knowing how to do the double back somersault—require a process of 
learning or deliberate practice.167 Since Janine hasn’t done the practice, she doesn’t count 
as having practical knowledge. 
                                                            
166 In the sense of having what Glick calls ‘internal’ ability (Glick, 2012). 
167 I don’t want to suggest that all practical knowledge requires practice; only that some does 
(Hawley, 2010, p. 401). There is a large body of empirical evidence stressing the importance of 
deliberate practice for skill acquisition. (Ericsson, 2006; P. Ford, Coughtan, Hodges, & Williams, 
2006). 
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If Janine does not have practical knowledge, why does it seem intuitively correct to 
ascribe knowledge-how to her? Janine does have lots of non-practical knowledge about 
the double back somersault, some of which can be picked out by the non-practical 
readings of ‘S knows how to V’. She might have non-practical propositional knowledge 
about how the move is done, how one ought to do it, and how to learn to do it. It is also not at issue 
that she knows how—in the practical sense—to teach others how to do the move. The fact 
that Janine has these pieces of knowledge allows us to explain our intuitive judgements 
about sentences (2) and (3).  We can truly ascribe knowledge to Janine by using (2), but 
only insofar as we are picking out her non-practical knowledge about how the move is done, 
or about how one ought to do it. Similarly, we might think that the denial in (3) can be read 
either as saying that Janine knows nothing about the double back somersault, or as 
implicating that she is not well placed to teach the move.168  Since she does know 
something about the move, and certainly knows how to teach it, we might trace the 
weirdness of the sentence back either to the false claim that she knows nothing about the 
move, or the false implicature that she does not know how to teach it. 
 
One might worry that even though COACH poses a counterexample to KNT when 
this norm formulated with our ordinary concept of knowledge-how, the supporter of 
Pooling Skills can avoid this counterexample by endorsing a revisionary account of 
knowledge-how. We have seen from the previous chapter that there is reason to think that 
our concept of knowledge-how is inconsistent. This means that the sophisticated supporter 
of Pooling Skills can treat their view as a revisionary account of KNOWS-HOW, solely 
anchored in our need to flag up good teachers. The supporter of Pooling Skills can admit 
we ordinarily judge that generative teachers like Janine don’t know how to do what they 
teach others to do, whilst maintain that we ought to judge that they do have know-how on 
the grounds that our concept of knowledge-how ought to be answering to our need to flag 
up good teachers. It is true that the revisionary supporter of Pooling Skills has this option, 
but I think that it is an unattractive one. I have appealed not just to our extensional 
intuitions about whether Janine and the other teachers mentioned above have knowledge-
how but also to our intensional intuitions about the nature of knowledge-how — in 
particular to the claim that knowledge-how requires a process of practical learning. By 
                                                            
168 Asserting ‘S knows how to V’ often implicates ‘S can teach you to V’ (see chapter 4 §3), and 
denying it can plausibly generate the opposing implication. 
 142 
endorsing the revisionary account of knowledge-how, the supporter of Pooling Skills loses 
this important intuition about knowledge-how.169 
 
 
3.1.2. Response 2:  Teaching is Not Generative  
 
A second response to COACH is to argue that although Janine doesn’t know how 
to do the move, her teaching fails to be generative. This response comes in several flavours. 
 
One might say that Janine only gives her students beliefs about how to do the 
double back somersault. This way of reading the case is pretty implausible, since it is clear 
that Janine’s students end up not just having justified beliefs about how to do a double 
back somersault, but actually knowing how to do this move. This knowledge seems to have 
its source in Janine. Consider Janine’s colleague Lucy, who knows how to do the double 
back somersault but is unable to do it. Lucy might employ the same teaching methods as 
Janine to teach her students. If Lucy employs these methods, we would certainly want to 
say that she inculcates knowledge of how to do a double back somersault in her students. 
Since Janine’s methods are the same there seem to be no grounds for denying that Janine 
also generates knowledge in her students.  
 
Another possibility is that Janine does not teach her students anything at all. One 
might think that Janine is like a swimming teacher who pushes their students into the pool 
in that she merely causes her students to learn (or perhaps to teach themselves). It is a 
difficult question where to draw the line between teaching and merely causing to learn, but 
I think that it is pretty clear that we should think of what Janine does as genuine teaching. 
In the case of the swimming ‘teacher’, there are a number of indications that teaching has 
not taken place. For example, the students do not rely on the teacher’s judgement, and the 
teacher cannot claim any credit for the students’ knowledge. By contrast Janine’s students 
will rely on her judgement and Janine can take credit for her students learning to do the 
move. It seems wrong to think of her students as being self-taught. 
                                                            
169 In §3.2., we consider a different kind of counterexample to KNT, which appeals to the 
intensional claim that knowing how to do something requires knowing how to do all of the 
activities that are intentional parts of that activity. The revisionary response would also require 
losing this intuition. 
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One reason for thinking that Janine does not teach her students anything at all 
comes from the idea that successfully teaching someone how to do something is just a 
process of the transmission of a skill from one person to another. We can find appeals to 
this picture of skill teaching in Small (2014, p. 91), and Ryle (1971, p. 217, 2009a, p. 465). 
Although this picture of teaching has some intuitive appeal, calling on it will not get the 
supporter of KNT off the hook with COACH. Both COACH and the real-life cases of 
generative teaching considered above are just as much counterexamples to the claim that 
teaching is the transmission of skill as they are to the claim that knowledge-how is the 
norm of teaching. If we take seriously the existence of cases of generative teaching, then 
we cannot assume that skill teaching is just the transmission of skill from teacher to 
student.  
 
A final strategy is to fine-grain the content of what Janine teaches. Although 
Janine doesn’t know how to do a double back somersault, as I pointed out above she 
plausibly knows how one ought to do this move. The supporter of KNT might say that 
what’s going on in this case is that Janine is teaching her students how one ought to do the 
move, meaning that her teaching is not generative, since she knows how one ought to do the 
move. Although this is a true description of Janine’s teaching that is non-generative, there 
remain many other descriptions of her teaching that are generative. We can legitimately 
describe Janine as simply teaching her students how to do a double back somersault. 
Presumably the supporter of KNT would also want to say that Lucy – Janine’s 
knowledgeable but unable colleague – teaches her students how to do a double back 
somersault. Since Lucy and Janine employ the same methods, it is difficult to see how to 
deny that Janine teaches her students the same things as Lucy. 
 
 
3.1.3. Response 3: Generative Teaching is Inappropriate 
 
We are left with the claim that Janine’s teaching is inappropriate. I think that this 
line is pretty much a non-starter.  Unlike in the cases of generative teaching, where there 
might be thought to be a sense in which the testifiers are being deceitful, or breaking an 
epistemic rule in order to achieve a worthwhile result (Lackey, 2008, pp. 115–9), Janine’s 
teaching seems impeccable.  
 144 
 
3.1.4 Summing up 
 
Real-life cases of generative teaching, together with empirical evidence for the 
distinction between skill at teaching and skill at doing demonstrate that it is possible to 
successfully teach other people how to do something without knowing how to do it. This 
result in itself is interesting, since it undermines a picture of skill teaching as the 
transmission of skill. In cases of generative teaching, the teacher does not have the 
knowledge inculcated in the students. However, the important result for the debate about 
epistemic norms is that the teaching involved in COACH whilst generative is nonetheless 
epistemically permissible. This shows us that knowing how to V is not a condition on 
permissible teaching, meaning that KNT is false. In at least some cases merely knowing 
how to teach can be good enough for appropriate teaching. This result is bad news for the 
supporter of Pooling Skills, since this picture of the function of KNOWS-HOW predicted 
KNT would be true. The falsity of KNT also means that the general knowledge-how norm 
on pedagogy KNP is false.  
 
 
3.2. Generative Instruction  
 
Since COACH involves teaching via testimony and constructive criticism, this case 
does not function as a counterexample to KNS and KND, which concern particular kinds 
of teaching. Let’s now consider the narrower norm KNS, which concerns the category of 
non-linguistic skill-teaching which we are calling showing: 
 
KNS: One must: show how to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
In order to find a counterexample to KNS, we need to find a case in which a 
teacher appropriately teaches her student how to do something by showing without herself 
knowing how to do it. Consider the following case: 
 
TWISTER: Laura is a diving coach. She had a fairly distinguished county career, 
but got badly injured meaning that she never learnt to do some of the more difficult 
moves. For example, she never learnt to do a back somersault. After her injury, she 
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immersed herself in coaching and has become a distinguished coach. She is 
currently teaching Tom a move called The Twister. Laura knows that the Twister is a 
fiendishly complicated move involving two and half back somersaults together with 
two and half twists. Tom already knows how to do the twists and somersaults 
separately, and Laura draws up a diagram explaining how to put the two moves 
together. Tom quickly gets it, and has soon mastered the move.170 
 
In this case, Laura instructs Tom on how to do The Twister by drawing up a 
diagram explaining how the various parts of the move fit together. We are to imagine her 
teaching to be successful, and it certainly seems that there is nothing inappropriate about 
Laura’s teaching. However, I think that we should deny that Laura knows how to do the 
Twister. In order to know how to engage in any complex activity – in the practical sense – 
one needs to know how to do the intentional sub-activities that make up that activity. To 
know how to make lemon drizzle cake, one needs to know how to make lemon icing. To 
know how to cycle from Edinburgh to Aberdeen, one needs to know how to cycle from 
Edinburgh to the Forth road bridge. Although Laura knows how to put the different parts 
of the Twister together, she does not have practical knowledge about one of the basic parts 
of the move: the back somersault. Hence she doesn’t know how to do the Twister. As in 
COACH, Laura might be said to ‘know how to do the Twister’, in the sense that she has 
non-practical propositional knowledge about what one needs to do in order to perform this 
move, but she does not know how to do a Twister in the practical sense. As with COACH, 
this judgement is not merely based in our extensional intuitions about knowledge-how, but 
is grounded in a significant feature of knowledge-how. 
 
This lack of knowledge does not stand in the way of Laura’s teaching. Since Tom 
knows how to do all of the basic parts of the Twister, all he needs to learn is how the 
different parts of the move fit together, which is something that Laura can teach him.  
Crucially for this example to function as a counterexample to KNS, there doesn’t seem to 
be anything inappropriate about Laura’s demonstration: she knows how the various parts 
of the move go together and fully understands the system for representing dives on a 
whiteboard, and she need not deceive Tom about her ignorance of how to do a back 
                                                            
170 There are interesting variants of this case concerning the instruction of group agents. A coach 
who has never played Rugby might instruct her team how to do a particular move—say, a 
Springbok Loop—without knowing how to do any of the sub-activities involved in that move. 
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somersault. Laura successfully and permissibly shows Tom how to do a move that she 
doesn’t know how to do. 
 
A supporter of KNS has the same moves to respond to this case that we saw in 
response to COACH: they can argue that Laura really knows how to do the Twister, that 
her teaching is not properly generative, or that her showing is impermissible. As with 
COACH, none of these responses are compelling. 
 
Once we have the distinction between practical knowledge and the knowledge 
picked out by ‘knows how’ in mind, it is implausible that Laura has the interesting kind of 
practical knowledge about the TWISTER. She has practical knowledge about teaching 
the move, and knows many facts about how to do it, how one ought to do it, and so on. 
However, she does not in the relevantly practical sense know how to do it, because she 
lacks practical knowledge about one of its sub-activities. 
 
Pushing the line that Laura’s teaching is not generative also seems implausible. Tom 
ends up not only with beliefs about how to do the Twister, but knowing how to do it. 
Laura’s contribution to Tom’s learning also seems properly to be called teaching. Tom relies 
on her showing for as grounds for his beliefs about what moves make up the Twister, and 
Laura can take credit for Tom’s knowledge. One could also try the fine-graining move 
here. For example, one might insist that Laura only shows Tom the proposition one does a 
Twister by doing a two and half back somersault and two and a half twists. This might be a true 
description of what’s going on in this case. However, as above it is difficult to see how one 
can possibly avoid saying that she also teaches him to do the Twister. 
 
Finally, the defender of KNS might try claiming that Laura’s teaching is 
epistemically impermissible. As above this move seems like a non-starter. Laura is teaching 
beyond what she is competent to do, but not beyond what she is competent to teach. She 
does not need to mislead Tom: she can be quite open about the fact that she doesn’t know 
how to do a back somersault, and this would not detract from the appropriateness of her 
teaching. 
 
COACH relies on the fact that practical knowledge about some activity sometimes 
requires practicing performing that activity, whereas knowing how to teach an activity 
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does not requiring practicing that activity (although it might require practice at teaching). 
TWISTER relies on the fact that practical knowing about some complex activity requires 
practical knowledge of how to engage in the relevant sub-activities, whereas knowing how 
to teach some complex activity does not require practical knowledge about these sub-
activities. This gap between knowing how to do and to teach provides us with another 
recipe for constructing examples of generative showing in which teachers who don’t know 
how to V nonetheless appropriately teach others how to V, including teaching by showing. 
Notice that because showing is a kind of teaching, TWISTER is also a counterexample to 
KNT. At this point, I think that we should conclude that the prospects for a knowledge-
how concerning a broad notion of teaching are poor. 
 
 
3.3. Demonstrating, Knowing How, and Intentional Action 
 
  In this section, we will consider a knowledge-norm on a much narrower notion 
kind of teaching, teaching by doing, which we have been calling demonstration. The norm 
under consideration is: 
 
KND: One must:  demonstrate how to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
There are a couple of reasons to be interested in this norm. First, like KNS, KND 
is a fall-back position for someone who wanted to defend an epistemic norm relating some 
kind of teaching to knowledge-how. Secondly, the examples which Buckwalter and Turri 
use in their conversational arguments above involve demonstrations, and one might 
suspect that the conversational evidence that they claim supports KNT really only 
supports KND.  
 
 Since demonstrating to someone else how to V involves intentionally V-ing, a 
straightforward counterexample to this norm would involve an agent demonstrating how 
to V by intentionally V-ing without knowing how to V. It is difficult to find compelling 
cases in which someone acts intentionally without know-how, so I won’t push this line. 
Instead, I will argue that this norm only looks plausible because of more general 
connections between knowing how and intentional action.  
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There are two ways to explain away the appeal of KND: by appealing to the idea 
that knowledge how to V is necessary for intentionally V-ing, and by appealing to the idea 
that knowledge how is the norm of intention.  
 
One explanation of why it is so difficult to find cases of intentional action without 
knowledge-how is that knowing how is a necessary condition for the intentional action. 
Let’s call this principle NEC-A: 
 
NEC-A: If S is intentionally V-ing, then S knows how to V. 
 
Note that NEC-A is a necessity claim about the conditions entailed by action, and 
not a norm on appropriate action. This principle is contentious: it has some prominent 
supporters,171 but it faces some serious problems.172 I don’t want to adjudicate the debate 
about the truth of NEC-A here, and I will remain neutral on this principle. I want to make 
a conditional claim: that if NEC-A is true, then the demand that one demonstrate only 
what one knows how to do becomes trivial. Since demonstrating how to V involves 
intentionally V-ing, if NEC-A is true then demonstrating how to V entails knowing how to V, 
meaning that it becomes impossible to flout KND. Since a genuine norm requires the 
possibility of acting without fulfilling the relevant condition, if NEC-A is true then KND is 
not a genuine norm.173 This is just an example of the way that epistemic norms and the 
corresponding necessity claims crowd one another out. 
 
An alternative strategy for explaining away KND is to posit a norm connecting 
knowledge-how and intending. In the previous chapter, we pointed out a supporter of 
Mutual Reliance might claim that knowledge-how is the norm on intending: 
 
                                                            
171 (Anscombe, 1957, p. 89; Gibbons, 2001, pp. 597–8; Stanley & Williamson, 2001, pp. 442–3; 
Stanley, 2011b, pp. 185–90; Hornsby, 2016, opp. 8-10). 
172 For example, NEC-A has trouble with luckily successful action (Setiya, 2008, 2009, 2012), and 
seems to rule out the possibility of learning to do something by practicing doing it. (Bengson & 
Moffett, 2011b, p. 33). Assessing NEC-A is made much more complex by the context-sensitivity of 
knowledge-how ascriptions. If the truth-value of a ‘knows how’ ascriptions varies depending on 
the context, then one can create counterexamples or confirming instances to NEC-A by shifting 
the context.  
173 Although it is tempting to think that NEC-A entails KND (albeit a trivial version of KND), that 
is not the lesson that I want to draw. Instead, my contention is that if NEC-A is true, then KND 
cannot be a genuine norm. 
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KNI: One must: intend to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
I want to put off making the case of KNI until the next chapter. The point I want to 
make is again conditional: if KNI is correct, then there is something normatively deficient 
about ignorant demonstrations because the intention to perform the activity being 
demonstrated will fail a standard on intentions. The point isn’t that KNI entails KND. 
These norms relate to different activities—KNI to intending, and KND to 
demonstrating—and a negative evaluation of an intention need not be inherited by the 
activity that one intends to do. Rather, if KNI is true, then it is not permissible to intend to 
demonstrate how to V without knowing how to V. If knowledge-how is the norm of 
intention, ignorant demonstrations will be accompanied by normatively deficient 
intentions, meaning that an offer to demonstrate something which one doesn’t know how 
to do will have something deficient about it.  A nice feature of this norm is that it predicts 
that intentions to teach or show will be evaluated by knowing how to teach, which fits well 
with the cases of generative teaching above.174  
 
With NEC-A and KNI in play, we are in a position to explain Buckwalter and 
Turri’s original motivation for KNT. I will do this in two steps: by pointing out that the 
conversational phenomena hold up only when there is an assumption that teaching will 
involve demonstration, and by observing that the phenomena in the case of demonstration 
can be explained by either NEC-A or KNI. 
 
In support of the first point, consider activities that one cannot teach by 
demonstrating. Returning to COACH, let us suppose that a back double somersault is 
something that one can only learn to do by engaging in guided practice. If both participants 
in a conversation know this fact, then Buckwalter and Turri’s conversational evidence 
breaks down. Asking ‘do you know how to do a double back somersault?’ in this context 
would not function as a request to teach. It would not be plausible for a students who knew 
that guided practice was the only way to learn the double back somersault to challenge 
Janine’s offer to teach by pointing out that she doesn’t know how to do the move. It would 
                                                            
174 For the same reason KNI does not entail a pedagogical knowledge-how norm on teaching 
(requiring that one know how to teach in order to appropriately teach). Rather it entails a 
pedagogical knowledge-how norm on intending to teach. 
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also be no excuse for Janine to say – truly – that she didn’t know how to do a double back 
somersault. Janine could even felicitously utter the supposedly Moorean sentence:   
 
(5) I’ll teach you how to do a double back somersault, but I don’t know how to do one. 
 
This suggests that the conversational evidence given in §1.1. only concerns 
demonstration. However, the conversational dynamics concerning demonstration can be 
explained by either of the two knowledge-action connections suggested above. 
 
If knowledge-how is a necessary condition on intentional action, then we can 
explain the possibility of requesting a demonstration by asking about know-how by 
claiming that this question functions as an indirect request which picks out a necessary 
condition for demonstration (much as one can ask someone to pass the salt by asking them 
whether they are able to (Searle, 1979)). Similarly, we can explain challenges and excuses 
that appeal to know-how by observing that if NEC-A is true, then it is not possible to 
demonstrate how to do something without knowing how to do that activity. On this line, 
the conjunction of an offer to demonstrate with a denial of know-how is odd because it 
involves offering to do something while saying that one won’t be able to fulfil that offer.  
 
If knowledge-how is a norm of intending, then we can explain the conversational 
phenomena by putting them in the context of broader phenomena relating to offers to act. 
Just as we can solicit demonstrations by asking whether someone knows how, we can ask 
people to do stuff for us by asking them whether they know how. Asking someone whether 
they know how to prune an apple tree can function as an indirect request for them to do 
so. Similarly for challenges and excuses: if I offer to lead us to a restaurant, you can 
challenge my offer by asking me whether I know how to get there, and if you ask me to, I 
can excuse myself saying that I don’t know how to get there. We might also put the 
Moorean sentences concerning offers to demonstrate into the context of other sentences 
involving offers to do stuff, which seem just as bad: 
 
(6) I’ll prune your apple tree, but I don’t know how to prune apple trees. 
(7) I’ll lead us to the restaurant, but I don’t know how to get there. 
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These more general phenomena can be explained by KNI, without the need to posit 
a specific norm relating to demonstration. 
 
In this section I’ve shown that although there is some reason to think that there is 
an interesting connection between knowledge-how and demonstration, this connection can 
be explained by the idea that knowledge-how is a necessary condition on intentional 
action, or the idea that knowledge-how is the norm of intending. These principles leave no 
room for a knowledge-how norm specifically on demonstration, since NEC-A blocks 
KND from being a genuine norm, and KNI explains the badness of ignorant 
demonstration in terms of the badness of the underlying intentions. This discussion 
suggests that in general we ought to be cautious in offering arguments for epistemic norms 
stemming from their ability to explain conversational data, since conversational data can 
admit of multiple explanations appealing to different normative principles.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
One consequence of the recent focus on the question of whether knowledge-how is 
a species of propositional knowledge has been a neglect of the respects in which 
knowledge-how is interesting qua species of knowledge. In this chapter I have contributed 
toward redressing this balance by paying attention to the normative role of knowledge-
how. I have argued against one picture of the normative role of knowledge-how – the 
knowledge-how norm of showing. I have argued that the conversational evidence which 
seemed to support the norm admits of multiple explanations, that versions of the norm 
concerning teaching and instruction are subject to counterexamples, and that positing a 
norm on demonstration is undermined by general connections between knowledge and 
action. 
 
Our discussion has a number of interesting consequences.  
 
i. Cases of generative teaching show that it is mistaken to think of teaching-how as 
the transmission of skill from teacher to student.  
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ii. Since there is no plausible knowledge-how norm relating to skill-transmission, one 
cannot appeal to KNT in order to establish the general knowledge-norm relating to 
pedagogy. 
iii. The failure to find a normative connection between know-how and showing puts 
pressure on Pooling Skills as an account of the function of KNOWS-HOW, which 
predicted the truth of KNT, which as a consequence puts pressure of Pooling 
Epistemic Sates an as account of the function of KNOWS.  
iv. Finally, the fact that know-how is not the norm of teaching-how has some 
interesting educational consequences. If KNT were true, the dictum ‘those who 
can’t do, teach’ would have serious normative bite, casting aspersions on the 
credibility of those who teach what they do not know. By contrast, I have 
suggested that what matters for successful skill teaching is knowing how to teach 
rather than knowing how to do. 
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Chapter 6: Knowledge-How is the Norm of Intention 
Introduction 
 
 Skipper is having his French neighbours over for lunch. He really wants to impress 
them, so he decides to make them Coq au Vin, in a traditional rustic French style. He 
informs his neighbours about his culinary plan, buys all the required ingredients, and gets 
up early to make sure that he has plenty of time to make the dish. But disaster strikes! 
Skipper realises that he does not know how to make coq au vin; let alone in the rustic 
French style. In frustration he changes his plan, cobbles together a cottage pie. His guests 
leave disappointed. 
 
Skipper’s plan is clearly criticisable, but why? Making Coq au Vin does not seem 
practically irrational. Making an authentic French dish is a good way to impress your 
French neighbours, meaning that Skipper’s intention was supported by his reasons. 
Skipper might well also know his reasons, meaning that he cannot be criticised for his 
epistemic position regarding his practical reasoning. Coq au vin is also not a difficult dish 
to make – providing you know the recipe – meaning that the dish was something that was 
within Skipper’s power to make. Skipper didn’t intend to do something beyond his 
physical capabilities. 
 
 In this chapter, I want to make the case that Skipper’s intention is rationally 
deficient because he didn’t know how to do what he intended to do. I will argue that there 
is a norm on intentions with something close to the following form: 
 
 KNI: One must: intend to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
 I will call this normative claim the Knowledge-how Norm on Intention. This norm is 
intended to parallel the much-discussed knowledge norms on assertion, belief and practical 
action, which claim that knowledge is the condition on epistemically appropriate assertion, 
belief and action (Williamson, 2000, Chapter 11; Hawthorne, 2004; Sutton, 2007; Bach, 
2008; Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008; Fantl & McGrath, 2009). Unlike these norms, I will 
think of KNI as a norm of rationality, in part because I find it difficult to isolate a 
specifically epistemic sense of evaluation of intention. I deliberately formulate this norm as 
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a necessity norm, not a sufficiency norm, since merely having knowledge-how is by no 
means sufficient for having a rational intention. Nonetheless, there will be something good 
about an intention accompanied by appropriate know-how: it will be in accordance with a 
norm of rationality, namely KNI.  
 
 The idea that there is a distinctive normative connection between knowledge-how 
and intention is not entirely novel. Setiya claims that forming an intention to V is only 
epistemically justified when one knows how to V, because knowledge-how provides the 
entitlement to the beliefs that are tied up with intentional action (Setiya, 2008, pp. 406–9, 
2012, pp. 300–4). 175 Stanley also comes close to endorsing KNI, appealing to an analogy 
between acting unskilfully and acting on the basis of ignorance to explore similarities 
between the debate about the condition which is the norm of action and the conditions 
required for skill (Stanley, 2011b, pp. 175–81).176 Whilst acknowledging that KNI has 
important relations to debates about the epistemology of intention, epistemic norms and 
the nature of skill, I want to put these debates to one side, and avoid making commitments 
in them. My hope is to make the structural claim that whatever kinds of things knowledge-
how and intention are, they are connected by a rational norm that is importantly distinct 
from other epistemic norms. 
 
                                                            
175 Setiya also endorses a restricted necessity claim about intentional action: 
 
K: If A is doing V intentionally, A knows how to V, or else he is doing it by doing other 
things that he knows how to do. (2008, p. 404) 
 
K is compatible with KNI, since K makes a claim about the necessary conditions on acting, 
whereas KNI states a norm on intending. What would cause problems for KNI would be if intending 
to V entailed knowing how to V. However, this claim is extremely implausible. For the same reason 
KNI is also compatible with the stronger principle NEC-A noted above: 
 
NEC-A: If S is intentionally V-ing, then S knows how to V 
 
Note that if we deny that there is a distinction between intending and acting, following (Ferrero, 
MS.; Thompson, 2008; Moran & Stone, 2011), then NEC-A and KNI are incompatible. However, 
on this view NEC-A is extremely implausible, since knowledge-how is not a necessary condition 
for intending.  
176 I say comes close, because Stanley suggests a norm on acting, not intending. Stanley suggests 
that acting without skill involves norm violation, and he claims that skill requires know-how 
(Stanley, 2011b, p. 175). This commits him to a knowledge-how norm on action: 
 
KHNACT: One must: V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
Unlike KNI, KHNACT is incompatible with NEC-A. 
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 As I noted above, KNI is predicted by Mutual Reliance, which is a view of the 
function of KNOWS-HOW connecting knowledge how to our need for responsible 
practices of co-operation. The plausibility of KNI is a point in favour of Mutual Reliance as 
an account of the function of KNOWS-HOW. 
 
 The plan of action is as follows. In §1, I lay out the case for KNI, showing that 
versions of the arguments used for other knowledge norms can be adapted to fit the case of 
intention. In §2, I work though some problem cases in which it appears that we can 
appropriately intend without having the requisite know-how. In order to deal with these 
cases, I will offer a revised version of KNI, which appeals to Michael Bratman’s notion of 
a partial plan (Bratman, 1987) to make clear what the know-how requirement of a given 
intention is. In §3, I consider the worry that the knowledge-how norm is reducible to some 
other norm of intention. In §4, I consider alternative conditions which might figure in a 
norm on intention, and argue that the alternatives to a know-how norm are either 
unattractive, or face significant problems of implementation. 
 
 
1. The Case for the Knowledge Norm on Intention 
 
 In the case of other knowledge-norms, there is a range of arguments that make the 
case that the relevant activity or state — be that action, belief, or assertion — is governed 
by a requirement for knowledge. At the centre of this case are the following phenomena: 
 
i. The naturalness of using knowledge ascriptions to evaluate the relevant activity; 
ii. The existence of a range of conversational phenomena which are explained by the 
knowledge-norm; 
iii. The unacceptability of asserting, reasoning from, or believing lottery propositions, 
such as my ticket will lose the lottery. 
 
 In this section, I will show that these phenomena also occur in the case of intention, 
and that endorsing KNI provides a nice way to explain them. I will not try to offer a 
systematic defence of each of these arguments, or to respond to all potential objections. I 
cannot hope to categorically convince those who are sceptical about this battery of 
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arguments. In fact, we’ve already seen some reasons to be sceptical about some of the 
arguments from conversational phenomena that come under ii) in the previous chapter. 
The goal of this section is to establish a cumulative case for KNI, based on a broad range 
of arguments. 
 
 
1.1. Evaluative Knowledge-how Ascriptions 
 
 We’ve seen in chapter 4 that knowledge-how ascriptions have various 
conversational functions. Saying that someone knows how can be a way of flagging them 
up as a good teacher, or a way of flagging them up as someone who can be relied upon to 
do something. In addition to these functions we can use knowledge-how ascriptions to 
evaluate plans and intentions. If Skipper explains his misadventure to a friend, it would be 
natural for them to chide him by appealing to his lack of know-how, asking ‘why did you 
plan to make Coq au Vin; you don’t know how to make it!’. We also find cases in which this 
evaluation works prospectively: if I say that I’m planning to build a bike from scratch, you 
might knock me down a peg by saying ‘why are you planning to do that? You don’t know how 
to make a bike!’ This kind of evaluation can also apply to group actions: if Matti and Lisa 
express their plan to lift a piano up the stairs to their new apartment, it would be 
completely natural for their friends to say: ‘that seems like a bad plan; you guys don’t know 
how to safely lift a piano up a staircase.’ We can also read this kind of evaluative knowledge-
how ascription into Hawthorne and Stanley’s restaurant case, which they use as evidence 
for the knowledge-that norm of action (2008, p. 571). After Hannah leads her and Sarah 
down the wrong street, it would be quite natural for Sarah to criticise Hannah by saying: 
‘why did you offer to lead? You don’t know how to get to the restaurant!.’  
 
 This function of knowledge-how ascriptions suggest that knowledge-how is 
normatively bound up with the evaluation of intentions, just as the use of knowledge-that 
ascriptions to evaluate practical reasoning and assertion suggests a normative connection 
between knowledge and practical reason and assertion (Williamson, 2000; Hawthorne & 
Stanley, 2008, pp. 572–4; Gerken, 2015).  
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 Although this kind of argument is suggestive, I have some reservations about it. 
For one thing, knowledge-how is just one of many conditions which can be used to 
evaluate intention.177 We can also appeal to the agent’s abilities, their skills, their 
competences, and myriad other conditions. Another worry is that it is a bit murky exactly 
what is being evaluated in these cases. On the face of it, these ascriptions negatively 
evaluate intentions. However, there is a case to be made for different kinds of evaluation: 
perhaps the negative evaluations in these cases targets the acts which the agents are 
intending to perform, the agents’ cognitive habits, or the agents themselves. One way to 
work around this worry is to give a case in which the agent is uncriticisable, except with 
respect of their lack of knowledge-how. I won’t try to formulate such a case, because it’s 
just difficult to know what the other norms relating to intentions are. Moving to a more 
recherché case also undermines the ordinariness of using knowledge-how ascriptions to 
evaluate. In line with my general strategy in this section, I take the evidence from 
evaluative knowledge-how ascriptions to be suggestive, but by no means definitive. 
 
 
1.2. Conversational Dynamics 
 
 A second kind of argument for KNI comes from conversational phenomena that 
suggest that knowledge-how bears a normative relation to intentions. There are four 
conversational phenomena that are central to this kind of argument: uses of know-how 
ascriptions to challenges intentions, to excuse from requests, and to solicit action, and the 
existence of analogues to Moorean sentences for the expression of intention. All of these 
phenomena can be nicely explained by the hypothesis that knowledge-how is the norm of 
intention. 
 
 
1.2.1. Challenging Intentions 
 
It has been frequently observed that asserting something opens the speaker up to 
challenges to their knowledge. If S asserts the proposition ‘p’, it is open to her interlocutors 
to ask the questions ‘how do you know that p?’, or more directly ‘do you really know that 
                                                            
177 (J. Brown, 2008a, p. 170). 
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p?’ (Unger, 1975, pp. 263–4; Slote, 1979; Williamson, 2000, p. 252). Expressing an 
intention opens up the agent to parallel questions. If I say ‘I intend to make a bike from 
scratch’, you might ask me ‘how are you going to do that?’, or more directly ‘do you know 
how to make a bike?’ The same goes for various other ways of expressing an intention, for 
example by saying ‘I will make a bike’, and ‘I am making a bike’.  
 
The proper answers to both how will you V? and do you know how to V? involve 
appealing to knowledge-how. A direct answer to the question do you know how to V? will 
involve claiming that one knows how to V, since this question directly targets the 
possession of knowledge-how. Although the question how will you V? targets an agent’s plan 
rather than their know how, one can only satisfactorily answer this question by expressing 
knowledge-how. If I answer how are you going to make a bike? by explaining my plan then I 
will be expressing — or at least purporting to express — my knowledge of how to make a 
bike. Detailing a plan for making a bike opens up the further question of whether I know 
that following that particular plan is a way to make a bike. Saying that I’ve just made a 
guess about a plan does not answer the challenge, even if my guess happens to be correct. 
Taking a lead from Anscombe’s discussion of why-questions, we might suggest that 
intentions are the kinds of things to which the question ‘how are you going to do that?’ has 
application, where in the standard case answering this question will involve exercising 
knowledge-how.178  
 
 One might worry that there are ways of getting out of these questions without 
expressing knowledge-how. If you ask me how I am going to make a bike, I might respond 
by saying ‘I haven’t decided yet’, ‘I’m going to look it up’, or ’I’m going to work it out as I 
go along’. I take it that these responses involve expressing complex plans, and that these 
complex plans are only legitimate if accompanied by knowledge-how. If I say ‘I haven’t 
decided yet’, then I claim that there are several options for making a bike open to me, that 
I have know-how relating to several of the options, but I haven’t decides which of them to 
pursue. If I say ‘I’m going to look it up’, or ‘I am going to work it out as I go along’, then I 
am expressing a plan to pick up knowledge as I go along. This kind of plan will only be 
legitimate if I have sufficient general know-how to count as knowing how to learn how to 
                                                            
178 On the close relations between ‘how?’  and ‘why?’ questions in an Anscombean theory of action, 
see (Hornsby, 2005). The idea that this question has application (rather than just receiving an 
answer) is doing work, because in the case of basic actions, there will be no answer to the ‘how?’ 
question, just as at the top of the chain of rationalisation there is no answer to the ‘why?’ question. 
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make a bike by looking it up, or knowing how to work it out as I go along. Saying ‘but you don’t 
know anything about bikes’ would be a legitimate challenge to these plans because it 
would challenge my knowledge of how to work it out as I go along. (I will address a 
general worry for KNI stemming from these responses in §2.1.) 
 
If knowledge-how is the norm of intention we can nicely explain the felicity of 
responding to expressions of intention with questions that target knowledge-how. If KNI 
is correct, in expressing an intention to V one represents oneself as having the requisite 
knowledge how for that intention to be rationally adequate. Asking questions about what 
one’s plans are, or asking directly about knowledge-how can thereby function as 
challenges to this intention, challenging whether it is normatively adequate. 
 
Interestingly, directive speech acts – such as commanding, offering, and advising – 
also open up questions about knowledge-how. If you tell me to make you a macchiato, I 
can respond by asking how to make one, or by observing that I don’t know how to make 
one.179 The same goes for non-commanding directives. If I’m at a dinner party, and you say 
‘have an oyster’ (meaning to offer me one, not to command: it’s a polite dinner party), I 
could respond  ‘I’m sorry, but I don’t know how to eat an oyster’. The standard function of 
a directive speech act is to get someone else to form an intention, which suggests that we 
can challenge a directive by challenge the appropriateness of the intention it aims at. If 
knowledge-how is the norm of intention, then questions about knowledge-how challenge 
the appropriateness of the directive in this way. If the target does not know-how, then the 
intention which the directive aims at is inappropriate, and the directive itself inherits that 
inappropriateness.180 Supposing that assertoric and directive speech acts play analogous 
conversational roles — of adding propositions to the common ground, and adding tasks to 
the to-do list (Portner, 2007)— we get a neat symmetry between the conversational roles 
of the knowledge norms of intention, and assertion. Just as the norm of assertion checks 
                                                            
179 Strictly speaking the parallel question would be ‘do I know how to make a macchiato?’. 
However since most people know what they know how to do, it is more normal to simply deny 
knowledge. 
180 Directives are typically associated with an asymmetry of power, and it may be that the person 
issuing the directive responds to the challenge by simply ignoring the challenge and reissuing the 
directive. I don’t think that this detracts from the inappropriateness of the intention that may be 
formed. Just as someone in a position of power can use their authority to override moral norms, 
they can use this authority to override rules of rationality. Cases of knowingly overriding KNI 
raise the tricky issue of whether it is possible to knowingly flout KNI, or whether knowing that 
you don’t know how to do something makes it impossible to form a full intention. 
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updates to the common ground, the norm of intention checks updates to the conversational 
to-do list. 
 
1.2.2. Excuses 
 
One can excuse a request to answer a question by claiming that one doesn’t know 
the answer to that question: if you ask me how long naked mole rats live, I can legitimately 
respond by saying ‘I don’t know’, (Turri, 2011, p. 38). Rather than answering the question, 
this kind of response functions as an excuse from the request to make an assertion. The 
hypothesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion can nicely explain this kind of excuse, 
claiming that without knowledge, an assertion would be epistemically inappropriate. We 
find a similar phenomenon in the case of requests to do stuff. If Tariq asks Joan whether 
she could mow lines into his lawn with her lawnmower, Joan could legitimately respond 
by saying ‘I don’t know how to mow lines into a lawn.’ As in the case of assertion, this 
response doesn’t directly answer the request, but it does seem to function as an excuse. 
According to the supporter of KNI, Joan’s response functions as an excuse by claiming 
that she is not in a position to form a rational appropriate intention to mow lines into 
Tariq’s lawn. 
 
 
1.2.3. Soliciting Intentions 
 
 Questions about knowledge can also function as indirect requests to perform certain 
kinds of action. The question ‘do you know what the capital of Mali is?’ can function as a 
request to make an assertion answering the question of what the capital of Mali is (Turri, 
2011, p. 38). This phenomenon fits into a wider set of cases in which asking a question 
about a normative or necessary condition for some action can function as an indirect 
request to perform that action (Searle, 1979; McGlynn, 2015, p. 93). 
 
 We find cases in which a question about knowledge-how can function as a request to 
form an intention. If Baird and Jana are going on a drive, and Baird is worried that he 
might get a migraine making him unable to drive, he might ask Jana ‘do you know how to 
drive a manual?’. In this case, this question functions not as a request to drive — Baird 
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wouldn’t expect Jana to get in on the driver’s side — but rather as a request for Jana to 
form a conditional intention to drive if Baird gets a migraine.181 Similarly, if Hailey is 
injured and is looking for someone to climb with when she’s recovered in six months time, 
she might ask Daman ‘do you know how to climb?’ meaning not to ask him to climb, but 
rather to form the intention to go climbing with Hailey once she’s recovered. If knowledge-
how is the norm of intending, then these requests to form intentions fit nicely into the 
wider phenomenon of indirect requests based on questions about normative conditions. 
 
 
1.2.4. Moorean Sentences 
 
Another conversational phenomenon which has been stressed by supporters of 
knowledge-norms is the existence of Moorean sentences involving knowledge 
(Williamson, 2000, pp. 254–5). The ommisive Moorean sentence ‘p, but I don’t know that p’ 
seems bizarre to assert. According to the supporter of the knowledge-norm of assertion, 
this is because uttering this kind of sentence involves asserting the proposition in the fist 
half of the sentence, whilst claiming that one is not in an adequate epistemic position to 
assert this proposition because one doesn’t know it.  
 
There are a number of candidates for an analogous Moore sentence for expressions 
of intention: 
 
(1) I intend to V, but I don’t know how to V. 
(2) I will V, but I don’t know how to V. 
(3) I am V-ing, but I don’t know how to V. 
 
Some cases with this kind of structure seem bad, although perhaps not quite as bad 
as the original sentences for belief and knowledge. Consider 
  
                                                            
181 We are interested in cases of requests to intend, rather than straight requests to do, because 
KNI is a norm on intending, not on acting. The phenomenon of questions about know-how which 
are used as requests to act can also be explained by the hypothesis that knowledge-how is 
necessary for action, which makes these cases less useful in arguing for KNI. 
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(4) I intend to find a hyacinth on my walk today, but I don’t know how to recognise 
one. 
(5) I will perform a Salchow tomorrow, but I don’t know how to do a Salchow. 
(6) I am making a computer program for finding nth roots, but I don’t know how to 
code 
 
However, others seem to be acceptable. Consider: 
 
(7) I intend to make a bike, but I don’t know how to make one. 
(8)  I will prune your apple tree, but I don’t know how to prune an apple tree. 
(9) I am supposed to be taking us to the restaurant, but I don’t know how to get there. 
 
The difference between these sets of cases seems to stem from differences in 
whether it is possible to learn how to perform the relevant activities before the time of the 
intention. It isn’t possible to learn how to recognise hyacinths simply by looking at plants, 
but it is possible to learn to make a bike from scratch by muddling through, and exercising 
general problem solving skills. In fact, sentences 7, 8 and 9 seem to carry the implicature 
that the agent intends to learn how to do the relevant activity. In response to either claim, 
it would be natural to ask ‘so when do you intend to learn?’ The hypothesis that 
knowledge-how is the norm of intention is nicely placed to explain the badness of 
sentences like 4, 5, and 6. Cases in which an agent’s plan includes the intention to learn are 
puzzling for this norm, but I will postpone extended discussion of such cases until §2.1. 
 
 
1.3. Lottery Intentions 
 
A final argument for knowledge norms stems from the unacceptability of asserting, 
believing, or reasoning from lottery propositions. (We’ll focus on assertion). It is no 
surprise that it is epistemically amiss to assert that you have won a fair lottery, if the result 
has been drawn but not announced. If there are a reasonable number of tickets then 
winning a fair lottery is unlikely, meaning that a belief that you have won is unjustified, 
and most likely false. However, the interesting case is the fact that there is something amiss 
in asserting that you have lost a fair lottery. With enough tickets, the probability of losing 
may be rather high, meaning that it seems possible to have a justified belief that one has 
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lost. However, one cannot know that one has lost (plausibly because the belief that one has 
lost is unsafe). The supporter of a knowledge norm can explain the inappropriateness of 
asserting that one has lost, whereas the supporter of other norms – such as truth, belief or 
justification norms – cannot, meaning that Lottery propositions give the knowledge norm 
one up on its competitors (Williamson, 2000, Chapter 11; Hawthorne, 2004, pp. 21–36; 
Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008, p. 572).  
 
We find the same pattern with intentions related to lotteries. An intention to win a 
lottery is inappropriate.  One can explain this by appealing to knowledge-how, since one 
cannot know how to win a fair lottery (Gibbons, 2001, pp. 287–9; Setiya, 2012, pp. 286–7). 
However there are various alternative explanations for the badness of this intention: 
buying the winning ticket in a large fair lottery is overwhelmingly unlikely, meaning that 
one ought to have low credence in the proposition that one will win.182  
 
As with assertion, the interesting case is the intention to lose the lottery. An 
intention to lose will be overwhelmingly likely to be successful, and one ought to have a 
high degree of credence in the proposition that one has lost. Nonetheless, there is 
something extremely strange about intending to lose the lottery.  In normal cases, 
intending to lose is strange because the value of one’s ticket being a loser is negative. 
However, it is easy to set up cases where losing the lottery has positive value: say if a 
losing lottery ticket functions as an invitation to the Lottery Losers party, the value of which 
outweighs the cost of a lottery ticket. To see the inappropriateness of an intention to lose in 
the case where losing has positive value, consider the following piece of practical 
reasoning: 
 
P1: If I lose the Lottery, I’ll be able to go to the Lottery Losers party 
P2: The Losers party will be a lot of fun 
C : I’ll lose the Lottery  
 
The premises of this argument are true, and it is an instance of a valid schema for 
practical argument. These premises might also be known, avoiding violations of the 
                                                            
182 Furthermore, in most real-world lotteries buying a lottery ticket has negative expected value 
because the cost of a ticket is larger than the value of the prize divided by the number of tickets. In 
a case where the value of the prize is sufficiently large, buying a lottery ticket can be practically 
rational. 
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knowledge-that norm of practical reasoning. Nonetheless, forming the intention expressed 
by the conclusion of this syllogism is obviously inappropriate.183 We cannot explain the 
inappropriateness of this intention by appealing to the low chance of losing the lottery, or a 
low credence in the proposition that one will win, since I know that it is very likely that I 
will lose. However, we can explain it by appealing to the knowledge-how norm. Despite 
the overwhelming probability of losing, one cannot know how to lose a fair lottery because 
it’s just not something one has any control over. Hence, even when one employs a sound 
argument, and the value of having a losing ticket is positive, lack of knowledge how makes 
an intention to lose the lottery inappropriate. 
 
 
1.4. Summing up 
 
In this section, we have seen that the phenomena which supporters of knowledge 
norms of belief, assertion, and action appeal to also occur in the case of intention. 
Although there is considerably more to be said about each of these phenomena, and I have 
noted a number of worries above, the combination these phenomena provides a plausible 
cumulative argument for the knowledge-how norm of intention. 
 
 
2 The Knowledge-How Norm of Intention 
 
 The phenomena that we considered in the previous section seem to support the 
simple knowledge norm stated in the introduction. To reiterate, this norm is: 
 
 KNI: One must: intend to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
 In this section I will address some cases in which it seems appropriate to intend to 
do something without knowing how to do it, which will address the worries raised in §1. I 
will consider a number of fixes for these problem cases, and then offer a revised account of 
the knowledge-how requirements on a given intention, which appeals to the notion of a 
partial plan. 
                                                            
183 Although it would be appropriate to intend to buy a ticket. 
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 Before we turn to the problem cases for KNI, it is worth making some clarificatory 
observations about its normative import. KNI claims that at any time at which one is in the 
state of intending to V, one better also be in the state of knowing how to V. KNI evaluates 
intentions prospectively: one violates this norm if one forms an intention to V without 
knowing how to V even if one picks up this knowledge before the time of action. If one 
intends to V and only later learn how to V, then the intention becomes appropriate at the 
time of learning, but it remains inappropriate before this time. This feature means that 
KNI can seem overly conservative, requiring considerable knowledge before one intends. 
KNI is not violated if one merely intends to try to V. Trying to V is just another of activity 
which can be substituted into KNI, meaning that an intention to try to V requires knowing 
how to try to V, rather than knowing how to V. I might know how to try to dress fashionably, 
without knowing how to dress fashionably, meaning that by the lights of KNI I ought only 
form the intention to try to dress fashionably.  
 
 KNI can also be overridden by other kinds of considerations. In a case in which an 
intention not accompanied by know-how is morally required, the supporter of KNI is 
committed to saying that there is something rationally inappropriate about that intention, 
although it might be all things considered rational.184 In the case of other knowledge-
norms, it is common to fix in on the evaluation given by the knowledge norm by 
considering a distinctively epistemic sense of evaluation. I find it difficult to isolate an 
epistemic sense of evaluation of intentions, and will stick with the claim that KNI is a norm 
of rationality.  
 
 
2.1. Problem Cases for KNI 
 
 There are a number of cases that cause problems for KNI as formulated. I will 
focus on three kinds of problem cases: i) intentions to work out how to do something as 
you go along, ii) intentions to practice, and iii) intentions concerning life plans. 
 
                                                            
184 KNI can also be overridden by practical considerations. If I don’t know how to climb a 6c 
climb, but want to get half way up, the best way to buttress my resolve might be to form the 
intention to climb the whole way up. This is a case involving practical reasons to break a norm of 
rationality. 
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 The knowledge-how norm of intention demands that if we intend to do something, 
we know how to do it at the time we form that intention. As suggested by the excuses to 
the epistemic challenges to intention considered in §1 one might think that there is an easy 
way to get out of this demand. When one forms the intention to do something, one can 
simply form the additional intention to acquire the requisite know-how before the time of 
action. If Kieran does not know how to dance the Tango, but forms the intention to dance 
the Tango at his wedding in six months time, we might think that he can avoid negative 
evaluation by forming the supplementary intention to learn how to dance the Tango in time 
(Setiya, 2008, p. 406).185  In this case it seems that Kieran appropriately intends to dance 
the Tango despite not knowing how to do it. Intentions to V which are accompanied by the 
combination of ignorance about how to V, together with an intention to learn how to V 
appear to be counterexamples to KNI. Setiya suggests that an agent in this kind of case 
really intends to learn to dance the tango, meaning that their intentions are consistent with 
KNI (as long as they know how to learn to dance the Tango). However, as Paul points out 
(2009b, p. 556), this description of Kieran’s intentions is rather strained: it seems much 
more plausible to say that Kieran both intends to learn, and intends to dance the Tango, 
and that he has the first intention because he has the second. 
 
A second kind of problem case concerns practicing. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, Knowledge-how is associated with various distinctive kinds of learning including 
practicing, whereby one engages in an activity to learn how to do it. According to KNI, 
when one intends to practice V-ing, that intention is inappropriate, since the point of 
practice is to gain knowledge-how.186 This is a strange result, meaning that for activities 
that require practice, the only way to get oneself in a position where one’s intentions are 
appropriate according to KNI is to repeatedly form intentions that break that very norm. 
This would be bad enough if practicing was a brief stage at the beginning of the life-cycle 
of a skill. However, the importance of continuous improvement to skilful activity (Ericsson, 
2006; Montero, 2016, Chapter 6) suggests that practicing is an important part of all levels 
of skill, meaning that KNI predicts a host of norm violations associated with skilled 
activities. 
 
                                                            
185 For related examples, see (Hawley, 2003, pp. 20–26; Setiya, 2012, p. 297). 
186 (Setiya, 2009, n. 23). 
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A final kind of problem case concerns life-plans. Up until this point, I have been 
concentrating on one-off intentions to perform discrete action. However, intentions can 
also structure our lives in more complex ways over the longer term, and if KNI is to be a 
general norm, it should also cover these cases. However, many long-term intentions will 
involve such complex and long-term plans that no one can properly claim to know how to 
pull them off. Consider a new parent’s intention to bring up his child to be a happy, 
flourishing person. Plausibly, no new parent can claim to know how to cope with the many 
and varied challenges which can occur during the course of ten or twenty years of a child’s 
life. Perhaps a parent of multiple children, who has faced a range of parental challenges 
can claim to know how to bring up a child, but it is not obvious that this knowledge could 
be condensed into a form which could be easily transmitted to a new parent. So, according 
to KNI, a new parent’s intention to bring up their child to be a happy and flourishing 
individual breaks a norm of rationality. It is easy to multiply examples of this kind: staying 
faithful to one partner for a lifetime, living a worthwhile and fulfilling life, or taking care of 
another human being are all activities which no-one — except perhaps people at the end of 
their lives — has a claim to know how to do. This means that it appears that the supporter 
of KNI seems committed to saying that many life-structuring intentions are inappropriate. 
 
 
2.2. Potential Fixes for KNI 
 
 There are a number of responses to these problem cases.187  
 
 One option is to stick with the evaluations given by KNI, and say that in the above 
cases our intuitive judgements are tracking a different dimension of evaluation of 
intentions. For example, perhaps intentions to practice are always inappropriate, as KNI 
predicts, it’s just that we allow this inappropriateness because it is in pursuit of the 
epistemically worthwhile goal of gaining more knowledge-how. Although there is 
                                                            
187 One option that I don’t have space to develop is to develop a graded norm, which claims that the 
strength of one’s intention ought to match one’s degree of knowledge-how. For example, we might 
combine Holton’s notion of partial intention (Holton, 2008) with Pavese’s notion of partial 
knowledge-how (Pavese, 2017), to give: 
 
PKNI: One must: have a partial intention to V, only if one knows at least in part how to V.  
 
Setiya alludes to this kind of norm (Setiya, 2016, pp. 12–3), although in his framework degrees of 
intention correspond to degrees of belief. 
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something to be said for this line, it would be a considerable cost of KNI if the kinds of 
intentions in the previous section have something inappropriate about them. 
 
 A more concessive response is to say that in the above cases full intentions are 
inappropriate, although intentions to try are appropriate. This seems like a plausible line 
for intentions to practice. When a novice is practicing some activity for the first time, she 
should be open to the possibility that she will fail. It would be strange to be practicing 
giving a philosophy talk perfectly, and to make plans based on the assumption that one will 
perform it perfectly first time. One should intend to merely try to give the talk perfectly, and 
form back-up plans conditional on messing up. We might say something similar about 
experts who are practicing new skills. However, this line is less plausible in some of the 
other problem cases: it seems strange to say that Kieran is (or that he ought to be) 
intending to only try to dance the Tango at his wedding, or that we ought only to form 
intentions to try to achieve our life goals.  
 
 Another option is to appeal to contextual dependence in the condition involved in 
the norm to yield a theory where the appropriateness of intention varies depending on 
contextual features. There are a number of possible contextualist theses about knowledge-
how, but one view that can do some interesting work here is the task-indexed 
contextualism suggested by Hawley (2003, pp. 21–2) (see chapter 3 §3.3). Hawley 
suggests that knowledge-how ascriptions are made relative to a contextually supplied set 
of tasks, the idea being that for ‘S know how to V’ to be true in some context S needs to 
know how to perform the set of V-related tasks salient in that context. This allows us to 
say in some contexts – ones where learning is a salient task – merely knowing how to learn is 
be sufficient to count as knowing how to do. If learning how to speak Russian is a salient task 
in a particular context, someone who knows that one can speak Russian by taking a class, 
can be truthfully said to know how to speak Russian, (Hawley, 2003, pp. 19–20). 
 
Putting this contextualist view of knowledge-how together with KNI gives us a 
view where the conditions on appropriate intention vary by context. If the salient tasks are 
easy or few in number, it doesn’t take much knowledge to have an appropriate intention, 
but if the salient tasks are hard or numerous, one needs more knowledge. And if learning is 
a salient task, then knowing how to learn is sufficient to know how, and thus to 
appropriately intend. Although this line promises to gets the right result about the 
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appropriateness of Kieran’s intentions, it faces a number of problems. The contextualist 
explanation of the Tango case relies on learning the Tango being a salient task in our 
conversational context. But, its difficult to see why all of the contexts in which we say 
Kieran’s intention is appropriate should have this feature. In fact, when I introduced the 
Tango example above, I did not make learning to dance the Tango salient meaning that we 
made the judgement that Kieran did not know how to dance the Tango. However, we still 
judged that Kieran’s intention was appropriate, suggesting that our judgements about the 
appropriateness of his intention was not tracking which tasks were contextually salient.  
 
 
2.3. Know-how and Partial Plans 
 
I think appealing to intentions to try nicely explains intentions to practice. 
However, to explain the appropriateness intending to work things out, and intentions 
regarding life-plans I think that we need a more fine-grained framework for understanding 
intentions. To get this framework up and running, I will connect KNI with Bratman’s idea 
that intentions are partial plans.188 
 
Bratman points out that when we form intentions, our plans are typically rather 
coarse-grained and partial, leaving various practical issues open to be decided later on 
(Bratman, 1987). When I form the intention to make lasagne for dinner, I leave open what 
kind of lasagne to make, how to cook the different parts of the dish, and what time to start 
cooking. I will fill in these holes in my plan when I have enough situational knowledge to 
make an informed judgement about which more fine-grained plan to pursue. The idea of 
filling in helps to understand Kieran’s plan: his initial coarse-grained plan leaves open how 
he will dance the tango, and this plan gets filled in by an intention concerning how to get 
himself in a position to dance the Tango. 
 
It is plausible that the epistemic requirements on an intention vary depending on 
how filled in one’s intention is (Bratman, 1987, p. 31). Consider the way in which plans for 
making a lasagne vary depending on the cook’s culinary know-how. An experienced cook 
can plan to make a lasagne without needing to plan ahead, leaving open a host of practical 
                                                            
188 This connection ought to be unsurprising given the connections between Mutual Reliance, and 
the Planning theory of intention noted in chapter 5. 
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issues to be filled in later, whereas a more inexperienced cook will need to make a detailed 
plan that fills in the details. I suggest that the experienced cook’s know-how puts her in a 
position to fluidly fill in a coarse-grained plan by exercising her knowledge how to perform 
various culinary tasks, whereas the inexperienced cook’s knowledge does not put her in a 
position to fill out her plans as she goes along, meaning that she needs to make a detailed 
plan ahead of time which fills her plan in to the level of her knowledge-how. 
 
In order to explain this idea, we can build a connection between know-how and 
partial plans into the know-how norm, relativising the know-how norm to the open issues 
in an agent’s plan.189  This gives us the following norm: 
 
KNI-PP: One must: intend to V, leaving open a set of how-to issues {how to V1, 
how to V2, … how to Vn} only if for all of the open how-to issues in that set one 
knows how to perform those tasks. 
 
This revised norm is able to explain both the cases of intending to work things out 
as one goes along, and the cases of intentions relating to life plans. 
 
In the case of intending to V when one forms the intention to work out how to V 
whilst ignorant about how to V, I suggest we should think of the supplementary intention 
as filling in the partial plan. The initial coarse-grained plan – to V – gets filled in by some 
more complex plan – learn to V, then exercise this knowledge. This more complex plan 
does not leave open the issue of how to V, but rather the issue of how to learn to V, so 
requires not knowing how to V knowing how to learn to V. This is the result that we want in 
these cases: an intention to work it out as you go along requires less know-how, but it still 
requires some knowledge.  
 
In the case of life plans, I suggest that we should think of a plan to bring up a 
happy child not as an extraordinarily coarse-grained plan — which would require a great 
deal of know-how — but rather as a policy (Bratman 1987, 56–57).  Policies have a 
conditional structure which allows us to affect our future behaviour in predictable ways 
                                                            
189 This idea is even more attractive if we think of partial plans as question-relative (Snedegar, 
MS), since if we think of a partial plan as leaving open practical questions the knowledge-how 
requirements will be knowledge of the answers to those practical questions. 
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without knowing much about future circumstances. For example a policy to give up 
smoking will involves a plan like: if there is an opportunity to smoke, then I won’t take it. A 
parent’s plan to bring up a happy child involves a bundle of conditional intentions: if I have 
a decision to make, I’ll put my child first; if there’s an opportunity to find out about how to bring up my 
child, I’ll take it; and if my child isn’t happy, I’ll review my parenting practices.190 The crucial point 
is that these conditional plans leave open smaller issues than a coarse grained plan to bring 
up a happy child, requiring only knowing how to follow the conditional plans, rather than 
knowing how to bring up a child. Again, these policies will require some knowledge-how; 
the point is that they will require less knowledge-how than the corresponding coarse-
grained plan. 
 
The overall lesson of this section is that in order to tell what the epistemic 
conditions on intention are, we need to know quite a bit about the structure of intentions. I 
suggested that practicing ought to involve merely intending to try to succeed, meaning that 
one can intend to practice, without know how to succeed, as long as one knows how to try. 
I have claimed that intentions to work out how to do something involve forming fine-
grained intentions to fill in one’s partial plan, and offered a revision of this norm – KNI-PP 
– which makes the epistemic requirements on intention relative to the open issues in the 
partial plan. I have claimed that intentions to pursue life-plans plans are policies, and 
suggested that intending to follow a policy require knowing how to follow a bundle of 
simple conditional plans rather than how to resolve an extremely complex practical issue.  
 
 
3 The Knowledge-How Norm is not Reducible 
 
 
 One might worry that although knowledge-how is normatively connected to 
intending, this is only true in virtue of more general normative principles concerning 
intending. This thought comes in a few different guises, appealing to various different 
norms relating to practical reasoning. I will consider three: i) the ought-implies-can 
principle, ii) the principle of instrumental rationality, and iii) the knowledge-that norm of 
practical reasoning. The goal of this section is to show that the knowledge-how norm on 
intention is not entailed by any of these norms. 
                                                            
190 I focus on policies suited to single parenting. The two parent case will involve more complex 
policies. 
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3.1. Ought Implies Can 
 
It is a common thought that there is a connection between what one ought to do, and 
what one can do, which is often expressed in the slogan that ought implies can (which I will 
understand as the necessity claim: one ought to V, only if one can V).  The important point 
for our purposes is that if we think that there is a connection between what we can do, and 
what we know how to do (Vranas, 2007, p. 169), it would be natural to think that the ought 
implies can principle also entails what we might think about as an ought implies know-how 
principle. 
 
This connection is controversial. For starters, the ought implies can principle is 
controversial (Littlejohn, 2009a; Graham, 2011), meaning that appealing to this principle 
is not a uncontentious way to motivate the know-how norm. A second issue is that the 
connection sketched above requires that there is some connection between know-how and 
what we can do; in particular that being able to do something entails that one knows how 
to do it. But, we’ve seen in chapter 1 that there are a host of counterexamples to the 
connection between knowledge-how and ability.  
 
Another worry is that the claim that ought implies know-how just looks independently 
implausible. Consider again cases of intending to V by learning how to V. Imagine that 
Kieran forms the intention to dance the Tango because it will make his partner happy. On 
the face of it, Kieran ought to dance the Tango because of this fact, despite the fact that he 
doesn’t know how to dance the Tango. Because he can easily learn how to dance the 
Tango, he is not excused from the ought-claim, despite not having knowledge how. 
 
A final problem with the attempted reduction is that the ought implies can principle 
has a narrower application than the know-how norm. The know-how norm concerns 
intentions in general, meaning that it negatively evaluates intentions even if they concern 
actions that are not what one ought to do. For example, if I intend to break a promise not 
to ride my bike by cycling to the shops but I don’t know how to ride a bike, then according 
to the know-how norm I have broken a norm of rationality. However, the ought implies 
can principle says nothing about this intention, because breaking a promise is not 
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something which I ought to do. This means that appealing to the ought implies can 
principle will not get us a competence norm on intentions in general. 
 
 
3.2. Instrumental Rationality 
 
 A somewhat different tack is to appeal to norms of instrumental rationality to explain 
the connection between intending and knowing-how. One way to motivate this line is to 
observe cases in which a failure to have knowledge-how is accompanied by a failure of 
instrumental rationality. If Skipper forms an intention to make Coq au Vin without 
knowing how to make it, he will not be in a position to form any further intentions 
concerning the means of making Coq au Vin. One thing that is bad about his position is 
that he has an intention to do something, without having a corresponding intention about a 
means to reach that end, meaning that he breaks some norm of instrumental rationality. 
The suggestion would be that there is a requirement that intentions be accompanied by 
knowledge-how, only because not having knowledge-how entails having a belief which is 
in violation of some version or other of the principle of instrumental rationality. 
 
 The core idea behind the principle of Instrumental Rationality is that there is some 
kind of rational failure associated with having the following combination of attitudes: 
intending to E, believing that E requires intending to M, and not intending to M. There is 
a good deal of controversy about how to formulate this principle, and why the principle 
holds, which I will simply put to one side.191 We’ll use Broome’s version of this norm as a 
stalking horse (Broome, 1999, 2005) but the considerations which pull apart Broome’s 
principle apart from the knowledge-how norm of intention generalise. 
 
 Broome argues that the principle of Instrumental Rationality takes the form of a 
wide-scope rational requirement connecting intention with believed means: 
 
Instrumental Rationality: Rationality requires that: if one intends to E, and believes 
that one will E only if one intends to M, then one intend to M. 
 
                                                            
191 (Bratman, 1987, 2009a, 2009b, Broome, 1999, 2005, 2013; Brunero, 2009; Schroeder, 2009) 
 174 
 A couple of clarifications about this principle. First, the sense of ‘means’ at issue in 
this norm is intended means, rather than the conditions and tools which are required for 
achieving E (Setiya, 2007, pp. 668–9). In the relevant sense, merely having knowledge 
how to E is not an required means for intending to E. Secondly, this norm is best thought 
of as applying to the special case in which there is one means to achieve E (or at least, that 
the agent thinks that there is). This means that this principle does not say anything about 
cases in which there are various possible means available. In order to explain why 
knowledge-how is a requirement in other cases in which there is no necessary means, we 
will need some generalisation of this principle (such as Bratman’s means-ends coherence 
principle, considered below).192 
 
 The question to consider is whether failing to have knowledge-how entails violating 
Instrumental Rationality. I think that it does not. Not knowing how to E will in some cases 
go along with having no beliefs about the required means for achieving that end. But, 
someone who has no beliefs about the necessary means for achieving E has a set of 
attitudes that are consistent with Instrumental Rationality. If one does not fulfil the 
antecedent of the conditional given in this norm — either by not intending E, or by not 
having a belief about its required means — then it is not possible to violate the principle. 
There will also be cases in which an agent does not know how to E, has a false belief about 
the necessary means for achieving E, and has intentions which are consonant with those 
beliefs. For example, I might intend to make the perfect cup of tea, mistakenly believe that 
the perfect cup requires soya milk and intend to use soya milk. This combination of 
attitudes also does not violate Instrumental Rationality, because the intention is constituent 
with the (false) belief. However, it does violate KNI, because anyone that believes that the 
way to make a perfect tea is to use soya milk does not know how to make a perfect cup of 
tea. Although the relation between knowledge-how and false belief is somewhat fraught, it 
is not at all controversial that there are some cases in which agents fail to know how to do 
something, and also have false beliefs about how to do that activity. These cases 
demonstrate that it is possible to violate the knowledge-how norm without violating 
Instrumental Rationality. Although I won’t push this point, it seems reasonable to think that 
the majority of cases in which an agent lacks knowledge-how, they will either have no 
                                                            
192 A further complication is that Instrumental Rationality requires time-indexing to allow an agent to 
form an intention to perform the means at some time after forming the intention to E, but before 
the time at which they would need to M (Setiya, 2007, p. 668). Implementing this change entails a 
further difference to KNI-PP that evaluates intentions at the time of formation. 
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belief, or a false belief about how to perform the relevant activity. This suggests that in the 
majority of cases, lacking knowledge how does not involve violating Instrumental Rationality. 
 
 One move a supporter of the reduction of the know-how norm might want to pursue 
is to say that fulfilling Instrumental Rationality requires true beliefs about necessary means, 
or perhaps just forming a means-intention which is in line with the facts about how to 
achieve the relevant end. However, these tweaked versions of the principle of Instrumental 
Rationality would not entail the knowledge norm of intention either. There are cases in 
which an agent lacks knowledge-how to E, takes a lucky guess about how to E, forming 
the true belief that M as a means to achieve E, and thereby intends to M. For example, 
Skipper might in a panic write down a random series of cooking tasks, which by sheer 
fluke happen to constitute a fairly reliable way to make Coq au Vin. With no other option, 
he forms the belief that this recipe constitutes a way to make Coq au Vin, forms the 
appropriate intentions and follows the recipe successfully. In this kind of case Skipper 
lacks knowledge how to make a Coq au Vin, but fulfils Instrumental Rationality in the best 
way possible: by having true beliefs about the means to his ends, and intending those 
means. These cases of lucky true belief are important, because the combination of intention 
to E, true belief that intending to M is necessary to achieve E, and intention to M is the 
central case in which an agent fulfils the norm of Instrumental Rationality. Because one 
can fulfil instrumental rationality via a lucky guess whilst lacking knowledge-how, failing 
to have knowledge-how does not entail violating the norms of instrumental rationality. 
Instrumental Rationality makes no requirement about the epistemic provenance of the 
belief about the means, whereas knowledge how to V does, meaning that the knowledge-
how norm will systematically divergence from the requirements of practical rationality. 
 
 To see how these considerations against Broome’s version of the principle of 
Instrumental Rationality generalise, consider Bratman’s more general requirement, which 
he calls the Means-Ends Coherence Principle (Bratman, 1987, pp. 31–5). This principle is 
formulated within the framework of partial plans, and says that our partial plans must at 
the appropriate time be filled in with sub-plans that specify means to achieving our goals. 
Means-Ends Coherence is more general than Instrumental Rationality, in that it applies to ends 
with multiple possible means, and does not require that we form subplans ahead of time. It 
is easy to come up with cases in which agents fulfil Means-Ends Coherence without knowing 
how to V. Although it is not possible to form a subplan while lacking a belief, it is clearly 
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possible to fill in a plan based on a false belief about possible means, meaning that it is 
possible to fill in a plan to E, without knowing how to E. Even focusing on cases in which 
the subplan is a possibly successful one, there will be cases in which the agent lacks 
knowledge how to E, takes a guess about how to E which luckily comes out true, and fills 
out their plan based on that lucky guess. This means that lacking knowledge-how does not 
entail violating the Means-Ends coherence principle, even focusing on forming potentially 
successful subplans. 
 
 It appears that the prospects for getting the knowledge-how norm out of some 
version of the principle of Instrumental Rationality are not good. This does not undermine 
the important connections between knowledge-how and instrumental rationality. As I 
noted in §2.2., it is extremely plausible that exercising our knowledge-how is one of the 
primary ways in which we form beliefs about the required means to our ends, and more 
generally fill out our plans. The point to take away from this section is that it is also 
possible to fill out our plans in other ways that have less good epistemic credentials but are 
impeccable from the point of view of achieving our ends. 
 
 
3.4. Knowledge-That Norm of Action 
 
  If Intellectualism about knowledge-how is correct then we might expect that the 
properties of knowledge-that — including its normative properties — would carry across 
to knowledge-how. This means that the Intellectualist who is committed to a knowledge-
that norm on action might think that they can explain the epistemic norms concerning 
knowledge-how by appealing to the knowledge that norm of action. In this section, I will 
show that the combination of Intellectualism knowledge-that norm of action does not 
entail the knowledge-how norm. 
 
 McGlynn points out that there are two versions of the knowledge norm of action, 
depending on whether one is required to know only the propositions which one treats as 
reasons, or all of the premises of practical reasoning (McGlynn, 2015, p. 132). This 
distinction gives us the knowledge norm on treating as a reason for action (KNRA), and 
the knowledge norm on premises of practical reasoning (KNPR): 
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KNRA: One must: treat p as a reason for action, only if one knows that p.193  
 
KNPR: One must: employ p as a premise in practical reasoning, only if one knows 
that p.194 
 
 The importance of this distinction becomes clear when we notice that practical 
reasoning includes not just reasons which favour performing the action in the conclusion, 
but also means-ends propositions, as well as propositions which modify reasons without 
themselves being reasons, such as enablers, intensifiers and attenuators (Dancy, 2004, 
Chapter 3). KNRA does not require knowledge of means-ends premises, enablers, 
intensifiers, and attenuators, whereas KNPR does.  
 
 The question is whether we can derive some version of KNI from either KNRA or 
KNPR. There are two ways to connect KNI to these norms: i) by appealing to the fact that 
means-ends premises figure as premises in practical reasoning and ii) by appealing to the 
idea that knowledge-how is a enabler. It’s worth noting that because both connections rely 
on premises of practical reasoning that are not reasons, they only go through under 
KNPR. Let’s consider the two connections in turn. 
 
 If Intellectualism about knowledge-how is true, then knowledge-how is knowledge of 
a certain kind of proposition: plausibly a means-end proposition, or a proposition about a 
way of performing some act. One way to derive a requirement for knowledge-how from a 
propositional knowledge norm is if the relevant kind of proposition figures as a premise in 
practical reasoning. Consider the following piece of practical reasoning: 
 
P1: I need to be in Hoxton for a meeting 
P2: I am in Bloomsbury 
P3: To get to Hoxton, from Bloomsbury, one needs to take the number 35 bus 
C: I’ll take the number 35 bus 
 
                                                            
193 (Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008) 
194 (Williamson, 2000, p. 231; Hawthorne, 2004) 
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If KNPR is correct, then in order to be epistemically appropriate, this piece of 
reasoning requires that I know that taking the number 35 is a way to get from Hoxton to 
Bloomsbury. And, if Intellectualism is true then knowing the proposition expressed by P3 is 
sufficient for knowing how to get to Hoxton from Bloomsbury.195 Putting the two claims 
together means that this piece of practical reasoning is appropriate only if I know how to get 
from Hoxton to Bloomsbury. Generalising, we can say that whenever there is a means-ends 
premise in practical reasoning, KNPR predicts that this means-ends premise must be 
known for the reasoning to be epistemically appropriate, and that assuming Intellectualism, 
we can identify this means-end knowledge with knowledge of how to achieve the end. 
 
Although KNPR predicts that practical reasoning requires some knowledge-how, it 
does not mean that KNPR entail KNI. For one thing, in order to get a general know-how 
requirement on all pieces of practical reasoning, we would need an argument that all pieces 
of practical reasoning involve a means-end premise. This is a substantial commitment in 
the theory of practical reasoning. A more serious problem is that the requirement to know 
means-ends premises of practical reasoning yields a requirement for different knowledge-
how to KNI. Applied to the piece of practical reasoning above, KNI claims that in order to 
pursue this piece of practical reasoning, I better know how to take the number 35 bus. By 
contrast, KNPR predicts that I better know how to get from Bloomsbury to Hoxton. One way 
to put the point is to say that KNI requires knowledge-how relating to how to perform the 
conclusion of practical reasoning, whereas the requirement to know means ends premises 
gets us to a requirement for knowledge-how concerning the premises of practical 
reasoning. 
 
 The second way to get a knowledge-how requirement out of KNPR is to appeal to 
the idea that knowledge-how plays an enabling role in practical reasoning. The idea of an 
enabler picks out conditions which do not themselves speak in favour of a certain action 
(meaning that they are not reasons), but without which other considerations could not 
speak in favour of that action (Dancy, 2004, pp. 38–43). To get a grip on enablers, 
consider promising. Marcella has promised to make Mohammed dinner. The fact of having 
promised is a reason for Marcella to make Mohammed dinner. By contrast, the fact that 
her promise was not coerced is not a reason for her to make Mohammed dinner. It does 
                                                            
195 The claim that in some cases knowledge of a means-ends proposition suffices for knowledge-
how is Anti-intellectualists can also get on board with. See (Hornsby, 2005, p. 113) 
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not speak in favour of making dinner. Rather, the fact that the promise was unconcerned 
enables the fact of having promised to function as a reason for Marcella. One might think 
that knowledge how to V plays a similar role, enabling reasons to count in favour of V-ing 
without itself actually favouring V-ing. 
 
There are two ways to appeal to enablers to get the claim that fully appropriate 
reasoning requires knowledge-how: i) one might think that knowledge how to V is an 
enabler for reasons to count in favour of V-ing, or ii) one might think that the content of 
knowledge how to V is an enabler for reasons to count in favour of V-ing. In both cases, 
there are plausible routes from the claims about enablers to the knowledge-how norm of 
intending, but the underlying claims about enablers are implausible. 
 
Let’s start with option i). If know-how is an enabler, then someone who does not 
know how to V cannot have any reasons to V. This claim does not by itself establish a 
norm which is broken if one forms an intention without knowledge-how; rather it tells us 
that if one engages in practical reasoning to a conclusion which one does not know how to 
do, one will have no reasons supporting the intention which the conclusion of that 
practical reasoning. In order to get a knowledge norm we need to appeal to KNPR. If 
KNPR holds, then we must know all of the premises of practical reasoning, including 
enabling conditions. This combination of claims does not get us directly to KNI, but rather 
to the claim that we must know that we have knowledge-how in order to have appropriate 
intentions (KKNI for short): 
 
KKNI: One must: intend to V, only if one knows that one knows how to V. 
 
By contrast to KNI, which claims that appropriate intentions requires first-order 
knowledge, KKNI claims that appropriate intentions require second-order knowledge. 
However, the fact that a given epistemic norm entails a set of weaker norms, concerning 
the conditions entailed by the condition in the original norm (so that a knowledge norm on 
assertion entails a truth norm on assertion, and so on), together with the factivity of 
knowledge, means that KKNI entails KNI. 
 
Although the suggestion that knowledge-how is an enabler provides a neat route 
from KNPR to KNI, the suggestion that in general knowing how to V is an enabler for 
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reasons to favour V-ing is implausible. Consider the Tango case. Kieran does not know 
how to dance the Tango, but he nonetheless forms an intention to dance the Tango. If 
knowledge how to V were an enabler for reasons to count in favour of V-ing, then Kieran’s 
intention to dance the Tango would be unsupported by reasons. But Kieran’s intention to 
dance the Tango might be extremely well supported by reasons, despite his lack of 
knowledge-how. Cases of intending to do something by learning it as one go along provide 
us with counterexamples to the claim that knowledge how to V is an enabler for reasons to 
count in favour of V-ing. 
 
Given the failure of option i) let’s consider option ii), which appeals to the idea that 
the propositions which figure in knowledge how to V are an enablers. Unlike appealing to 
means-ends premises in practical reasoning, this proposal concerns propositions about 
how to engage in the conclusion of practical reasoning. In our above example of practical 
reasoning, the idea would be that the some fact about how to take the 35 bus functions as 
an enabler for reasons to count in favour of catching the number 35 bus. Given KNPR, 
appropriate practical reasoning requires knowing that all enablers obtain, getting us the 
claim that appropriate practical reasoning to the conclusion to V requires knowing that 
some means-ends proposition about how to V holds. Given Intellectualism, we can identify 
knowledge of this means-ends proposition about how to V with knowledge how to V. 
 
The problem with option ii) lies in the suggestion that a particular means end 
premise is an enabler. It is plausible that being able to V is an enabler for V-ing (Dancy 
2004: 40). If there were no way to get to the bus stop, then one would not be able to get to 
the bus stop, and I would have no reasons to get to the bus stop. However, with most 
practical tasks, the means-ends premises that we know are not unique, so that a particular 
means-ends proposition can be false, without it being the case the one is unable to perform 
the relevant action. Suppose that walking to the stop on Tottenham court road is a way to 
catch the number 35 bus. Is that fact an enabler for me taking the 35?  A plausible test for 
an enabler is to consider whether if the fact failed to obtain whether I would have any 
reason to perform the relevant action. If Tottenham court road was the only stop for the 
number 35, then if walking to that stop was not a way to catch the bus, that would mean 
that I was unable to catch the 35, which would stand in the way of my having reasons to 
take the bus. However, in a more ordinary case, there will be many ways to catch the 35, 
such that the falsity of one of the means-end propositions does not undermine my ability to 
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catch the 35, or my having reasons to catch it. In this ordinary kind of case, any particular 
means-end proposition does not function as an enabler. This means that option ii) faces the 
same problem as option i), being based on an implausible general claim about enablers. 
 
 
 4 Alternative Norms on Intention 
 
In the debates about the norm of belief, assertion, and practical reasoning — which 
I will call the propositional case — the knowledge norm is not the only possible norm on 
intention. In the propositional case, the standard alternative conditions are: truth (Weiner, 
2005), safe success (Pelling, 2013), belief (Bach & Harnish, 1979; Bach, 2008), 
justification, (Douven, 2006; Lackey, 2008; Kvanvig, 2011), or various higher-order 
conditions (Williamson, 2000, pp. 260–3). In this section I consider analogies to each of 
these norms in the case of intention, as well as a ability norm of intention, and show that 
the alternatives to a knowledge-how norm on intention face problems.  
 
4.1. Success 
 
The analogy to a truth norm in the case of intention would be a success norm of 
intention (SNI): 
 
SNI: One must: intend to V, only if one Vs. 
 
We need to restrict the variable in this norm to intentional actions, otherwise the 
norm would positively evaluate success down to deviant causal chains. Even with this 
restriction, SNI makes some rather strange predictions. If I form the intention to make a 
cup of tea, but change my mind and have a coffee, then SNI claims that my initial 
intention is inappropriate. Similarly, if I start to make a cup of tea, but get prevented by a 
sudden intruder, SNI claims my intention was inappropriate.196 SNI also does poorly in 
evaluating the effects of luck. If I form the intention to win a fair lottery, and happen to 
win, then SNI claims my initial intention is appropriate, which seems like the wrong result. 
The underlying problem with SNI is that it evaluates intentions retrospectively with 
                                                            
196 One way to avoid these problems would be to switch to a no-failures norm, where changing 
one’s mind, and outside interference do not count as failures. 
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regards to success, whereas we want our evaluation of the appropriateness of intention to 
function prospectively, so that we can know whether an intention was appropriate before we 
know how things turn out.197 
 
 
4.2. Safety 
 
The analogy to a safety norm on assertion (Pelling 2013) would be a safe success 
norm of intention (SSNI): 
 
SSNI: One must: intend to V, only if one could not easily fail to V. 
 
SSNI does much better than SNI on cases of lucky success: SSNI predicts that a 
lucky lottery win involves an inappropriate intention, because the success will not by safe. 
It also gets the right result about intentions to lose the lottery. Although these intentions 
are overwhelmingly likely to be successful the success will not be safe, because there is a 
close world in which the ticket wins, meaning that according to SSNI, these intentions are 
not appropriate. 
 
However, SSNI is an implausible standard on intentions. There are many ordinary 
intentions which are unsafe (Hawley, 2003, pp. 23–4). Kayetan is a skilled baker, and 
knows how to bake a perfect loaf of bread, but that does not mean that he always produces 
a perfect loaf — there are just too many variables to get it right every time. This means 
that even when Kayetan bakes a perfect loaf, there is a close world in which something 
goes wrong, and his intention fails.198 Nonetheless, his intention seems appropriate. 
Although in this case the number of failure worlds is fairly small, we might think that we 
can appropriately intend when there are many close failures. Consider cases of difficult 
action (Marušić, 2012, 2015): quitting smoking, staying faithful to a partner for a lifetime, 
or running a first marathon. Plausibly these are acts which we can at least sometimes 
                                                            
197 This is not to say that success is irrelevant to the normative evaluation of intentions. Plausibly 
success is the constitutive aim of intention, meaning that only a successful intention will meet its 
constitutive aim. 
198 One way to avoid this problem is to tweak the safety condition to allow some error possibilities 
in close worlds (Pritchard, 2005). However, allowing any errors in close worlds means that SSNI 
loses its explanation of the inappropriateness of intending to lose the lottery. 
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appropriately intend to perform, but involve great many close worlds in which we fail, 
simply because these tasks are extremely challenging.199  
 
 
4.3. Belief 
 
The analogous norm to the belief norm is a norm that one believes that one will 
succeed (BNI): 
 
BNI: One must: intend to V, only if one believes that one will succeed in V-ing. 
 
The supporter of BNI can appeal to many of the conversational arguments which 
support KNI; for example, saying ‘do you think that you will succeed in making a soufflé?’ 
can function as a challenge to someone who has just expressed an intention to make a 
soufflé. 
 
An initial problem for BNI comes from cases in which an agent intends to do 
something without believing that she will. These cases are familiar from the debate about 
Cognitivism about Intention (Bratman, 1987, pp. 38–9; Holton, 2008, pp. 28–9). Michael 
might intend to take a book back to the library, but in light of his general absent-
mindedness suspend on the question of whether he will take the book back, forming a 
back-up plan to renew the book online if he cycles past the library. There seems nothing 
inappropriate about his intention to take his book to the library, although it is not 
accompanied by the belief that he will succeed.200 
 
Another issue concerns why we should think that mere belief in success is an 
interesting condition for determining the appropriateness of intentions. BNI makes no 
restrictions on the epistemic status of the belief in success, meaning that it predicts that 
                                                            
199 Since we can know how to bake bread, and know how to perform difficult actions, although our 
success in these activities will be unsafe, these cases provide counterexamples to the claim that 
knowing how to V entails safe success in V-ing. 
200 In order to explain these cases Holton floats the suggestion of a partial belief norm on intention 
(Holton, 2008, pp. 56–8) where the notion of partial belief that p is a doxastic state which takes 
both p and not-p as live possibilities. This yields the following norm: 
 
PBNI: One must: intend to V, only if one partially believes that one will succeed at V-ing 
 184 
unjustified beliefs based on wishful thinking or guesses can render intentions appropriate. 
This seems like a bad prediction. I do not appropriately intend to climb a difficult 
bouldering problem just because I wishfully think that I will climb it. 
 
 
4.4. Justification 
 
We might think that the condition for appropriate intention is having justification 
for believing that one will succeed in one’s plan. This gives us the analogue to a justified 
belief norm for the case of intention (JBNI). (I’ll run with a doxastic justification norm, 
but one could also work with propositional justification): 
 
JBNI: One must: intend to V, only if one has a justified belief that one will succeed 
in V-ing. 
 
JNBI seems attractive – we might think that there is something seriously amiss 
with an intention to do something which is not accompanied by a justified belief that one 
will succeed (Marušić, 2015, Chapter 2). However, the question of how we gain epistemic 
justification for believing that we will succeed in our intentions is a hugely controversial 
one, intersecting in fairly complex ways with the debate about our knowledge of our own 
actions.201 The connections between these two debates means that the predictions of JBNI 
will depend on which account of the justification for believing that one’s intentions will 
succeed one takes up. The available views of this justification vary drastically in their 
predictions (my discussion here follows (Setiya, 2016, pp. 12–3)). On the one hand, there 
are sceptics about practical knowledge, who claim that belief in success is only justified 
when properly based on prior empirical evidence.202  If scepticism turns out to be correct, 
then JBNI is a pretty restrictive norm, having the consequence that intending to perform 
difficult action is inappropriate, because one will not have sufficient prior empirical 
evidence to believe in success. One the other hand, there are permissivists about practical 
knowledge, who claim that merely forming an intention is sufficient to grant justification to 
believe that one will succeed, so long as one knows that this belief will be true and justified 
                                                            
201 See (Anscombe, 1957; Velleman, 1989; Moran, 2004; A. Ford, Hornsby, & Stoutland, 2011) 
202 (Grice, 1972; Langton, 2004; Paul, 2009a). 
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once formed.203  If permissivism is correct, then a majority of intentions will be appropriate 
according to JBNI.  Which view we take of nature of the justification for belief in success 
also determines whether JBNI is a genuine alternative to KNI. As I noted in the 
introduction to this chapter, Setiya suggests something rather close to KNI, on the basis of 
the thought that knowledge-how grants an epistemic entitlement to the beliefs which are 
tied up with intentional action, including the belief that one’s intention will be successful 
(Setiya, 2008, pp. 206–8, 2012, pp. 300–4). On Setiya’s view, having a justified belief that 
one will V requires knowing how to V, meaning that if Setiya’s view is right, then JBNI 
entails KNI and is not an alternative to it. These considerations do not constitute a direct 
criticism, but they do show that the supporter of JBNI needs to make commitments in a 
contentious debate to fill their account out. 
 
 
4.5. Ability 
 
If knowledge-how and ability come apart, one might think that it is ability which is 
the condition on appropriate intention, giving us an ability norm on intention (ANI):204 
 
ANI: One must: intend to V, only if one is able to V. 
 
One problem for ANI concerns how to understand the notion of ability in ANI. In 
ordinary language ‘can’, ‘is able to’, and ‘could’ are extremely context-sensitive (Kratzer, 
1977; Lewis, 1996). This means that if ANI employs the ordinary notion of ability, it 
entails that the appropriateness of intention tracks the contextual features which determine 
the meaning of phrases like ‘is able to’, which seems unlikely. 
 
The supporter of ANI therefore needs to offer an independent and context-
insensitive account of the kind of ability they are interested in. They have a number of 
options here, ranging from reliable ability to mere physical capacity. All of these options 
face problems explaining lottery intentions. The only way that an ability norm can explain 
the inappropriateness of intending to lose the lottery is by opting for an extreme version of 
a reliable ability condition that comes close to a safety condition. But as we noted above in 
                                                            
203 (Harman, 1976, n. 8; Velleman, 1989, nn. 56-64). 
204 This norm has not been defended in the propositional case, but behaves something like an 
objective probability norm. 
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connection with safety conditions, this kind of condition does not provide a plausible norm 
on intentions, because there are lots of ordinary intentions (as well as intentions to perform 
difficult actions) that are appropriate despite not meeting this standard. 
 
 
4.6. Higher-Order Norms 
 
In §1 I argued that the possession of knowledge how is significant for the 
normative status of intention. One way to go along with this idea while resisting KNI is to 
claim that it is our epistemic status regarding our knowledge-how that is the norm on 
intending. One might endorse a higher-order norm, such as a belief that one knows how 
norm (BKNI),205  or a knowledge that one knows how norm (KKNI): 
 
BKNI: One must: intend to V, only if one believes that one knows how to V. 
 
KKNI: One must: intend to V, only if one knows that one knows how to V. 
 
Our epistemic standing with respect to our knowledge-how seems significant to the 
evaluation of intentions. Someone who does knows how to do something but has misleading 
evidence that they do not seems poorly placed to intend, and someone who does not know to 
do something, but has misleading evidence that they do seems well placed to intend. These 
kinds of worries have also arisen in the propositional case, where they appear to support 
the move from a first-order knowledge norm to a second-order norm (Williamson, 2000, 
pp. 258–63).  
 
In the propositional case, there are a family of moves available to the supporter of a 
first order norm to allow them to explain the normative significance of the higher order 
conditions without moving to a higher-order norm. These views endorse Separabilism 
(Boyd, 2015) which is the view that any norm involves two separate dimensions of 
evaluation: one concerning whether the agent fulfilled or violated the norm, and another 
concerning whether the agent was epistemically well placed with respect to whether they 
fulfilled the norm. There are a number of views about the normative significance of one’s 
                                                            
205 (Paul 2009, p. 555) BKNI shares with BNI the problem is that it does not distinguish whether 
the belief is well-supported or not. 
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epistemic position with respect to having fulfilled an epistemic norm: one might appeal to 
the idea of excusable norm violation (Williamson, 2000; Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008; 
Littlejohn, 2009b), the distinction between agent and activity evaluation (Williamson, 
forthcoming; Lasonen-Aarnio, 2014) or the distinction between primary and  secondary 
propriety (DeRose, 2002). Endorsing any of these Separabilist views allows the supporter 
of KNI to claim that in cases of misleading higher-order evidence, these two dimensions of 
evaluation of intentions come apart. One might think that in a case where an agent 
intended to do something innocently thinking that they did know how to do it, they 
violated the knowledge-how norm, but did so excusably, with secondary propriety, or 
whilst exercising a good cognitive habit. 
 
With Separabilism on the table the supporter of KNI can explain the importance of 
second-order evidence without endorsing a second-order norm. Given that KNI and 
KKNI are on par with respect to the relevance of higher-order evidence, I think that we 
ought to prefer the simpler norm – KNI – on the grounds that it is more likely to be the 
norm governing our ordinary interactions of intentions. It is also worth pointing out that 
endorsing KKNI doesn’t release us from the need to appeal to the distinction between 
norm violation and excusable norm violation: just as one can have misleading evidence that 
one knows-how, one can also have misleading evidence that one knows that one knows 
how.206 
  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have explored the normative role of knowledge-how in the mental 
economy, arguing that knowledge-how is the norm of intention. I have developed a strong 
cumulative case for this norm based on extensions of argument for other knowledge-
norms, and shown that this norm can explain some tricky problem cases if it is formulated 
within a sufficiently rich framework for understanding intentions. Although the 
knowledge-how norm is related to other norms of practical reasoning, and the knowledge-
that norm of action, I have argued that it cannot be reduced to any of these norms. Finally, 
I have also argued that the alternatives to a knowledge-how norm are unattractive: either 
                                                            
206 Another worry is that higher-order knowledge of competence is rare. See (Kruger & Dunning 
1999). 
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facing serious problems, or requiring serious philosophical development to count as a 
genuine alternative to the knowledge-norm. Whereas philosophers have often stressed the 
role of knowledge-how in guiding intentional action,207  I have tried to show that 
knowledge-how has an important role to play in practical reasoning. Just as according to 
the knowledge norm of action, we must know the premises of our practical reasoning, 
according to the knowledge-how norm of intention, we must know how to enact the 
conclusions of practical reasoning.208  
 
 In closing I want to tie up two loose ends. 
 
 One might wonder how our discussion of epistemic norms bears on the debate 
between Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism. If we cannot reduce epistemic norms 
relating to knowledge-how to norms relating to knowledge-that, or if the standard norms 
relating to knowledge-that cannot be extended to the case of knowledge-how, it might 
seem like a strike against Intellectualism (this would be an example of what (Fantl, 2008) 
calls a normative argument against Intellectualism). I take this kind of argument to be an 
instance of the kind of problematic divergence argument that we considered in chapter 2 
§3 in connection with the idea that knowledge-how does not require justification. In 
general, it is open to Intellectualists to think that knowledge-how and knowledge-that are 
both species of propositional knowledge, but that they are two species of propositional 
knowledge with different epistemic properties.  
 
 We ended chapter 4 with two pictures of the function of KNOWS-HOW: Pooling 
Skills, which connected knowledge-how with teaching, and predicted KNT, and Mutual 
Reliance, which connected knowledge-how with competence, and predicted KNI. I 
suggested that our concept of knowledge-how lies somewhere between these two 
functions, leading to inconsistencies in the extension of knowledge-how. The question was 
whether to revise our concept of knowledge-how toward Pooling Skills, or toward Mutual 
Reliance. COACH and TWISTER demonstrate that some important intensional intuitions 
about knowledge-how are in tension with KNT. By contrast, KNI fits fairly well with our 
everyday concept of knowledge-how. The revisions to the simple norm KNI to the more 
                                                            
207 (Kumar, 2011; Stanley, 2011b; Cath, 2015) 
208 This might not be the only role for knowledge-how in practical reasoning. One might think that 
knowing how to V is a norm on treating V-ing as an option in practical reasoning. On the norms 
for options, see (Hedden, 2012, 2015). 
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complex norm KNI-PP only required giving a more fine-grained framework for 
understanding intentions. In the interests of revising toward the minimally revisionary 
account of knowledge-how, we ought to favour Mutual Reliance, and use judgements about 
knowing how to teach as a standard on teachers. The connection between this view of 
KNOWS-HOW and the Planning theory also suggests that we have deep practical 
interests which favour working with a concept to evaluate competence. 
 
 
 190 
Part 3: Bringing Linguistic and Philosophical 
Considerations Together 
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Chapter 7: Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, we will connect up the linguistic and philosophical considerations 
from previous chapters to set out a positive account of the nature of knowledge-how. This 
account is a compromise position, combining the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how 
is a relation to a question with the Anti-Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind 
of ability, yielding what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view. This view claims that 
knowledge-how is a relation to a question, making it semantically implementable within 
the standard linguistic treatments, but it also claims that knowledge-how involves a certain 
kind of abilitative relation, making it able to explain the distinctive practicality of 
knowledge-how. This account also has the virtue of providing a unifying explanation of the 
relation between knowledge-how, the ability to act, and propositional knowledge, and 
identifies knowledge-how with a state that is a good candidate for the norm on intending. 
 
 The plan of action is as follows. In §1, I set up a picture of the dialectic between 
Intellectualists and Anti-Intellectualists as centring on the tension between the semantic 
implementability constraint and the idea that knowledge-how is a distinctively practical 
kind of knowledge. In §2, I distinguish between object and relation claims, offering a 
richer picture of the logical space of this debate. In §3 I develop the Interrogative Capacity 
view, identifying knowledge-how with an ability to answer a question on the fly. In §4, I 
argue that this account does well on the desiderata for an account of knowledge-how, and 
in §5 I compare this view to Dickie’s and Stanley and Williamson’s views of skill. 
 
 
1. Linguistics and Practicality 
 
 The previous chapters have established a number of conditions on an adequate 
account of knowledge-how. Chapter 1 argued for a (defeasible) semantic implementability 
constraint on accounts of knowledge-how, and chapters 1 and 2 together provided us with 
a pretty solid argument for thinking that the how-to complement in ‘knows how’ 
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ascriptions functions as an interrogative phrase denoting a question. This linguistic 
evidence together with the semantic implementability constraint appeared to give the 
Intellectualist the upper hand. However, chapter 3 argued that Intellectualists face a 
problem in picking out a species of knowledge that is plausibly sufficient for knowledge-
how. I noted two aspects of this sufficiency problem: the Practicality problem, and the 
Generality problem. In that chapter we focused on the Generality problem, but the 
practicality problem is just as serious an issue for Intellectualists. In this section, I want to 
sketch out a picture of the dialectic between Intellectualists and Anti-Intellectualists as 
centred on the need to give an account of knowledge-how that both resolves the 
practicality problem, and is semantically implementable. 
 
As noted above, when we talk about knowing-how, we have in mind a species of 
knowledge with a distinctively practical set of properties, and not just any knowledge 
which we pick out with the words ‘knows’ and ‘how’.209 Although there is no consensus 
about these properties, there are a number of candidate features for cashing out the 
practicality of knowledge-how: 
 
- Directness: knowing-how is exercised directly in intentional action, not via some 
intermediate act of mental contemplation (Ryle, 2009b, pp. 17–20; Stanley, 2011b, 
Chapter 1); 
- Necessity: knowledge-how is in some sense a necessary condition for intentional 
action (Anscombe, 1957, p. 89; Gibbons, 2001, pp. 597–8; Stanley & Williamson, 
2001, pp. 442–3; Stanley, 2011b, pp. 185–90; Hornsby, 2016, pp. 8–10);210 
- Flexibility: knowing-how involves an ability to react flexibly to a wide range of 
possible situations (Ryle, 1976; Hornsby, 2011, pp. 89–95; Stanley, 2011b, pp. 181–
5; Wiggins, 2012; Fridland, 2013). 
 
The fact that knowledge-how has these practical properties poses a challenge for 
Intellectualists. Other types of propositional knowledge do not seem to be practical in the 
way that knowledge-how is, which means that the burden of proof is on Intellectualists to 
show that a propositional theory can explain the practicality of knowledge-how. For 
                                                            
209 But see (Braun, 2011) for dissent. 
210 I am hesitant about endorsing the strict version of this claim (NEC-A) for reasons detailed 
above (see chapter 5 §3.3). However, I do think that it is plausible that in central cases intentional 
action of V-ing will involve knowledge how to V. 
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example, if there is some metaphysical connection between knowledge-how and 
intentional action, then an Intellectualist ought to be able to explain why the relevant kind 
of propositional knowledge has this special connection with intentional action (Setiya, 
2012, pp. 290–3).211 Stanley and Williamson try to meet this challenge by claiming that 
knowledge-how involves a distinctively practical first-person mode of presentation, relying 
on the thought that first-person thought in general has a distinctive connection with action 
(Stanley & Williamson, 2001, pp. 429–30; Stanley, 2011b, pp. 109–10, 182–3). Critics of 
Intellectualism have contended that the notion of a practical way of thinking is at best 
obscure, challenging its ability to explain the practicality of knowledge-how (Glick, 2015), 
Intellectualists have responded by developing accounts of the nature of practical ways of 
thinking (Pavese, 2015b) and the debate about the legitimacy of appealing practical modes 
of presentation is on-going.212  
 
We can see the debate between Intellectualists and Anti-Intellectualists as centring 
on the Semantic Implementability Constraint and the Practicality Problem. This picture is 
an oversimplification in a few ways — in particular it focuses on Abilityist versions of 
Anti-Intellectualism213 — but it does represent an important thread in the debate about the 
nature of knowledge-how. 
 
Intellectualists start with the linguistic evidence. Observing that an account of 
knowledge-how ought to be semantically implementable, they read off an account of 
knowledge-how from the standard semantics for the ‘knows+wh’ construction given by the 
Answer theory of knowledge-wh, yielding an account on which knowledge-how is a 
species of propositional knowledge. By contrast, Anti-Intellectualists take the practical 
features of knowledge-how as their starting point, claiming that in order to explain the 
practicality of knowledge-how, one needs to identify knowledge how to do something with 
some kind of ability to do that thing. Since capacities to act intrinsically have a tight 
                                                            
211 A possible exception is directness. Stanley stresses that on his conception of propositional 
knowledge, all knowledge is exercised directly in action (Stanley, 2011b, Chapter 1; Stalnaker, 
2012). 
212 Pavese’s account of knowledge-how is in my view the Intellectualist account best able to explain 
the practicality of knowledge-how. However, her account is complex, and reasons of space prevent 
me from giving it proper consideration. That said I take it that (Pavese, 2015b) would be the first 
place to go for an Intellectualist challenger to the Interrogative Capacity view. 
213 Does Bengson and Moffett’s view (2011a) do any better than Abilityism in meeting these 
desiderata? Their notion of an action-guiding conception holds out hope to explain the practicality 
of knowledge-how, but as I argued in chapter 2 their account is not semantically implementable. 
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relationship to action, the hypothesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability is well placed 
to explain the distinctive practicality of knowledge-how.214  
 
Each kind of account has a positive feature: Intellectualism is semantically 
implementable, and Anti-Intellectualism can explain the practicality of knowledge-how. 
However, each account has trouble with the evidence that motivated the other account. 
Because Intellectualists identify knowledge-how with garden variety knowledge-that, they 
have trouble explaining the practicality of knowledge-how. And, because Anti-
Intellectualists identifies knowing how with relation to an activity rather than a question, 
their view is not semantically implementable. This overview has been extremely brief, and 
I haven’t argued that neither kind of view is able to resolve the challenge facing their view. 
However the fact that the established views face symmetric challenges suggests that we 
might make progress by looking for a compromise between Intellectualism and Anti-
Intellectualism. 
 
 
2. Objects and Relations 
 
In thinking about knowledge we need to carefully distinguish claims about the 
object (or relatum) of knowledge from claims about the nature of the knowledge relation. 
Claims about what knowledge-how is knowledge of are often confused with claims about 
what kind of relation is involved in knowing how. Reflecting on this distinction helps us to 
clarify the disagreement between Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism, and opens up 
space for a compromise between these two positions.  
 
Both Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism can be understood as claims about 
either the object of knowledge-how, or about the knowledge-how relation. Glick points out 
that the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge 
can be understood in two ways (2011, sec. 4) (See chapter 1 §4.2.5.): 
 
                                                            
214 Consider the ability to swim: this ability is exercised directly in swimming, is a necessary 
condition for intentionally swimming, and can manifest in a wide range of different kinds of 
swimming. 
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Weak Intellectualism: Know-how is knowledge which has a proposition as a 
relatum.  
Strong Intellectualism: Know-how is knowledge which both has a proposition as a 
relatum, and involves the theoretical knowledge relation.  
Weak Intellectualism is just the claim that the object of knowledge-how is 
propositional. Strong Intellectualism encompasses both the claim that the object of 
knowledge-how is propositional, and the claim that the relation involved is the same 
theoretical knowledge relation which is found in knowing that p (i.e. JTB plus Gettier 
proofing). Although Strong Intellectualism entails Weak Intellectualism, the converse 
entailment does not hold (Glick, 2011, pp. 412–5). Weak Intellectualism is compatible with 
views that claim that the knowledge-how relation is something other than theoretical 
knowledge. For example, one might think that knowledge-how has as its object the set of 
propositions which answer the question how to V? but think that it is a distinctively practical 
knowledge relation to those propositions. The distinction between Weak and Strong 
Intellectualism is crucial for understanding the significance of the linguistic evidence. In 
chapter 1 I argued — following (Glick, 2011) — that the linguistic evidence only provides 
evidence for the claim that knowledge-how is a relation to a question, and not for the claim 
that the semantic value of ‘knows’ picks out only the theoretical knowledge-relation, 
meaning that it supports Weak Intellectualism, and not Strong Intellectualism.  
Turning to Anti-Intellectualism, the claim that knowledge-how is not a species of 
theoretical knowledge can also be understood in two ways:  
Weak Anti-Intellectualism: know-how involves a relation other than theoretical 
knowledge. 
Strong Anti-Intellectualism: know-how involves a relation other than theoretical 
knowledge, and has a non-propositional relatum. 
Weak Anti-Intellectualism is the claim that the knowledge-how relation is 
something other than theoretical knowledge. Strong Anti-Intellectualism endorses both the 
claim that the knowledge-how relation is a non-theoretical one, and the claim that 
knowledge-how is a relation to something other than a proposition. Strong Anti-
Intellectualism entails Weak Anti-Intellectualism, but Weak Anti-Intellectualism does not 
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entail Strong Anti-Intellectualism. Weak Anti-Intellectualism is compatible with the claim 
that the object of knowledge-how is a proposition or a set of propositions, so long as the 
relation is something other than theoretical knowledge.  
Just as the linguistic evidence supports only Weak Intellectualism, the idea that 
knowledge-how is a distinctively practical kind of knowledge supports only Weak Anti-
Intellectualism. The argument I sketched above rested on the idea that one can explain the 
practicality of knowledge-how by identifying it with a kind of ability, since abilities have 
the right kind of practical properties to explain the practicality of knowledge-how. At this 
point it is indubitably tempting to endorse the Abilityist view that knowing how to V is just 
the ability to V, which is a Strongly Anti-Intellectualist view because an activity is a non-
propositional item. However, the view that knowledge-how is ability is compatible with 
various views about what knowledge how is an ability to do. For example, one might think 
the Craigian considerations in favour of Pooling Skills support the idea that knowing how to 
V is the ability to teach others to V, which we have seen is quite some distance from being 
able to V. In fact, the majority of Anti-Intellectualists steer clear of identifying knowledge 
how with the plain ability to act. Setiya argues that knowledge-how is the ability to enact 
intentions to V (Setiya, 2008, 2012), and Wiggins suggests that knowing how is a sui 
generis intellectual capacity relating to V-ing (Wiggins, 2012). Even Ryle stops short of the 
ability theory, claiming that knowing how to do something is the ability to apply criteria to 
action, or think what one is doing (see chapter 1 §2).  Because there are various views 
about what kind of ability knowing-how might be and what it is an ability to do, the 
argument from practicality sketched above only establishes the Weak Anti-Intellectualist 
claim that the knowledge-how relation is something other than theoretical knowledge.  
We’ve distinguished two kinds of disagreement about the nature of knowledge-
how: disagreement about whether the object of knowledge-how is propositional or non-
propositional, and disagreement about whether the knowledge-how relation is theoretical 
knowledge or something else. Putting these disagreements together gives us the following 
picture of the logical space of this debate: 
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  Object  
  
Propositional (i.e. that 
w is a way in which one 
can V)  
Non-Propositional (i.e. 
Activity, way of acting, 
predicate) 
Relation Theoretical knowledge (i.e. JTB+) Strong Intellectualism  — 
 
Something other than 
theoretical knowledge 
(i.e. practical 
knowledge, 
understanding, ability) 
Weak Intellectualism; 
Weak Anti-
Intellectualism. 
Strong Anti-
Intellectualism. 
 
Table 1: Logical space in the knowledge-how debate. 
 
 Strong Intellectualism is associated with the Propositionalist theories held by Stanley 
and Williamson (2001), and Stanley (2011b). Strong Anti-Intellectualism encompasses 
Abilityism, Bengson and Moffett’s Objectualism, (which appeals to a non-theoretical relation 
and a non-propositional object) (2011a), and Actism (which claims that knowledge-how is 
a knowledge relation to an activity) (Carr, 1979, 1981; Hornsby, 2011; Wiggins, 2012). 
There are a number of views which might occupy the compromise position at the bottom 
left: the view that knowledge-how is a practical knowledge relation to a proposition (Glick, 
2011; Cath, 2015), and the view that knowledge-how is a seeming relation to a proposition 
(Cath 2011). It is an interesting question whether there are any views which might take 
occupy the top right position. I think that there are two which might: Brogaard’s view that 
knowledge-how is a JTB-type relation to a predicate (Brogaard, 2011), and the view that 
knowledge-how is a theoretical knowledge relation to a way of acting. 
 
Let’s relate this picture of the logical space to the impasses between the linguistic 
evidence and the practicality of knowledge-how. The argument from linguistics concerned 
the object of knowledge-how, pushing us from the right column to the left column. The 
argument from practicality concerned the knowledge-how relation, suggesting that 
knowledge-how involves some kind of ability pushing us from the top row to down the 
bottom, and suggesting that the relation was some kind of abilitative one. Putting the two 
arguments together suggests that knowledge-how involves an abilitative relation to the set 
of propositions which answer a question of the form ‘how to V?’.  
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What would a view that claimed that knowledge-how is an abilitative relation to a 
question look like? There are several ways to be related to a proposition or question by an 
ability. For example one might be able to remember that Wayne came for dinner last week, 
or able to ask in German where the toilet is. These kinds of abilities are not plausibly 
identified with knowledge-how. However, there is an abilitative relation that is a good 
candidate for being identified with knowledge-how: the able-to-answer relation. Let’s call 
the view that identifies knowledge-how with an ability-to-answer relation to a question the 
Interrogative Capacity view of knowledge-how.215According to this kind of account knowing 
how to V is standing in the able-to-answer relation to the question ‘how to V?’.216 
 
It is worth getting clear on how to understand the notion of an ability to answer a 
question. I am interested in the sense of ‘answering’ where it is a success term, which means 
that the kinds of answers we are interested in are correct answers to the question. 
Additionally, we are not interested in the ‘quiz show’ notion of answering (Radford, 1966, 
pp. 2–3), where luckily producing a correct answer counts as answering. Rather we are 
interested in an ability to answer a question in the epistemically right way. Rather than 
attempting to give an account of ‘in the right way’, I will rely on the idea of an ability to 
know answers, with the thought being that knowing an answer will entail having got to the 
correct answer in the epistemically right (i.e. non-Gettiered, non-lucky) way.217 Being able 
to answer is also not to be understood as being able to engage in the speech act of 
answering.218 Rather, the idea is that one has an ability to be in a certain mental state: the 
state of knowing. Although in the majority of cases an ability to know will consist in an 
ability to gain new pieces of knowledge, I want to leave open the possibility that an ability 
to know might involve repeated exercise of one piece of propositional knowledge. I might 
be able to answer the question what are the 4th roots of 16? in virtue of being able to follow an 
algorithm for calculating nth roots. However, I might be also able to answer the question 
what is 2+2? simply in virtue of having standing knowledge that 2+2=4. To capture this idea, 
                                                            
215 One way to understand this view is that it claims that knowledge-how is like wondering, in that 
it is primarily a relation to a question, rather than to the propositions that answer that question. On 
relations to questions, see (Friedman, 2013). 
216 For some suggestive comments along these lines, see (Hornsby, 2005, p. 117; Setiya, 2009, pp. 
135–6, 2012, p. 296). 
217 On abilities to know, see (Kelp, forthcoming.; Millar, 2009; Miracchi, 2015). 
218 Hyman criticises White’s account of knowledge for equating knowledge-that with the ability to  
give an answer in language (Hyman, 2015, pp. 165–6). This criticism is somewhat wide of the 
mark, since White claims that one can exercise the ability to answer in question in acts other than 
saying, such as showing (1982, p. 29), and distinguishing (1982, p. 120). 
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we can understand an ability to know to be an ability to activate knowledge (Williamson, 
2013, pp. 5–10), where one activates knowledge just in case one either learns a 
proposition, or exercises standing knowledge of that proposition. 
 
 
3. The Interrogative Capacity View 
 
 In the previous section I suggested that we might take knowledge-how to be an 
ability to activate knowledge of answers to the question ‘how to V?’. However, knowledge-
how is not identical with just any kind of ability to answer a how-to question. Someone 
who has read a book on skiing is in a sense able to answer the question of how to ski, but 
we don’t want to say that they thereby know how to ski. Just as the simple ability account 
faced the problem of isolating a kind of ability to V that is plausibly identified with 
knowledge-how, this account faces the problem of isolating a kind of ability to answer a 
question that is plausibly identified with knowledge-how. Whereas the simple ability 
theory only had to deal with the issue of what kind of situations one needs to succeed in in 
order to have the relevant kind of ability, the interrogative capacity view needs to address 
three questions: 
 
i. What kinds of question does one need to be able to answer? 
ii. What kinds of situations does one need to be able to generate those answers in? 
iii. What kind of answering process is involved? 
 
 In this section, I address this challenge by isolating a kind of interrogative capacity 
that is plausibly identified with knowledge-how, which I will call the ability to answer a 
question on the fly. 
 
 First, let’s consider the kinds of questions which are involved knowing how to do 
something. Following Stanley and Williamson, we will take these to be how-to questions, 
like how to swim?. Although these questions seem simple, we saw in chapter 3 that there are 
many propositions which can answer a question like how to swim?, ranging from coarse-
grained propositions like one can swim by splashing about in the water to fine-grained 
propositions which specify an exact technique for swimming in a particular situations, 
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leading to a generality problem for any theory which appealed to questions concerning 
which kinds of answers are the relevant ones. In order to respect the connection between 
knowledge-how and a capacity to react to the particular situation, and resolve the 
generality problem, I will take an ability to generate answers on the fly to be an ability to 
activate knowledge of arbitrarily fine-grained answers to a how-to question, which specify 
a method that is sensitive to a token practical situation. In some cases, these fine-grained 
questions will have many different answers: consider the fine-grained answers to the 
question how to dress fashionably?. However, I want to remain open to the possibility that 
there are some fine-grained questions which receive very similar or even identical answers 
in different situations: consider the fine-grained answers to the question how can one put one’s 
trousers on?.  
 
 Secondly, we need to get clear on what kinds of situations the ability relates to. There 
are many different kinds of situations in which one might be able to generate practical 
answers. For example, a skiing teacher may be able to generate answers to the question of 
how to perform various moves in the classroom, but not out on the slopes. Since 
knowledge-how is a kind of practical knowledge, I will take an ability to answer on the fly 
to involve the ability to activate answers in a contextually supplied set of practical 
situations. I introduce the element of context-sensitivity to explain the shiftiness of knows-
how ascriptions discussed in chapter 3 §3.3, and chapter 6 §2.2. Hawley points out that the 
truth of knows-how ascriptions seems to be sensitive to conversationally salient tasks 
(Hawley, 2003, p. 22). For example, in a US context in which only driving an automatic 
car is salient then someone who only knows how to drive an automatic car will count as 
knowing how to drive, whereas in a UK context in which both driving a manual and 
driving an automatic are salient, then only people who know how to drive both types of 
car will count as knowing how to drive. On the account under consideration this shiftiness 
is to be traced back to the salient set of practical situations, with the thought being that in 
a US context, the set of salient practical situations is somewhat narrower than in the UK 
context.  
 
 Appealing to context-sensitivity allows the Interrogative Capacity view to explain 
why being in a position to answer how-to questions is sometimes not sufficient for 
knowledge-how. Someone who is good at figuring things out might be in a position to 
work out how to fix a dishwasher just by exercising their general engineering know-how. 
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Do they know how to fix a dishwasher? Having an element of context-sensitivity in the 
picture allows us to say: it depends. If the salient set of practical situations include having 
sufficient time to work it out from first principles, then someone who only has general 
engineering know-how will count as knowing how to fix a dishwasher, but if the salient set 
of situations is time-restricted, then such a person will not count as knowing how. 
Although this can sound a little weird, I think that this shiftiness matches the way that we 
ordinarily use ‘knows how’ ascriptions (for examples, see (Hawley, 2003, p. 26)). 
 
 Finally, let’s consider the way in which questions are answered. There are various 
ways in which one can answer a question: by looking it up on the Internet, by engaging in 
deliberation, or by asking someone else. I want to pick out an action-oriented process of 
activating knowledge. In the cases where knowing how involves gaining new knowledge, I 
think that one acquires this knowledge by doing. Consider the way in which one might 
solve a difficult maths problem. Although it might be possible in some cases to just ‘see’ 
what the method for solving a problem is, the more usual way is to work how to solve it 
out as one goes along. Depending on the problem, one might either split it into sub-
problems and work on them in turn, or one might just try out different techniques and see 
what sticks. I suggest that we should think of both seeing the solution, and working it out as one 
goes along as involving the exercise of an ability to answer a question. In the former case, 
one engages in a mental action in order to generate an answer to the question of how to 
solve the question, and then exercises that knowledge in solving the problem. In the latter, 
one answers the question by getting going on solving various parts of the puzzle in turn, 
meaning that one may not have knowledge of how to solve the puzzle until one has almost 
solved the puzzle.219 In cases of working it out as one goes along it is difficult to distinguish 
the processes of doing and working out, and it may be more accurate to think of the two as 
aspects of the same process. The kind of answering process I have in mind is one Ryle has 
in mind when he says that a skilled mountaineer walking in difficult conditions “is 
concomitantly walking and teaching himself how to walk,” (Ryle, 2009b, p. 30). Such an 
agent is not just applying pre-learned techniques to a situation they have dealt with before, 
in part they are engaged in a process of self-teaching (Ryle, 1971, 2009a). I take it that this 
kind of answering process is a familiar one: consider the way in which one might exercise 
one’s knowledge of how to fix a bike by engaging in a mixture of diagnosis, trial and error, 
                                                            
219 For in-depth discussion of this kind of action-based problem solving in motorcycle maintenance, 
see (Crawford, 2010). 
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and experimentation. In the cases where knowledge-how involves activating knowledge by 
exercising standing knowledge, the idea that one answers the question by acting plays out 
slightly differently. Rather than learning by doing, the idea will be that one activates 
knowledge of the answers to the question by exercising standing knowledge of 
propositions in action. 
 
 Putting these three ideas together, we have the idea that knowing-how involves an 
ability to activate fine-grained propositional knowledge in practical situations, where one 
activates this knowledge by doing the relevant kind of activity.  
 
 The ability to generate answers on the fly comes apart from the ability to express those 
answers and communicate them to others. There are a number of reasons why someone 
who has the ability to answer a question on the fly might not be able to articulate it in 
explicit linguistic terms. For one thing, the agent may not be in the right kind of practical 
situation to activate knowledge of an answer to the question. A climber who has learnt to 
scale a difficult wall might be unable to activate knowledge of how to climb the wall 
without having the holds in front of her as a prompt. Even in the relevant kind of practical 
situation, an agent may only be able to express their knowledge in indexical terms (Stanley 
& Williamson, 2001, pp. 428–9). I might only be able to express and communicate my 
knowledge of how to tie a Cat’s paw knot by making one and saying ‘this is the way to tie 
it’. I want to take seriously the idea that using this kind of demonstrative can express 
knowledge of a method for making the knot, but I want to treat it in a rather different way 
to Stanley and Williamson. Stanley and Williamson take this kind of demonstrative to pick 
out a general method involving a method-type (2001, n. 29). On the Interrogative 
Capacity view, since answers are extremely fine-grained propositions, we can say that the 
way picked out is a method-token. This is good feature of this view because whereas it is it 
is difficult to see how to secure reference to a method-type by pointing at a token which 
instantiates many different types (see chapter 3 §3.4.), securing reference to a method-
token via a demonstrative is unproblematic. Even allowing that one can express 
knowledge-how via demonstratives, there might be cases in which an agent who is able to 
generate answers but not to express those answers. It is hard to point at yourself – or speak 
– while you are swimming.  
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With these clarifications in place, we can formulate the Interrogative Capacity view 
of knowledge-how: 
 
Interrogative Capacity View:  
S knows how to V if and only if for some contextually relevant class of practical 
situations {F1, F2 …} S has the capacity to activate fine-grained answers to the 
question how to V in Fn? in the process of acting.  
 
 I will call this view the Interrogative Capacity view, but strictly speaking it is only 
one version of the Interrogative Capacity view: there might be other views which claim 
that knowledge-how is a different kind of capacity to answer a question. On the 
framework above, this view is both Weakly Intellectualist — because it claims that 
knowledge-how is a relation to the set of propositions which answer the question ‘how to 
V?’ — and Weakly Anti-Intellectualist — because it claims that the knowledge-how 
relation is an abilitative one, rather than the theoretical knowledge relation.  
 
 The central cases for the Interrogative Capacity view will be ones where knowledge-
how is constituted by the capacity to generate an open-ended and complex body of 
propositions. However, this account is also able to deal with cases in which the answers to 
a how-to question are homogeneous, meaning that one can have the ability to activate 
knowledge of the answer to a question in virtue of having standing knowledge of the 
answer. For example, one might think that the answers to the question of how to open a 
particular safe are uniform, meaning that all it takes to have a capacity to answer the 
question how to open the safe it is the ability to enact standing knowledge of a proposition 
about what the code is.220  In this case the answer is uniform, and the ability is grounded in 
standing knowledge. There may also be cases in which one answers a uniform question by 
re-learning the same proposition again and again in action, or cases in which one answers a 
complex question by exercising a larger body of standing knowledge. If in some cases an 
Interrogative Capacity can be grounded in standing knowledge, then something like 
Stanley and Williamson’s account (minus practical modes of presentation) comes out as a 
special case of the interrogative capacity view, although crucially this account requires not 
just propositional knowledge, but the ability to activate that knowledge in action. My 
                                                            
220 (Lewis, 1999; Snowdon, 2004, pp. 9, 12; Glick, 2011, p. 427). 
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suspicion is that the cases in which knowledge-how is constituted by standing knowledge 
will primarily be cases of basic, or habitual action, meaning that most of the interesting 
cases – such as knowing how to swim, play an instrument, or engage in conversation – will 
involve substantial elements of acquiring new knowledge on the fly. 
 
 Whereas the Intellectualist account built in a knowledge-action connection via the 
idea of first-person thought, the Interrogative Capacity view captures this connection via a 
distinctive kind of capacity to answer questions in acting. This might lead to the worry that 
I haven’t said enough about Interrogative Capacities to avoid the charge of mysteriousness 
which is often levelled at the appeal to practical modes of presentation (Glick, 2015). It is 
true that there is a great deal more which ought to be said about how it is that we come to 
have various putative ability to answer questions on the fly. However, I don’t think that 
there is anything very mysterious about the idea of an ability to answer a question on the 
fly. All that we require to get this account going are fine-grained questions, a pinch of 
context-sensitivity, and a kind of action-based problem solving which ought to be familiar 
to anyone who’s tried to fix a bike. The difficult questions don’t concern the nature of 
interrogative capacity, but rather the question of what grounds them. I am tempted to be 
disjunctivist about the grounds of knowledge-how (Bengson & Moffett, 2011a, n. 5), 
allowing that this kind of capacity can be grounded in a mix of mental conditions, 
including propositional knowledge, general planning ability, and various domain-specific 
competences.  
 
 
4. Benefits of the Interrogative Capacity View 
 
 The Interrogative Capacity view has four key philosophical payoffs. First, this view 
explains the meaning of habitual knowledge-how ascriptions. Secondly, it resolves the 
tension between semantic theory and the practicality of knowledge-how. Thirdly, this view 
elucidates the relationship between knowledge-how, propositional knowledge, and the 
ability to do. Finally, this account is in a good position to explain why it is that knowledge-
how is the norm on intending.  
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Habitual sentences – like ‘Jane runs’ – express a generalisation about an agent 
fulfilling a certain verb across a range of situations. This kind of sentence is to be 
distinguished from a non-habitual sentence like ‘Jane is running’ which makes a singular 
claim about Jane being engaged in running right now. Typical knowledge-how ascriptions 
are not habituals. Consider: 
 
(1) Bilal knows how to spell ‘DOG’. 
 
This sentence makes the singular claim that Bilal has standing knowledge of the 
answer to the question ‘how does one spell “DOG”?’. However, there are some 
knowledge-how ascriptions which are plausibly habituals (Pavese, 2013, n. 59, 2016b, pp. 
656–7; Stanley & Williamson, 2016). Consider:  
 
(2) Elsa knows how to calm people down. 
 
 Sentence (2) has a reading which says that in situations in which someone needs to 
be calmed down, Elsa knows how to calm the relevant person down. Rather than ascribing 
a single piece of standing knowledge with a general content, this reading makes a 
generalisation about Elsa’s possession of different pieces of situation-specific knowledge in 
different situations.221 What might make this generalisation true? Well, it might be that 
Elsa has some clever way to acquire knowledge of how to calm people down (maybe she 
has an app). However, the simplest hypothesis is that the sentence is made true by Elsa’s 
ability to generate situation-specific knowledge in the necessary situation. If this is right, 
then the sentence is made true not by the agent’s standing knowledge of answers to the 
questions but by her ability to answer the question.  
 
 We should be careful not to overstate the significance of this linguistic evidence as 
support for the Interrogative Capacity view. The slipperiness of the habitual reading 
makes it difficult to tell how many ‘knows how’ ascriptions have this reading, but my sense 
                                                            
221 One can find a similar reading in ascriptions with a quantifier in the complement. Consider: 
 
 (1) Jonah knows how to please everyone. 
 
Although this sentence has a singular reading (Jonah knows one method for pleasing everyone), it 
also has a generalising reading (for every person, Jonah knows a method for pleasing that person), 
which plausibly might be made true by an ability to generate knowledge of how to please people. 
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is that they are at best a somewhat limited class. In fact, not even all habitual ‘know how’ 
ascriptions pick out the relevant kind of ability to answer a question on the fly, because a 
generalisation could be made true by other features of an agent besides the on the fly 
abilities, such as having an app (Pavese, 2016b, p. 644).  
 
One way to semantically implement the Interrogative Capacity would be to agree 
with Stanley and Williamson’s semantics for ‘knows how’ ascriptions and posit a GEN 
operator scoping over ‘knows’ for all ‘knows how’ ascriptions. This view is implausible, 
because the majority of ‘knows how’ ascriptions appear to not have a habitual reading. My 
preferred semantic implementation for the Interrogative Capacity view would be to put it 
as a claim about the semantics of the ‘knows’ relation, claiming that ‘knows’ can in some 
cases pick out a certain kind of able-to-answer relation. Although this view does posit a 
somewhat revisionary semantics for ‘knows’, it does not rely on the linguistically 
implausible claim that all ‘knows how’ ascriptions involve a habitual reading.222 
 
In the first section, I argued that an account of knowledge-how ought to respect 
both the standard propositional semantics for knowledge-how ascriptions, and the 
intuition that knowledge-how is a distinctively practical kind of knowledge. The 
Interrogative Capacity view meets both criteria.  
 
This view takes knowledge-how to be a relation to a question — the question how to 
V? — and understands that question as being identical to a set of possible answers. So, this 
view is compatible with the standard linguistic treatments for Interrogative complements. 
Where this account diverges from Stanley and Williamson’s linguistic argument for 
Intellectualism is in the application of the Answer theory to knowledge-how. Whereas 
Stanley and Williamson claim that knowledge-how involves the standing knowledge 
relation to one answer to a how-to question, the Interrogative Capacity view claims that 
knowledge how is an abilitative relation to many true answers to a how-to question. It is 
true that this view might involve positing a somewhat disjunctive semantic value for 
‘knows’, but philosophical accounts of knowledge are already in the game of giving 
philosophically-motivated semantics for ‘knows’, meaning that there is nothing suspicious 
about the Interrogative Capacity view making this move. 
                                                            
222 This position might be thought to be in tension with uniformity arguments for Intellectualism, 
however, in chapter 1 §4.1. I argued that we shouldn’t take these arguments too seriously. 
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The Interrogative Capacity view is also able to vindicate the intuition that 
knowledge-how is a distinctively practical kind of knowledge. In §1 I split this idea into 
three parts: directness, necessity, and flexibility. Let’s take these ideas in turn. 
 
 The idea that knowledge-how is exercised directly in action is explained by the fact 
that answering a question on the fly involves activating knowledge by engaging in the 
relevant activity. One of the distinctive features of answering a question on the fly is that 
the process of doing and the process of answering are intertwined. On this view, if I know 
how to dance, then I can exercise the capacity to activate knowledge of the answers to the 
question of how to dance directly in dancing. Since this view posits no intermediary 
between knowledge-how and action, it seems well placed to explain the idea that 
knowledge-how is exercised directly in action. 
 
The interrogative capacity view also explains the connection between knowledge-
how and intentional action. If we think about doing something intentionally as involving 
answering a practical how to question, then it would be natural to think that just as the 
standard case of acting involves the agent having some kind of fairly robust ability to act, 
the standard case of answering a question involves the agent having some kind of fairly 
robust ability to answer that question.223 There might be tricky cases in which someone 
answers a question by luck without possessing ability, but this just flags up the issue that it 
is unclear whether the connection between knowledge-how and intentional action is strict 
necessity or something weaker. 
 
We can also explain the flexibility of knowledge-how by appealing to the fact that 
an interrogative capacity can produce different propositional knowledge for different 
situations. Whereas Intellectualists identify knowing how to do something with a fixed 
body of propositional knowledge, on the Interrogative Capacity view certain pieces of 
knowledge-how can be identified with an ability to generate an expanding set of situation-
                                                            
223 It is important that the idea that acting answers a how-to question is restricted to the 
descriptions under which action is intentional. When I raise my arm, I don’t necessarily answers 
concerning non-intentional aspects of my movement, such as the tightening of my muscles.  
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specific propositional knowledge.224 Someone exercising an Interrogative capacity is both 
doing and learning. If we think of the process of learning as being keyed in to the 
particular features of the practical situations at hand, then it will be natural to think of this 
expanding body of knowledge as being fairly heterogeneous, generating different 
knowledge to meet the needs of different situations. 
 
The Interrogative Capacity view also explains the connections between knowledge-
how, propositional knowledge, and the ability to do. Although the universal claims that 
knowledge-how always entails propositional knowledge or the ability to do are 
controversial, it is plausible that in central cases knowing how is connected with both 
being able, and knowing facts about the activity in question. It would be good to have 
explanations of these connections, and the Interrogative Capacity view is well positioned 
to do this. According to this view, knowledge-how will produce propositional knowledge 
as a product of its exercise. When someone who knows how to swim exercises their ability 
to generate answers to the question how to swim?, the result will be a piece of propositional 
knowledge about how to swim. This propositional knowledge may be temporary, and need 
not ever be consciously articulated, but it is plausible that at least some of the time it will 
make its way into an agent’s standing knowledge. As I pointed out above, there may also 
be cases in which having standing knowledge of an answer to a question suffices for 
having an interrogative capacity, meaning that knowledge-how is grounded in 
propositional knowledge. This view also predicts that knowledge-how has a close 
connection with a certain kind of ability to act. Since generating an answer to a practical 
question on the fly will involve successfully engaging in the relevant activity, an ability to 
generate practical answers will entail a certain kind of ability to successfully pull off the 
relevant kind of action. 
 
The Interrogative Capacity view also vindicates the idea that knowledge-how is the 
norm on intending. The idea behind KNI is that KNOWS-HOW should pick out a state 
that is a plausible standard of competence relating to enacting an intention. Although this 
standard need not guarantee that an agent will always succeed in pulling off their 
intentions, it should be the kind of thing that entails that an agent will normally be 
                                                            
224 Stanley claims that first-personal knowledge involves a disposition to acquire new propositional 
knowledge (2011b, pp. 182–3), but it is not clear that there are any non-know-how examples 
which display this phenomenon. 
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successful in normal environmental conditions. The capacity to answer a how-to question 
on the fly is a good candidate for this kind of state. Although one can be able to answer a 
question, and still fail to act, in normal environmental conditions, someone who has an 
ability to answer a how-to question on the fly will succeed in performing the relevant 
activity. If we buy Bratman’s idea that Intentions are typically partial plans, then the 
connection between KNI and the Interrogative Capacity view is even clearer. When we 
form an intention to V, we will typically leave open a set of how-to questions, concerning 
the fine details of our plan to V. What the combination of KNI and the Interrogative 
Capacity says is that when we leave open these how-to issues, we better right now be in a 
position to generate fine-grained answers to those smaller how-to questions, as part of our 
ability to answer the overall question how to V?.225 
 
 
5. Comparison 
 
In this final section, I compare the Interrogative Capacity account to some related 
views that appeal to abilities in order to understand knowledge and skill. I first consider 
how the Interrogative Capacity view relates to other views that understand knowledge to 
be a species of ability. I then compare this view to the views of skill offered by Dickie 
(2012) and Stanley and Williamson (2016). 
 
Although the most popular approach to analysing propositional knowledge has 
taken it be a species of belief, there is alternative approach that takes propositional 
knowledge (or even knowledge in general) to be a species of ability. Wittgenstein and Ryle 
both seem to claim that knowledge is a kind of ability (Ryle, 2009b, p. 117; Wittgenstein, 
2009 §150), and there are a number of views which develop this insight into an account of 
propositional knowledge. Kenny takes propositional knowledge to consist in the ability to 
adjust one’s behaviour to reach one’s goals (Kenny, 1989, p. 108), Hetherington identifies 
knowing that p with a concatenation of p-related abilities (Hetherington, 2011), and 
Hyman takes propositional knowledge to be the ability to act for the reason that p 
                                                            
225 What is the relation between the open how to questions, and the question how to V?? Following 
(Snedegar, MS.), I take them to be subquestions of how to V?. 
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(Hyman, 1999, 2015). Alan White even proposes that propositional knowledge in general 
is the ability to answer a question (White, 1982, pp. 29, 115–21).  
 
The existence of ability-based accounts of propositional knowledge opens up the 
possibility of a general account of knowledge in terms of ability. For example, putting 
together White’s ability-based view of knowledge-that with the Interrogative Capacity 
view would yield a general account of knowledge in terms of the ability to answer 
questions (see White, 1982, p. 29). Alternatively, if we take the ability to be guided by the 
facts to subsume the ability to answer a question (Hyman, 2015, p. 170), then we can pull 
a similar move with Hyman’s account, offering an account of knowledge in terms of a 
general kind of ability to be guided by the facts. These views have the virtue of 
explanatory unity, allowing us to posit a unified semantic value for ‘knows’ but I don’t 
think that the supporter of the Interrogative Capacity view need be committed to either 
view. Instead, one might think that knowledge is a somewhat disjunctive kind which 
encompassing both doxastic states, and abilities to answer questions.226 
 
Putting knowledge-that to one side, it is worth noting that there is a good case for 
taking other kinds of knowledge-wh to consist in the ability to answer the embedded 
question. This kind of account is noted by Masto (2010) and Michaelis (2011), and 
developed by Farkas (2016). As some first-pass linguistic evidence for this view note that 
it is easy to find habitual knowledge-wh ascriptions. Consider: 
 
(3) Paula knows where the best clubs are. 
 
Sentence (3) plausibly has a reading that says that Paula has the ability to generate 
knowledge of where the best clubs are in various locations.227  This seems to be good 
grounds for taking at least some knowledge-wh ascriptions to be made true by an 
interrogative capacity relating to the relevant wh-question. If knowledge-how and 
                                                            
226 Does the disjunctive view of knowledge need to be committed to the claim that ‘knows’ is 
ambiguous? I don’t think so. As Glick points out (2011, pp. 431–2) the claim that there are two 
kinds of knowledge does not entail the claim that ‘knows’ is ambiguous. Perhaps ‘knows’ has a 
semantic value which encompasses both doxastic and abilitative states. 
227 See (Stanley & Williamson, 2016). Farkas also gives cases in which it seems felicitous to assert 
that an agent knows-wh in cases in which they can easily access the answer to the question 
(Farkas, 2015, p. 112). I might say that A knows what his partner’s number is even if he can easily 
look it up. We might well think of the ascription as strictly false but pragmatically conveying that 
A will be able to tell you what the answer is. (Hawley, 2011, pp. 288–9; Stanley, 2011b, p. 180). 
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knowledge-wh turn out to be abilities to answer questions, then knowledge-wh turns out 
to be continuous other attitudes which are primarily attitudes to questions such as inquiry, 
wondering, and curiosity (on attitudes to question, see Friedman, 2013). 
 
Turning back to knowledge-how, let’s compare the version of the Interrogative 
Capacity view to the accounts of skill offered by Dickie and Stanley and Williamson. Both 
views appeal to certain kinds of abilities to generate propositional knowledge, but identify 
these capacities with skill rather than knowledge-how.  
 
Dickie (2012) sets out to defend a skill-first picture, on which skills are 
explanatorily prior to propositional knowledge. She endorses Stanley and Williamson’s 
Propositionalist account of knowledge-how — making her a Strong Intellectualist — but 
understands this knowledge as the by-product of the exercise of a skill. On her view, a skill 
at V-ing is a capacity to select reliable ways to V, and an act of V-ing counts as skilled just 
in case the agent Vs in way w because she recognises that acting in that particular way is a 
reliable way to V. Although on this view a skill is strictly a capacity relating to V-ing and 
thus not an Interrogative Capacity in my sense, Dickie argues that such a capacity will 
involve the generation of propositional knowledge as a by-product. The basic idea here is 
that skilled action of V-ing will involve a recognition which can be thought of as a belief of 
the form w is a reliable way to V, and that the reliability of a skill at V-ing provides a kind of 
practical justification for that proposition, doing the epistemic work of making that belief 
into knowledge.228 One way to think about this view is as a Strong Intellectualist account 
of knowledge-how combined with a virtue-theoretic account of knowledge-that, according 
to which knowledge-how is grounded in the exercise of skill. 
 
There’s a lot to unpack here, but this sketch of Dickie’s view should be enough to 
show her how view differs both from standard Strong Intellectualism, and from the 
Interrogative Capacity view. Whereas standard Strong Intellectualism treats knowledge-
how as a self-standing epistemic state, on Dickie’s view knowledge-how depends on skill. 
In this account, the notion of skill picks up the explanatory slack of explaining the 
distinctive practicality of knowledge-how, since for her skill has close connections to 
action. The crucial difference between Dickie’s view and the Interrogative Capacity view 
                                                            
228 See (Brogaard, 2011, pp. 147–9). 
 212 
is that whereas Dickie claims that skill is a capacity that generates propositional knowledge 
(which she calls knowledge-how), on the Interrogative Capacity view, knowledge-how is a 
capacity that generates propositional knowledge. Although this can seem like a mere 
verbal disagreement about what label to give to the relevant capacity to generate 
knowledge, I think that there are important issues that hang on this choice. For one thing, 
Dickie’s view entails that knowledge-how and skill are explanatorily connected, since for 
her knowledge-how is the product of the exercise of a skill. She is also committed to the 
claim that knowing how to do something entails having the skill of doing it. By contrast, 
the Interrogative capacity view doesn’t make any commitments about the relation between 
know-how and skill, and is compatible with there being cases of knowledge-how without 
skill, and vice versa.229  
 
Dickie’s equation of knowledge-how with the product of skill also causes problems 
for making sense of the temporal profile of knowledge-how, and threatens to make 
knowledge-how epiphenomenal.  
 
Knowing how to do something is a standing epistemic state. Someone who has 
learnt to V knows how to V throughout the time after learning, unless they forget. Dickie’s 
view has difficulty explaining this fact. It is clear that for her skill is a standing epistemic 
state: someone who has learnt the skill of V-ing will be able to select reliable methods for 
V-ing at any point afterwards, even when they are not actually exercising that capacity. 
However, on Dickie’s view knowledge-how is a by-product of the exercise of skill, 
generated at the time of action. There doesn’t seem to be any reason to suppose that this 
situation-specific knowledge will be maintained after action has finished, especially if this 
knowledge relies on first-person thought about one’s own action. On Dickie’s view, 
knowing how to do something looks a lot like knowing what you had for breakfast — you 
                                                            
229 What should the supporter of the Interrogative Capacity view think about the connection 
between knowledge-how and skill? According to what I take to be the default view of skill, being 
skilled at V-ing is just being able to V to some contextually supplied standard of goodness. In a 
certain sense, having the capacity to answer the question of how to V will be necessary for this 
kind of ability (at least if the contextual requirements for ‘know how’ are suitably low), but it will 
not be sufficient for it, (at least in cases where contextual standards are reasonably high). (Pavese, 
2016a, p. 646, 2016b, sec. 4). Other accounts allow for cases of knowledge-how without skill and 
vice versa. (Stanley & Krakauer, 2013) suggest that skill consists of propositional knowledge 
together with motor acuity, meaning that knowledge-how is not sufficient for skill, and 
(Weatherson, 2016) argues that skills and propositional knowledge come apart in both directions 
(meaning that if knowledge-how is propositional knowledge, then it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for skill). 
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can’t help but know what you are having for breakfast while you are eating it, but this 
knowledge is lost soon afterwards, simply because there is no reason to keep hold of it. 
The problem is that if knowledge-how is transient in this way, it is difficult to make sense 
of the idea that knowledge-how is a standing epistemic state that persists when the agent 
isn’t acting.230 If a skilled swimmer is sitting on the sofa, then their capacity to generate 
answers will be dormant, meaning that Dickie seems committed to thinking that they do 
not have occurrent knowledge how to swim. The Interrogative capacity view also has the 
consequence that the propositional knowledge that is the product of an interrogative 
capacity will be transient, but since this knowledge is not identified with knowledge how, 
its transience doesn’t undermine the idea that knowledge-how is a standing epistemic state. 
 
Dickie’s account also has trouble making sense of the explanatory significance of 
knowledge-how. It is a plausible Rylean thought that knowledge-how is the kind of state 
that one can use to explain intelligent action. The standard way for Intellectualists to 
understand this idea is by appealing to the idea that knowledge-how guides an agent 
toward successful action in virtue of representing a way to act successfully (Bengson & 
Moffett, 2011b; Stanley, 2011b, pp. 175–7; Stanley & Williamson, 2016). Dickie explicitly 
repudiates the idea that knowledge-how guides intelligent action, instead explaining 
intelligent action in terms of skill. However, she doesn’t offer any other account of the 
explanatory significance of knowledge-how, which leaves knowledge-how looking like a 
mere epiphenomenal by-product of skill. Effectively this means that she ends up with the 
same problem about accounting for the distinctive practicality of knowledge-how that is 
faced by standard Strong Intellectualism. If the connection between knowledge-how and 
intelligent action is meant to be constitutive of the state of knowing-how, then we should 
identify knowledge-how with whatever explains skilful action. If Dickie is right, and it the 
interrogative capacities which are the explanatorily significant states, then we should 
identify these states with knowledge how. 
 
Stanley and Williamson also offer a Strong Intellectualist view that gives a central 
role to skill (Stanley & Williamson, 2016).Like Dickie, Stanley and Williamson claim that 
skill generates propositional knowledge, and they identify this propositional knowledge 
with knowing how. However they treat a skill as a capacity to know, rather than as a 
                                                            
230 See also (Farkas, 2016). 
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capacity to do, meaning that they explicitly treat skill as a kind of interrogative capacity. On 
their view a skill at V-ing generates propositional knowledge about V-ing relating to both 
how, and other wh-questions, and this propositional knowledge then guides action, 
meaning that skill only manifests indirectly in action. For example, if I am a skilled 
conversationalist on this view, I possess a capacity to generate knowledge of the answers to 
range of practical questions — when to speak, how to be polite, and so on — and while 
speaking, I will generate knowledge to these answers which will guide me in what I say. 
One way to think about this view is as a kind of particularism about intelligent judgement 
(Stanley, 2011b, pp. 181–5). This view allows that intelligent action requires situation-
specific judgements that cannot be subsumed under general rules, but it still claims that 
these situation-specific judgements are expressed in propositional knowledge and that 
intelligent action is guided by propositional knowledge encapsulating these judgements. As 
with Dickie’s view, the notion of skill seems to play the role of filling in missing element of 
practicality in the Strong Intellectualist view, downplaying the significance of knowledge-
how in explaining skilled action. 
 
Although Stanley and Williamson’s updated view is even closer to the Interrogative 
Capacity view than Dickie’s, I think that there remain important differences that provide 
reason to prefer the Interrogative Capacity view. Stanley and Williamson face the same 
worry as Dickie about explaining the temporal profile of knowledge-how, and their 
account relies on the controversial idea that intelligent action is guided by propositional 
knowledge. 
 
 Stanley and Williamson’s view shares with Dickie’s the commitment to thinking 
that skill is a standing general epistemic state, whereas knowledge-how is fine-grained 
propositional knowledge produced to meet the demands of the situation.231 Since this 
knowledge is not possessed before one encounters a practical situation, there does not 
seem to be reason for thinking that it will be maintained after one leaves these situations, 
making this knowledge transient. This means that Stanley and Williamson also face the 
problem of explaining the idea that knowledge-how is possessed at every time after 
                                                            
231 Stanley and Williamson don’t directly discuss the granularity of this knowledge, but they do 
make comments which suggest that they take it to be fairly fine-grained. They say: ‘the 
manifestations1 of skill are situation specific. Skill at conversation is a disposition when one is in a 
conversation s to know at the time of s facts appropriate to guiding actions relevant to s.’ (Stanley & 
Williamson, 2016). 
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learning, rather than just at the times at which an agent is actually exercising her skill. I 
cannot see any way for them to resolve this problem, other than to offer an argument for 
the implausible claim that this highly situation-specific knowledge is retained after it is 
generated to meet the demands of a particular practical situation. 
 
 One respect in which Stanley and Williamson’s account does better than Dickie’s is 
that they do have an account of the relation between knowledge-how and intelligent 
action: they can appeal to the standard Intellectualist idea that intelligent action is action 
guided by propositional knowledge (Stanley, 2011b, p. viii). Although Stanley and 
Williamson seem happy to endorse this claim as a means of displaying their robustly 
Intellectualist credentials, it remains extremely controversial. By contrast, because the 
Interrogative capacity view identifies knowledge-how with the interrogative capacity that 
generates propositional knowledge, it can remain neutral about whether skill is action 
guided by propositional knowledge. The Interrogative Capacity view can allow both cases 
in which an agent generates knowledge of a method that guides their action, and cases in 
which the agent muddles through and only generates knowledge of the method once action 
is finished. Consider again the various ways in which one can work out how to solve a 
maths problem. Sometimes it is possible to just see what the method for solving a maths 
problem is, but in other cases one needs to work through various parts of the problem in 
order to work out how to solve it. On the Interrogative capacity view it is possible to say 
that the agent in the first case is being guided by her propositional knowledge, whereas the 
agent in the second case is not guided by propositional knowledge, but is intelligent in 
virtue of the exercise of her capacity to generate answers to the question of how to solve 
this class of maths problems.232 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The debate about the nature of knowledge-how has contrasted understanding 
knowledge-how as a kind of ability and understanding it to be a relation to a set of 
propositions. In this chapter, I have shown that the impression of a fundamental 
disagreement between these two views is misleading, and is driven by a failure to clearly 
                                                            
232 This is rather different to the standard criticism of Intellectualism about skill, which suggests 
that intelligent action is never guided by propositional knowledge. See (Dreyfus, 2014). 
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distinguish between claims about the object and relation of knowledge-how. This two-
debate framework allows us to see that the logical space in this debate is somewhat richer 
than has often been supposed, and opens up the space for various compromise positions.  
The second half of this chapter develops a compromise account of knowledge-how: the 
Interrogative Capacity view, which claims that knowledge-how is an ability to activate 
knowledge of the answers to how-to questions on the fly.  I have argued that this account 
is a happy compromise between standard versions of Intellectualism and Anti-
Intellectualism, combining the strengths of each, whilst avoiding their respective problems.  
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